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Abstract 
Making sense of change: 
An urban ethnography of middle-class narratives of uncertainty 
in Almaty, Kazakhstan 
 
Alexander James Parkyn-Smith 
 
This urban ethnography focuses on the new generation of young urban middle-class 
people in Almaty, Kazakhstan, who have grown up after the Soviet Union. It examines 
how they respond to the dramatic social, economic, political, and environmental 
changes their country has undergone since 1991. A close analysis of their distinct way 
of life, in comparison to both their parents’ generation and the wider public, provides an 
insight into the social strategies they employ to make sense of change in the context of 
their everyday lives. This research, based on fieldwork carried out between 2014 and 
2017, is an original study, addressing the question: How do Almaty’s urban middle-
class population make sense of change? 
 
I argue that young urban middle-class people in Almaty, Kazakhstan perform a public 
narrative of their lives, providing their everyday existence with a sense of structure, 
stability, and coherence in the face of past societal change and the risk of further change 
in the future. However, ruptures in everyday life—such as a flood, earthquake, currency 
devaluation, or even a marriage—expose vulnerabilities of this young generation that 
are only discussed in private contexts. To overcome their growing uncertainty about the 
reliability of public narratives, my informants increasingly rely on their trusted social 
relations of kinship and friendship networks. When these channels are exhausted, my 
informants turn to alternative discursive techniques, such as rumour, to discuss private 
concerns in public contexts without undermining their own public narratives. 
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Preface: 
Narratives, rupture, and uncertainty 
 
Nuriya was 23 years old when we first met. Born in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, she had grown up in an independent Republic of Kazakhstan and had attended 
university in Almaty. She is an ethnic Kazakh, tall with a slim build and shoulder-length 
brown hair. I met her at her workplace, where she was greeting guests at an international 
business networking event that my host was running at a restaurant in downtown 
Almaty. We chatted and found that we shared an interest in photography. A few days 
later I joined a group of her friends on a photoshoot in the frozen snow of Gorky Park, 
also in downtown Almaty. Over the course of my 18 months of fieldwork we became 
good friends, and Nuriya also became one of the young urban middle-class informants I 
will focus on in my thesis. We would often go on long afternoon walks, traversing the 
city while discussing the news, topics that had emerged in my interviews, or her 
thoughts and feelings about Kazakhstan, the city of Almaty, her neighbourhood, and her 
family. 
 
A few weeks into my fieldwork, Nuriya and I met for tea at the apartment where she 
lived in the southwest of Almaty, a few blocks’ walk from where I was staying. Her 
mother, Nurbakyt, had set aside a few hours to sit with us and take part in an informal 
interview. Nurbakyt is an ethnic Kazakh and was in her mid-60s at the time. She has 
three daughters and was living in this one-bedroom apartment with Nuriya, the 
youngest; Nurbakyt slept in the living room on a foldout sofa. Nurbakyt spoke in both 
Russian and Kazakh about her life as Nuriya helped to translate, creating a picture of 
her upbringing, education, work, the birth of her daughter, and her thoughts about the 
present. 
 
Nurbakyt presented a coherent story of her life as a response to my interest as a 
researcher, but this was also something she wanted to do; she told me that ‘it needs to be 
shared’. She began, ‘I was born in the Karagandy region, near the small town of 
Satpaev in the village of Jishchi. I am one of seven children and I have a twin sister. My 
parents worked at a mail point [a stop on the train or road network where post would be 
sorted for onward travel, delivery, or collection] and that is where I grew up’. Nurbakyt 
went to school in Tashkent in 1963, then attended the National Women’s Teacher 
Training University in Almaty. She told me, ‘I felt afraid when I first came to Almaty. I 
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was afraid to get lost, as the city was big and I didn’t have local friends here’. Nurbakyt 
made a point of saying that the city had changed, commenting, ‘Almaty has got much 
bigger. I think it got a little more dangerous as people came to the city: there are more 
cars and a bigger population’. Nurbakyt also compared her experience as a student with 
present-day student life, remarking that ‘there were no entertainment centres as there are 
now’. She recalled that students entertained themselves at one another’s homes rather 
than at ‘restaurants and bars in the city’. When Nurbakyt had finished her training at 
university, she was sent to a small village in the steppe to work as a teacher. She met her 
future husband Rinat there; he was also working in the village. Despite the difficult 
living conditions, ‘there were no hard times, actually; no sad memories, it was all fun 
and lovely and nice’. 
 
However, Nurbakyt then described that she faced significant change in her life during ‘a 
hard time when the Soviet Union was destroyed’. The family was forced to find new 
employment: Nurbakyt went to work in a kindergarten, and because he couldn’t find a 
job as a teacher, Rinat went to work in a mine, then at the factory that produced 
explosives for the mine. Nurbakyt described the difficulties Kazakhstan faced in the 
1990s, many of which were experienced in everyday life in the form of rationing via 
coupons for goods such as bread and milk. ‘These were the most difficult years, from 
1992 to 1996’, she told me. 
 
Nurbakyt’s narrative ties together significant life events: her birth and early life at the 
mail point with her parents; her move to Almaty, where she trained as a teacher before 
being deployed by the state; and her life in a small village, where she met the man who 
would become her husband and Nuriya’s father. The end of the Soviet Union is marked 
as a significant point in her life during which she and her husband were forced to find 
new employment, compounded by the great difficulties she faced between 1992 and 
1996. This was also the time when Nuriya was born. 
 
Commenting on the present, Nurbakyt laughed away the threat of a major earthquake, 
externalising it from the narrative of her life by telling me, ‘People are always talking 
about a really strong earthquake, but it never happens while we are living’. A more 
pressing concern for her was the end of Nazarbayev’s period as the leader of the nation, 
a problem for which she had no solution. The literature up until the mid-2010s has 
focused on this generation, who grew up with one way of life and were then forced to 
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adapt to a significantly different way of life. However, that generation is not the focus of 
this thesis.  
 
For the narrative of my thesis, the significant event in Nurbakyt’s story is the birth of 
Nuriya. It marks a new life story: that of a post-Soviet generation. I explore the lives of 
this generation, who have grown up in independence-era Kazakhstan after the end of the 
Soviet Union and who, as a result of their recent coming of age, have not yet been the 
focus of anthropological enquiry. I argue that an anthropological analysis is able to offer 
insight into this society through the eyes of a distinct group who are approaching life in 
a new and dynamic way. This new way of living has its own issues, which I uncover in 
my analysis throughout the main chapters of this dissertation. In my conclusion, I detail 
some of the ways in which the young urban middle class are tackling the issues that 
their new way of life has forced them to confront. Nuriya’s story, which she told me just 
after we first met, gives us an example of the lives of this distinct group. 
 
Nuriya grew up in the village of Satpaev and has ‘memories of the family going 
together to the public baths during the summer months’. The family moved to Almaty 
when Nuriya was a teenager, and she enrolled at a private university, one of a host of 
new institutions sponsored by international businesses and set up in the city to offer an 
alternative to state-run universities. Nuriya ‘majored in marketing’ and had spent time 
‘on a live-and-work scheme in Chicago’ in the United States. Her friends I met at the 
photoshoot also went to Chicago, and this is how they knew each other. Nuriya 
graduated from university and has worked in marketing and sales for a popular 
restaurant chain as well as a large coffee firm in Almaty. She said that she works at the 
international networking event in order to meet people and make connections. When I 
asked about her about memories of change in the country, she told me, ‘As I remember, 
it has always been the same in Kazakhstan. It is an international country and many 
nationalities live here. They all live together in peace. They are all friendly to each 
other’. 
 
In many ways, Nuriya’s story appears underwhelming. While Nurbakyt told me about 
the difficulties she faced—being afraid when she first arrived in Almaty, the increasing 
danger she felt in the city since then, the difficulties of life in a small village, and the 
hard times experienced between 1992 and 1996—Nuriya only recounted the memories 
of the good times she spent together with her family. The aspects of her life Nuriya 
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shared with me are markers of a particular type of middle-class success: reaching the 
goals of a career in business marketing. Nuriya told a simple story of her life, of success 
and stability. When asked about the country, she repeated a mantra I heard repeated on 
many occasions throughout my time in Kazakhstan: a narrative of ethnic harmony 
reproduced in the present by the state as part of a multi-ethnic nation-building agenda, 
but rooted in Soviet social policies introduced in the 1930s (see Chapter 5). There 
appears to be nothing remarkable, or of much interest to the anthropologist, in Nuriya’s 
story—at least that is what I thought until one hot summer evening, six months after we 
first met, as she and I were walking through a park bordering the president’s former 
residence in downtown Almaty. 
 
We looked high above us to the corniced façade of a monumental white-marble-clad 
neoclassical building. Towering 20 metres above us were thin metal frames: two 
scaffolding towers joined by long planks stacked atop one another, spanning a wide gap. 
Precariously supported at each end, the towers held the weight of two construction 
workers who moved with one foot in front of the other, a brush and tin of paint in hand. 
I commented on my mother’s job as a health and safety inspector in the UK civil service 
and said that she would have a heart attack if she saw how they were working, adding 
that it must be so dangerous working in construction here in Almaty.  
 
Nuriya was quiet for a moment. ‘My dad died at work. There was an accident in the 
factory. It was years ago, but we are only now coming to an agreement with the 
company for a settlement. After he died we moved to Almaty and that’s why I live with 
my mom, as I am the youngest daughter’. 
 
This fact came as a revelation to me as a researcher. It was a missing piece in both 
Nurbakyt and Nuriya’s stories. It was absent from the public narratives that had been 
shared with me up until then, and its presence marked a difference between public and 
private life stories. It was only after building our friendship and trust that Nuriya felt 
that she was in a position to share this painful personal trauma with me. The death of 
her father has different consequences when placed into either Nurbakyt or Nuriya’s 
stories. Nurbakyt’s narrative connects and makes sense of a life progression through a 
series of challenges and changes; the death of her husband explains the reason behind 
her current circumstances, including a move to Almaty and away from the place where 
her husband had worked. The traumatic experience of her husband’s death was left out 
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of her narrative, which instead concentrated on how difficulties were overcome. 
Conversely, Nuriya’s story of her life, as she had presented it to me up until this point, 
was devoid of significant change, difficulties, or uncertainty. This piece of private 
information revealed the presence of two distinct narratives: the first public and the 
second private. The death of Nuriya’s father was an aspect of her personal life narrative 
that she did not share in public. Her disclosure to me marked a turning point in our 
friendship when I moved from recording a public-facing narrative of Nuriya’s life to 
opening up a discussion of her private uncertainties and concerns—the content of which 
I will discuss further in Chapter 6.  
 
This disclosure also marked a turning point in my research. It upended my thinking, 
exposing a tangle of questions which I could apply to many of the other narratives and 
stories I was being told. From this point on, this thesis began to unpick these strands. 
The story of Nuriya’s narrative itself is the premise on which I build my argument, 
asking: What can this difference tell us about the public and private narratives of the 
young urban middle class? How do these narratives differ from those of an older 
generation? Does this public-versus-private narrative apply to other instances? Why was 
this information not included in the public narrative, and what are the consequences of 
this? 
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Introduction 
Making Sense of Change: 
An urban ethnography of middle-class narratives of uncertainty  
in Almaty, Kazakhstan 
 
In this dissertation, I seek to understand how Almaty’s young urban middle-class 
population make sense of change. This covers the enduring influence of different periods 
of change on my informants, including the historical changes faced by their ancestors and 
relatives as narrated to me, and the experience of living during the Soviet era under 
different Soviet leaders. My young informants experienced the dramatic change that 
came with the collapse of the Soviet Union; the difficulties and hardships faced in the 
1990s; and, finally, the uncertainty of a fragile present. This period of relative stability 
and security is talked about in private as being precarious and uncertain as the accuracy 
of public narratives—both officially disseminated narratives and those of my 
informants—is called into question. As a result, my informants perceive an increase in 
risk and uncertainty in the present and near-future. My analysis contextualises and 
contrasts my informants’ experience in relation to others they interact with, including 
their friends, family, and other members of the urban population.  
 
My argument is that the young urban middle class in Almaty, Kazakhstan is a distinct and 
understudied demographic group, occupying a unique position in society. The way in 
which they narrate their lives in public reinforces a performative middle-class identity 
that promotes a sense of security, stability, and coherence in opposition to the dramatic 
changes of the past and the risk of further upheaval in the near future. In the preface, I 
described how, after months of building a trusted relationship with Nuriya, it was only 
then that she revealed that her father had died, evidencing a private narrative that was at 
odds with her public presentation of self. I detail further examples throughout the 
dissertation, going further to argue that when events threaten to expose the superficiality 
of public narratives and reveal uncertainties discussed in private contexts, my informants 
turn to novel discursive techniques, such as rumour, to be able to discuss these private 
uncertainties in public contexts without undermining their own public narratives or 
openly challenging official government narratives. I therefore focus on my informants’ 
narratives of uncertainty and how they are used to make sense of change. 
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Almaty: Background 
 
Kazakhstan is the ninth largest country in the world, yet it is still relatively unknown 
and understood in the West. This vast country covers many ecological zones, including 
mountains, steppe, and desert. There is a severe continental climate with extreme lows 
of -45º Celsius in the winter and high temperatures of up to 50º Celsius in the summer 
months. My research was carried out in and around the city of Almaty, in the 
southeastern corner of Kazakhstan, close to the mountainous border with Kyrgyzstan 
and 300 kilometres from a border crossing into Northwest China (Image 1.1). In 
Chapter 3, I include a detailed map of the city of Almaty and locate my research 
activities in the context of the city districts (Image 3.1). Almaty is built in a seismically 
active area, and there are multiple faults running under the city which have the potential 
to cause significant earthquakes. The city has suffered in the past from major 
earthquakes in 1867 and 1911. The city is also vulnerable to flooding from the multiple 
river channels that cross the city, as well as to landslides and mudflows from the steep 
slopes in the southern edge of the city that rise up into the Tian Shan mountain range. 
 
 
Image 1.1: Map of Kazakhstan showing the location of Almaty and the names of 
countries that share a land border. The base map is copyright OpenStreetMap 
contributors used under Creative Commons License 2.0. 
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I originally set out to undertake research into local perceptions of seismic risk in 
Almaty, but the threat of an inevitable, unpredictable, and devastating earthquake turned 
out to be just one of many risks which threatened my informants living there. The 
former capital of Kazakhstan from 1927 to 1997, Almaty has experienced rapid and 
dramatic changes since its inception. In 1867 the Russian krepost (fort) of Verny was 
built as part of the Orenburg line of military fortifications to protect the farthest 
frontiers of the Russian empire (Alexander, Buchli, and Humphrey, 2007, p. 76). 
Following the Bolshevik Revolution, Almaty (then named Alma-Ata) became one of 
the main urban centres of Central Asia. With that role in the region came flows of 
people, goods, and industries. This included the migration of a large ethnic Russian 
population to the city: soldiers’ families moved to live with them, and others came to 
supply the fort with goods and services and to benefit from the trade opportunities 
offered on this stop on a branch of the Silk Road to China. This led to the expansion of 
the town built adjacent to the fort.  
 
Following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, political influence shifted. In the 1930s, 
large-scale policies such as collectivisation and sedentarisation were enacted, which had 
a devastating impact on rural populations in the region and led to rapid urbanisation and 
chronic housing shortages in the city. The demographic composition of the city further 
changed as a result of Stalin’s forced movement of ethnic groups, including Volga 
Germans and Koreans, to Central Asia, explored further in Chapter 6. During the Great 
Patriotic War (World War II), major industries were moved away from the fighting 
front to places such as Almaty to protect them from being destroyed or seized by the 
enemy. This led to an expansion of the industrial areas of the city and the migration of a 
skilled management class to the city in order to run and manage these industries; I will 
return to this group below in a discussion of the origins of a Soviet middle class. 
Following the end of the war, there were further significant population movements, 
resulting in increasing diversity in the ethnic makeup of the city.  
 
During the 1960s, many Uighurs came over the border from China to escape Mao’s 
Cultural Revolution (see Chapter 6), exacerbating an ongoing housing crisis. In order to 
deal with these housing issues, Khrushchev began a large-scale Khrushchevka 
construction programme (see Chapter 3). Khrushchevka are large housing blocks made 
of prefabricated concrete panels that are built in factories and shipped to sites for 
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construction. Normally between three and five storeys high, Khrushchevka were built to 
similar specifications across the Soviet Union and have become a well-known marker of 
Soviet urban development from Crimea to Vladivostok. Under this programme, a 
significant proportion of the city was built, particularly the mikro-raion (housing 
districts made up of clusters of Khrushchevka) in which many of my young urban 
middle-class informants lived. 
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan became independent, 
and economic and political influence shifted away from Moscow to the newly 
independent republics. In common with much of the rest of the Soviet Union, there was 
a fairly wholesale privatisation of state assets such as housing and industry (see Chapter 
2). The 1990s were a difficult time in Almaty, with skyrocketing crime, high 
unemployment, and a shortage of goods as state-run supply-and-demand networks 
collapsed. The everyday realities of this time of dramatic change have been discussed in 
Nazpary’s 2002 ethnography Post-Soviet Chaos, in which he describes his informants’ 
experiences of bardak (chaos) and diki-kapitalism (‘wild capitalism’), which he argues 
characterised the city during this time.  
 
As a result of Russian imperial and then Soviet influence in Almaty, it remains a 
predominantly Russophone city today. The Kazakh language is gaining increasing 
importance, as the promotion of Kazakh culture is a central part of the Kazakh state’s 
nation-building agenda. Many other languages can be heard spoken across the city, 
including Uighur, Tatar, Uzbek, Dungan, and Kyrgyz, as well as English in some 
business contexts. I will indicate when different languages were spoken in relation to 
my research; for example, there are separate Uighur- and Kazakh-language mosques 
(Chapter 6), and some of my informants chose to speak in English during the focus 
groups discussed in Chapter 5. There are many different ethnicities living in Almaty; 
the reasons for and consequences of this diversity in the context of my thesis are 
explored in more detail in Chapter 6.  
 
With significant oil, gas, and raw-mineral reserves, Kazakhstan has weathered much of 
the tumultuous change seen over the last 30 years to emerge as a middle-income 
economy in the 21st century. Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s president from 1992 
to 2019, heralded these economic gains as the greatest achievement of his presidency, 
so much so that in his January 2014 address to the nation, he declared, ‘Kazakhstan of 
 19 
the 21st century is a country created from scratch in just two decades by talented, 
hardworking, and tolerant people’ (Nazarbayev, 2014). In public media narratives on 
television, radio, and the internet, the government emphasises the security and stability 
offered to those living in Kazakhstan by the Kazakh state and frames it within a context 
of regional political and economic instability. The beneficiaries of the government’s 
efforts are to be an urban middle class. In the same address to the nation, Nazarbayev 
cited a growing middle class and increased urbanisation—from 55 per cent to 70 per 
cent of the population during his presidency—as concrete indicators of social-sector 
development as outlined in the government’s Kazakhstan 2050 development agenda 
(Nazarbayev, 2014). Without definition, however, it remains unclear who exactly the 
middle class are in Kazakhstan. 
 
 
A middle class 
 
In this thesis, I focus on Almaty’s urban middle class, in particular the younger 
generation who have grown up after the Soviet Union. An urban middle class is not 
simply a post-Soviet invention, and their origins have been theorised as developing 
during the Soviet era. 
 
Vera Dunham coined the term ‘Big Deal’ to refer to a ‘tacit concordat […] formed by 
the Soviet leadership with the resilient middle class’ who had emerged in the 1930s and 
established themselves by the end of World War II (Dunham, 1990 [1977], p. 5). 
Dunham argues that following the war, there was a burgeoning need for a technical and 
managerial workforce; as a result, the Soviet leadership tolerated the presence of a 
middle class in society where ‘material incentives increasingly displaced moral 
incentives’ (ibid., p. 5; Millar, 1985, p. 694). Dunham argues that there are three 
possible definitions of the middle class. First, they can be considered a ‘statistical entity 
in the stratification of the society by income, wealth, or occupation’—that is, those 
between the extremes of a working class and a ruling elite. Second, they may have ‘an 
attachment to specific values, a way of life which partly crosscuts differences in 
position, of occupation and of income’ (Dunham, 1990, p. 4). Dunham considers the 
third definition of a Soviet middle class along the lines of the concept of meshchantsvo, 
which she describes as commonly used in two ways: either to refer to the ‘climbing 
careerism of the newly rich’ or the ‘complacent vegetation’ of those with money (ibid., 
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p. 19). Perhaps most importantly for this thesis, both of these groups are predominantly 
associated with urban contexts. 
 
Millar (1985) argues that following the Big Deal came the Little Deal, an agreement 
between Leonid Brezhnev (General Secretary of the Communist Party between 1964 
and 1982) and the Soviet people. Millar argues that ‘the rhetoric of Bolshevism 
continued, of course, to glorify self-sacrifice, collectivism, and egalitarianism, but these 
goals, like a particular kind of optical illusion, retreated farther and farther into the 
future with each new official pronouncement’ (Millar 1985, p. 694). Instead, Millar 
explains, these values were gradually replaced as ‘Brezhnev struck up a new but tacit 
bargain with the urban population: to tolerate the expansion of a range of petty private 
economic activities’ (ibid., p. 697). A middle class had taken root, but its form was ill 
defined and it was maintained through unofficial and private flows of goods, favours, 
and assistance. Millar suggests that ‘kinship and friendship reciprocity networks were 
one of the ways that the private goods started to move’ (ibid.). This is a key point, as 
these flows are echoed throughout this thesis in the private lives of my young urban 
middle-class informants. In the conclusion, I discuss how their utility is again drawn 
upon in the present as a vehicle not for goods and services, but for trusted information. 
 
By the late 1980s, it was clear that Soviet ideology was being followed in very different 
ways from the early days of the Soviet Union under Lenin and then Stalin. Yurchak 
(2003) describes how as early as the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet public took a 
pragmatic approach to socialism: an appearance of socialism was maintained while 
everyday practices continued to change out of sight of the public gaze. He argues that 
these changes became visible with Gorbachev and the policies of perestroika 
(restructuring) and glasnost (openness). Alongside the collapse of the Soviet Union 
came the upheaval of society and a shift towards neoliberal economic policies and 
greater consumerism. This occurred due to the influence of a complex array of parties, 
including Western governments and companies, the governments of the newly 
independent republics, and non-state actors—such as local criminals and politicians—
who used the privatisation of state assets as an opportunity to consolidate and formalise 
their influence through securing monopolies in key industries. These individuals 
emerged as a new class of super-rich oligarchs, one aspect of an increasing inequality 
and the expansion of a hierarchical structure in post-Soviet societies including 
Kazakhstan. 
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The discussion of the middle class diversifies after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Jennifer Patico (2008) argues that there was no single post-Soviet middle class that 
could be studied as a coherent entity; she titles her ethnography ‘Consumption and 
Social Change among a Post-Soviet Middle-Class’ [emphasis added] to indicate that 
divergent practices emerged in different former Soviet places. Told through the lens of a 
cohort of teachers, Patico’s description of the middle class in St Petersburg is focused 
on a group who are the age of my informants’ parents’ generation; Patico’s fieldwork 
was carried out between 1993 and 1999. Patico argues that for this generation, ‘what it 
meant to be “middle-class” was extremely uncertain’ and therefore for this group, 
‘coming of age under conditions of Soviet modernity led them to expect a certain kind 
of “middle-class” identity’. However, what they actually found was that it was 
‘increasingly difficult to conceive of themselves that way given their positions in a new 
market in commodities and labor’ (Patico, 2008, p. 13). It is important to note here that 
this generation grew up in the Soviet era. In this thesis, I show how the younger 
generation—those who have grown up after the Soviet Union—have overcome this 
uncertainty in public to appear confident in their public middle-class identity, although I 
argue that uncertainty is all too present in their private lives. What is most relevant to 
this dissertation is Patico’s definition of the middle class. She cites Liechty to support 
the assertion that being middle class is ‘an essentially performative and narrative 
phenomenon’, adding that ‘it refers not to a demographically locatable category of 
people but to a set of moral and material aspirations and orientations’ (ibid., p. 13 
[Leichty, 2003]). The definition of ‘middle class’ I use in this thesis focuses on these 
key elements: performance, narrative, and moral and material aspirations. This 
definition is explored and augmented throughout the thesis, specifically in relation to 
my theoretical approach to the performance of narrative in the literature review 
(Chapter 2) and more generally in conjunction with my analysis in Chapters 3, 5, 6, and 
7. 
 
 
Growing up after the Soviet Union 
 
I use the term ‘young’ to indicate a specific cohort who have grown up after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, but I have avoided using the collapse of the Soviet Union as a 
marker of belonging to this group. Many of my informants were born in the five or so 
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years before the collapse, but share the particular narrative performances and moral and 
material aspirations as those born in the early 1990s. This generation, some of whom 
may have been young children when Kazakhstan became independent, have spent their 
formative years growing up after the Soviet Union. Therefore, in the thesis I focus on 
those informants between the ages of 18 and 35 as a young-adult cohort. In Chapter 3, I 
contrast their perspective with that of their parents’ generation; in Chapter 4, I consider 
their perspectives in the context of the wider urban population; and in Chapters 5, 6, and 
7, I focus on how this generation lives and the consequences of their way of life. 
 
 
Moral and material aspirations 
 
According to Patico’s (2008) definition above, the middle class are defined not only by 
their performance and narrative (which I will discuss in more detail), but also their 
moral and material aspirations. This can be seen in what they are performing in public 
surroundings and narratives. My young informants strive for a set of moral aspirations: 
democratic representation in society, freedom of expression, and a correlation between 
hard work and personal reward. My young informants associate these moral aspirations 
with the system of governance and way of life in international contexts, including 
Europe and the United States; as such, they often take their understanding of life in 
these other places as a model for their behaviour. Presenting these qualities becomes an 
important aspect to be performed in their public-facing personas and narratives.  
 
The material aspirations of the young generation include outward symbols of 
consumerism such as branded clothing, accessories, and expensive cars (see Chapter 5). 
The other side to these material aspirations is the public presentation of success through 
social-media apps such as Instagram, Facebook, and VKontakt, a Russian-language 
alternative to Facebook with greater emphasis on streaming and sharing music and 
films. To meet these ends, the young generation, like many of their contemporaries 
around the world, are using their smartphones to snap pictures that are then shared to 
create the impression of material success and wealth. International travel, going to 
clubs, and even buying a branded coffee have become moments where pictures can be 
shared to reinforce a public perception of a certain way of life; see Chapter 5 for a more 
detailed analysis and further examples from my informants. 
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Onstage/offstage and public/private 
 
Following Patico’s (2008) definition of the middle class, which includes the key 
elements of performance and narrative, I have adopted theoretical tools from the 
literature which have helped me to understand how these elements of middle-class 
identity play out in everyday life. In the literature review (Chapter 2), I consider the 
anthropological study of narrative in context and in greater detail. Here, however, I will 
clarify how and why I use the particular terms ‘onstage’ and ‘offstage’ when referring to 
public and private contexts. These terms are integral to my argument and are frequently 
used throughout this thesis. 
 
My definition of these terms is grounded in Erving Goffman’s (1959) work The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Goffman lays out a dramaturgical theory of social 
interaction which uses the language of the theatre and performance, including terms 
related to both verbal and non-verbal communication, to analyse social behaviour 
(Goffman, 1959, p. 16). The basis of his argument is that in social situations, individuals 
are performing roles as part of a wider performance, where social expectations set the 
boundaries of different roles in a given context. Goffman defines ‘front’ as being the 
context in which performances are occurring; his example of a stage highlights the 
material qualities of the environment—the set—which help inform individuals of the 
type of performance that may be expected in this context (ibid., p. 33). Individual fronts 
are the performances expected in a particular social environment or set of 
circumstances. According to Goffman, ‘we often find a division into back region, where 
the performance of a routine is prepared, and front region, where the performance is 
presented’ (ibid., p. 231). 
 
Goffman’s ideas have proven useful tools for anthropologists thinking about social 
interaction. For example, James Scott (1985) extends the metaphor of a dramaturgical 
performance to understand the ways that different ‘transcripts’, or shared narratives, are 
formed in the context of his field site, the Malaysian village of Sadakah. In particular, 
he considers how an awareness of whether transcripts are ‘onstage’ and public, or 
‘offstage’ and hidden, can be used by those who are dominated within an unequal social 
power structure as a way to coordinate and organise resistance against their oppressors. 
Scott’s argument is that there is a distinction between ‘public, power-laden situations’ 
and ‘the comparative safety of offstage privacy’; this is a closer description of the 
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situation in Almaty than the examples Goffman uses, which discuss the combination of 
roles within a social establishment such as a school, prison, or workplace (Scott, 1985, 
p. 25). 
 
In order to explore the concepts of onstage and offstage in the context of my field site in 
Almaty, it is important to discuss the various meanings of the terms ‘public’ and 
‘private’, which I will also use throughout this thesis, and provide some examples to 
illustrate how these terms differ from ‘onstage’ and ‘offstage’. When I use the term 
‘public’ in this thesis, I am referring to places and spaces shared with others who may 
not be directly known or trusted by an individual. In the context of my thesis, ‘public’ 
includes Almaty’s streets, shopping centres (Chapter 4), markets, coffee shops (Chapter 
5), restaurants, bars, clubs, public transport, parks, and more broadly online spaces such 
as message boards and comment sections on news articles (Chapter 4). 
 
An important distinction is the alternative meaning of the term ‘public’ to indicate 
ownership. As Catherine Alexander notes, during the Soviet era everything was publicly 
owned, and therefore using ‘public’ and ‘private’ to distinguish different spaces or 
places may be problematic (Alexander, 2009a, p. 12). Instead, Alexander distinguishes 
between ‘public’ and ‘domestic space’, a description which is more akin to ‘onstage’ 
and ‘offstage’ as it distinguishes places and spaces according to the different narratives, 
similar to what Scott terms ‘transcripts’, that are used in those contexts (ibid., p. 12). 
Scott explains how different transcripts are produced in different social situations, 
giving the examples of how ‘the transcript of the factory manager speaking with his 
workers is different from the transcript when he is in the safety of his own club; the 
transcript of the slave owner dealing with his slaves is different from his unguarded 
remarks to other slaveholders over dinner’ (Scott, 1985, p. 288). In this thesis, I discuss 
not only what is said, but also where and when it is said—this context is key to 
understanding how my informants make sense of change in everyday life. 
 
In Kazakhstan, most public contexts are subject to the controls of the state, but there are 
many subtleties to how, when, and where the state enforces its control. Protest in public 
places is severely punished and indicates a wider restriction on freedom of expression 
(Chapter 7). As my informants explain in Chapter 5 while discussing which sources of 
information they trust, they view the media as heavily censored by the state; 
newspapers, TV, and radio cannot be considered places of public debate and are instead 
 25 
sources for the production and dissemination of state-controlled information for public 
consumption. As a lecturer at a private university told me, ‘The repertoires of contention 
in Kazakhstan are very limited’. Referring to Charles Tilly’s (1993) theory concerning 
the forms of public collective action available to a population, this lecturer was 
commenting on the options available to the Kazakh public if they wish to challenge the 
state in public. What can be said in public is strictly controlled, and onstage narratives 
are open to the state’s gaze—criticism can therefore expose individuals to potential 
retribution such as arrest and imprisonment (see Darya’s discussion in Chapter 5 for an 
example of this). 
 
I would like to distinguish between two definitions of the word ‘private’ used in this 
thesis: the first denotes private ownership, while the second refers to the production and 
sharing of narratives between trusted social relations. Private places and spaces are 
limited in Almaty and continue, in a post-Soviet context, to be mainly domestic settings. 
However, using the term ‘offstage’, I engage with a wider set of narratives which could 
be considered private but are spoken about in public places and spaces. Examples could 
include a discussion between close friends in a public park or between family members 
on public transport. A central thread that runs through this thesis involves the different 
ways that my informants communicate in contexts where there is a distrust of official 
public narratives produced by the government and, simultaneously, of individuals’ 
public narratives. This has important implications for my methodological approach, as I 
found that discussions and interviews with strangers, particularly those who were not 
friends or connections of other people I had already met, would often elicit public 
onstage narratives; it was only once I knew them better, as seen with Nuriya in the 
preface, that I was able to hear private offstage narratives.  
 
Individuals and groups manage the intricacies of these two realms of interaction in 
everyday life. For example, an informant could be actively displaying symbolic markers 
of dress and behaviour which support an onstage narrative of wealth and success in a 
public place such as a bar, but they could be simultaneously engaging in an offstage 
discussion with a close friend. This thesis uses ethnographic examples to tease apart the 
different narrative threads woven by my informants in their everyday lives and explain 
how these are used to make sense of change. 
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Past change and the risk of future change 
 
My informants living in Almaty have experienced many changes during their lifetimes. 
The older generations have experienced the replacement of their Soviet-era way of life 
with a shifting and still-changing set of moral and ideological principles that are driving 
changes in the organisation of society and everyday life. These changes include the 
privatisation of property; greater access to goods and services with the proliferation of 
street markets in the early 1990s; and the disappearance of jobs and consequent need to 
retrain, adapt, or find work in whatever form was available. In Chapter 3, for example, I 
describe how with the loss of her job in the early 1990s, a university-educated chemist 
was forced to work transporting cigarettes and goods from China, selling them in street 
markets before finding work in a cash-machine business and then setting up her own 
business as an accountant. 
 
There have also been dramatic changes to the cityscape of Almaty and everyday life in 
the city. The most significant change following the rapid building phases of the 1960s 
government schemes, in which entire areas of the city were built, has been the late-
1990s housing development boom: the relaxation of building restrictions has seen 
further development of large areas of the city moving out along the natural barrier of the 
mountains to the west and east of the city centre. 
 
For my young informants growing up in the 1990s and 2000s, other changes have 
affected their everyday lives. While young people across the world today have lived 
through periods of change and face a range of similar risks and uncertainties, such as 
difficulty in getting on the property ladder or securing long-term employment contracts, 
the social, cultural, and political context of Central Asia means that my young 
informants also face a host of changes unique to this context and historical situation. 
For example, a transition from the ruble to a new national currency, the tenge, has been 
followed by successive waves of devaluation and periods of economic insecurity (see 
Chapter 5). Almaty was plagued by rising crime levels and employment shortages in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. Jakob Rigi argues that in Kazakhstan ‘the privatization of 
state property and the abolition of the welfare state have vastly widened the cleavages 
that existed among youth in the Soviet era’, an assertion which supports my argument 
that the young middle class are a distinct group in society (Rigi, 2003, p. 48). 
Demographic change through migration, including the emigration of many ethnic 
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Russians, has changed the ethnic makeup of Almaty, although Matthew Blackburn 
(2019) argues that young Russians self-identify as having a strong continuity with 
Soviet identity in post-Soviet Kazakhstan despite having no lived experience of that 
period (see Chapter 2). There has also been rural-to-urban migration of ethnic Kazakhs, 
which has led to the young generation using many different stereotypes and phrases to 
distinguish between urban Kazakhs and Kazakhs from rural backgrounds (see Chapter 
5). Many of the changes explained above are still ongoing and while, to my informants, 
the present takes on the appearance of a secure and stable time, that is not to say that it 
is static. Perhaps most pressingly, it is the anticipation of further change that weighs 
heavy on my informants in the present. 
 
We cannot consider social, cultural, political, and economic change in Kazakhstan, and 
how they have affected my informants’ lives, without also considering the risk of 
further change. In this thesis, I define the concept of risk as the likelihood of a person or 
object coming into contact with a hazard, and uncertainty as an emotional response to 
the likelihood of a risk. The various risks faced by my informants are outlined in the 
paragraph below. 
 
The risks my informants reported to me included the following: earthquakes, floods, 
landslides, and mudflows; the erosion of traditional Kazakh culture; an increase in 
Chinese influence in the region due to the acquisition of local land; the cultural 
genocide of Uighurs living in China’s Xinjiang province just a few hours’ drive away; 
the erosion of ethnic Korean identities through out-marriage; the detrimental effect of 
endemic corruption, violent crime, and burglary; air pollution from city traffic; the 
availability, trustworthiness, and quality of health care; the threat of political collapse, 
potential for revolution as seen in neighbouring countries, and a lack of democratic 
representation; and the suppression of religious freedoms. Many of the risks faced in 
Almaty are also experienced by different people in other places across the world. 
However, Almaty offers the opportunity to consider how a combination of these risks 
plays out in an urban post-socialist context. Often, the threat of these risks—and how 
they are understood—is based on past experiences of change. 
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Narratives of uncertainty 
 
In order to make sense of change, as outlined in the above section, my informants turn 
to narrative. While discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, I outline the important 
points for my argument here and indicate the key literature I draw upon. Narrative is a 
powerful tool for both understanding and sculpting social situations and is used in many 
different ways from making ‘meaningful connections’ and providing ‘order and 
continuity’ through the telling of oral histories (Cruickshank, 2000, p. xii), to the 
structuring of biographies that retrospectively re-evaluate past decisions (Crapanzano, 
1984, p. 959). Stories can also be used as ‘defences against danger and hurt’ or to 
‘escape from terror’ (Jackson, 2013, p.15, p.14). There are also specificities to a Soviet 
and post-Soviet situation where particular biographical genres are common and come 
with their own conventions and purposes, for example the importance of sculpting the 
impression of a good socialist citizen in Soviet-era avtobiografia (autobiographical 
texts) (Hellbeck, 2001). See also Kamp’s (2001) discussion in Chapter 2 of the way that 
biographies can change over time in response to the social and political climate in 
which they are told. 
 
I follow Hannah Arendt’s (1958) theorisation, picked up by Michael Jackson (2013), of 
a ‘subjective-in-between’, where narratives structure sociality and the formation of 
meaning in the space between individual experience and collective understanding. In 
this subjective-in-between, narratives as diverse as life stories, biography, and rumour 
operate. This thesis focuses on narratives of uncertainty, particularly the role of gossip 
and rumour, which I found to have an important role in the context of my field site. 
Rumour provides an opportunity to discuss, challenge, verify, interrogate, and reflect 
upon official narratives, personal concerns, and the various risks faced in everyday life; 
moreover, it was used by my urban informants to explore alternatives to official 
narratives. Rumour therefore helped my informants to negotiate the subjective-in-
between, making sense of their own experiences, thoughts, and feelings in relation to 
public narratives. Rumours, as discussed in my concluding chapter, are therefore an 
example of narratives of uncertainty used by my informants to make sense of change— 
both the change they have experienced and the risk of further change in the future. 
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Methodology 
 
I spent a total of 18 months in Kazakhstan between 2014 and 2017, broken up into 
multiple trips. The majority of my time was spent in Almaty. I undertook brief visits to 
Astana (now Nur-Sultan) to visit the university there, as well as for short stays linked 
with connecting flights to the UK. In carrying out this research, I have used an 
ethnographic toolkit of research methods that include participant observation, informal, 
structured, and semi-structured interviews, focus groups, narrative life histories, 
participatory drawing methods, and photographic documentation. 
 
I recorded 139 interviews and held five focus groups as well as numerous discussions 
and interactions in the course of everyday life with a wide range of informants. My 
initial focus on seismic risk led me to include informants in my sample with specific 
technical and scientific specialisations, in addition to members of the public whom I 
met through my research assistants, contacts, and friends or in everyday encounters. 
 
Although I started with one aim in mind—researching how people living in Almaty 
perceived seismic risk—I found something quite different emerging from my research 
material. Returning to my data and looking again at the issues that my informants 
considered important, I discovered that my informants offered interesting insights into 
how they made sense of many different changes and risks, both small- and large-scale, 
which affected them in their everyday lives; seismic risk was just one example. As a 
result, I shifted my focus to how my informants live, understand risks, and make sense 
of change. 
 
This thesis focuses on the middle class more broadly in Chapters 3 and 4, using 
primarily semi-structured longform interviews and recorded life histories, while also 
contextualising their narratives in relation to other members of the public in response to 
a flood in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I narrow the scope of my discussion to focus 
primarily on the young middle-class informants whose narratives appear to contrast 
with those of an older generation. To understand the discursive production of young 
urban middle-class identity, I used focus groups as a research method—this encouraged 
discussion and debate with a select group of informants from similar backgrounds, such 
as the focus group participants in Chapter 5 who attended the same university. As I 
argue in Chapter 5, the young urban middle class is a heterogeneous group; this is 
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reflected in the sample of informants whose interviews are included. My sample 
consists of informants of different ethnicities, genders, family backgrounds, religious 
adherences, places of birth, and employment backgrounds. In Chapter 3, I discuss the 
jobs, social roles, and backgrounds of those I interviewed. 
 
My research assistants played a key role in my research, helping me to negotiate the 
challenges of researching a heterogeneous middle class in Almaty. My research 
assistants were distinguished from other informants in that they were paid, with the 
support of a fieldwork grant, to assist me in the organisation of meetings, translation of 
discussions, and identifying relevant individuals to interview. As I describe in the 
transect of my field site detailed in Chapter 3, a key aspect of this fieldwork is that my 
research assistants acted as gatekeepers to specific communities in different 
geographical areas of my field site. The specificities of their role as gatekeepers—for 
example, due to their own ethnicity, educational background, friendship group and 
language abilities—is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
 
As a consequence of the heterogeneity of the young urban middle-class people who 
became my informants, language use was an issue in the context of my fieldwork. 
Specifically, I encountered problems working across multiple languages, challenges in 
the use of research assistants as translators, the politicised use of language in a local 
context, and the impact of these factors on the reliability of the data I was able to 
collect. 
 
It was common for me to encounter three or more languages in the course of any one 
day of fieldwork, including English, Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uighur, and Uzbek, 
among others. My language skills were limited to English, Russian, and some basic 
Kazakh; over my 18 months of fieldwork it was not possible for me to master all of the 
languages spoken, so I relied on my research assistants to help navigate local language 
usage.  
 
Working with research assistants as translators was beneficial, as they built up an 
understanding of the topics and terms that I was asking about. They could also offer 
brief explanations to informants if they were to call when I was not present. All my 
research assistants spoke both English and Russian alongside another language such as 
Kazakh or Uighur, depending on their ethnicity. Amongst my informants, there were 
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exceptions to this pattern, with some ethnic Russians also speaking some Kazakh. 
During fieldwork, introductions would often be made in Russian, and during interviews, 
it was not uncommon for multiple languages to be used. For example, it was more 
likely that specific terminology, such as technical terms which came up in discussions 
about earthquake risk and emergency management, would be in Russian. Before an 
interview, I would always ask which language an informant would prefer to speak in, 
and I would try and carry out the interviews with a research assistant who spoke that 
language well. Many younger informants were keen to speak to me in English and 
would revert to Russian when there was a specific phrase that they did not know the 
translation for. This also allowed me to record more information during participant 
observation and when my research assistants were not present. 
 
Language use is politicised in Almaty. Russian is associated with the Soviet past and is 
also the dominant language used in the city for inter-ethnic communication. Other 
languages, such as Kazakh, Uighur, or Uzbek, are more likely to be spoken between 
members of the same ethnicity. However, it is important to note that not all Kazakhs can 
speak Kazakh; there are societal divisions along this issue, which I discuss further in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Kazakh is increasingly being promoted as the language used in 
interactions with the state, from public signs to official documents, although at the time 
of fieldwork a bilingual Russian/Kazakh option was most common. 
 
Using translators introduces issues with the reliability of the information recorded. To 
navigate these difficulties, I recorded the audio of interviews when possible, and with 
the permission of informants, this allowed me to work from direct transcripts when 
writing out the text. In other instances, I worked with my research assistants to write up 
notes and summarise interviews to ensure that what was said was established in the best 
way possible. Although there is always a degree of subjective interpretation in the 
meaning of specific comments, one benefit of long-term participant observation is the 
ability to build an understanding of local customs and practices that can contribute to 
the interpretation of data. 
 
In Chapter 2, I offer a theoretical rationale for my research. This rationale is based on 
anthropologists’ use of a diverse range of methodological tools to understand the 
specificities of urban contexts; risk and uncertainty; narratives including gossip and 
rumour; and carrying out research in a Central Asian context. Chapter 3 connects my 
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research methodology with the places in which research was carried out and where my 
informants lived. My methodological choices in relation to my chosen field site are 
explained in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
In writing up my research, I have chosen to structure my data in a way that supports a 
clear explanation of my thesis narrative and allows me to analyse the data in 
conjunction with the literature. For example, in Chapter 3 I use a transect to help 
explain my urban field site. The term ‘transect’ has seen historical use in the biological 
sciences. However, it has been taken up in urban studies as part of the New Urbanist 
agenda—a way to categorise and understand the changes that take place on a continuum 
between urban centres and rural areas (Duany, 2010). It has been used to study the 
increasing fragmentation of living as one moves from the centre to the periphery, as 
well as the phenomenon of urban sprawl (Yu & Ng, 2007). Anthropologists have used a 
similar analytical model of analysis. Matei Candea (2010) asks important questions 
about how an ethnographer, in the context of a field site, can understand where one 
place ends and another begins. Explaining the ways in which people, ideas, and goods 
flow easily between his field site and a local town, Candea argues that making 
distinctions based on political borders may artificially impose restrictions which are at 
odds with how informants conceptualise of places (see Chapter 3 for further discussion 
of urban field sites and Candea’s work). I describe three locations along a transect in 
Almaty that runs from the west of the city through the centre and out to the east. These 
three transect locations link the characteristics of the built environment, the time I lived 
in each area, and the development of personal relationships that allowed for the 
collection of different types of data. Other examples of methodological choices made in 
the writing stage include moving from a broad discussion of the middle class (Chapters 
3 and 4) to a focus on the young generation (Chapter 5, 6, and 7), and focusing on 
Uighur and Korean ethnicity alongside Kazakh identity in Chapter 6. 
 
 
Participant observation 
 
Participant observation is an important aspect of my research methodology. It grounds 
the study firmly in an established canon of anthropological research carried out over an 
extended period of time in the field (Howell et al., 2018, p. 3). Participant observation 
binds together the insights offered by other research methods I use, including interviews 
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and focus groups, to help build a ‘more holistic’ perspective of life in Almaty that can 
assist in discerning local characteristics of informants’ particular ‘world view’ (ibid.). In 
the context of this research, participant observation included travelling on local forms of 
transport; socialising with informants; taking part in household activities, including 
shopping in local markets and supermarkets and hanging out in shopping centres; and 
walking in parks, in the foothills of the mountains, and across the city. I also attended 
cultural celebrations such as Nauryz (Kazakh New Year) festivities, weddings, and 
birthday celebrations, and I visited informants at their homes to drink tea and chat. In 
these situations, the researcher seeks to achieve a paradoxical point of view, both 
‘participating fully in people’s lives, while simultaneously observing them from a 
distance’ (ibid.). 
 
Participant observation must also include reflection on the ethnographer’s own culture, 
background, and position—an idea that has become central to anthropological research 
since the reflexive turn, when anthropologists encouraged a more evaluative research 
methodology that recognised the fieldworker’s own cultural baggage which they carried 
with them in the field, influencing their presentation of research subjects (Clifford & 
Marcus, 1986). In my own case, as a British male in Kazakhstan, there was little 
mention of British influence on Kazakh history by my informants, which may have 
been a central concern if I had been carrying out fieldwork in an area which had been 
part of the British Empire. What should be noted is that for my young informants, a 
Western way of life was associated with aspects of their moral and material aspirations. 
I was often seen as a representative of Western values and culture—however, some 
informants, including my research assistants, commented that in many ways I did not fit 
with their idea of Western values, as I bought clothes from charity shops and didn’t 
have desirable markers of Western culture such as new smart trainers or a smartphone. 
As one young informant commented, ‘It is funny to see you with this Nokia’. For my 
informants, and my research assistants in particular, the learning process worked both 
ways as we shared our thoughts and opinions about the world, each acknowledging the 
cultural background from which these perspectives emerged. 
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Informal, semi-structured, and structured interviews 
 
Nigel Rapport argues that interviews should be seen as a ‘special, productive site of 
ethnographic encounter’ that allows access to information and topics that may not be 
‘open for discussion […] in “ordinary”, everyday, social interaction’ (Rapport, 2015, p. 
175). Rapport suggests that interviews offer a complementary source of data, providing 
a fuller picture when used in combination with participant observation. In my research I 
used informal interviews where conversations were allowed to flow freely, and I 
recorded notes on a wide range of topics. In these instances I would often ask open-
ended questions such as, ‘Tell me about the place where you live?’. I also conducted 
semi-structured interviews on occasions when I needed to steer conversation in the 
direction of particular topics I wanted to find out more about. Finally, I used structured 
interviews, in which I started with a set of pre-determined questions. Structured 
interviews were helpful as an efficient way of collecting data when I had encountered 
other restrictions. For example, when I interviewed local and national government 
officials, it had to be done in scheduled time slots; I needed to make use of the time 
available, and the structure helped me to retain control of the conversation and ensure 
that key topics were covered. For example, I asked the head of emergency situations 
specific questions such as, ‘Can you give me your account of the events surrounding the 
sel in Nauryzbai district [the subject of discussion in Chapter 3]?’ Knowing when to 
choose which type of interview structure is one aspect of using interviews as a form of 
data collection. The reliability of different interview data can also be better understood 
when the data is brought together with insights from participant observation and vice 
versa. 
 
The second aspect of interviews involves how the information gathered from them is 
collated and presented. In Chapter 2, I discuss how biography and life histories can be 
built up through interviews and explore how anthropologists have analysed informants’ 
presentation of self in these contexts. Van Maanen emphasises the role of ‘literary and 
rhetorical devices used to represent the results of fieldwork’, an important recognition 
of the ethnographer’s ethnographer in interpreting and re-presenting the world through 
their own literary and analytical framework (Van Maanen, 1988, p. 125). 
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Focus groups 
 
Agar and MacDonald argue that a toolkit of different ethnographic methods, including 
participant observation and interviews, offer a ‘broader frame of interpretation in which 
focus group details take on added significance’ (Agar & MacDonald, 1995, p. 78). The 
ability for focus groups to provide greater detail is a result of opportunities the 
researcher has to introduce and guide group discussions with selected individuals. 
David Morgan argues that what defines focus groups in comparison to group discussion 
is the researcher’s ability to collect data on ‘a topic determined by the researcher’ 
(Morgan, 1996, p. 130). Russell Bernard argues that this benefit of additional detail 
marks focus groups as a valuable research method over other methods such as surveys 
(Bernard, 2006, p. 236). At key stages in my fieldwork, I used focus groups to bring 
together informants and discuss important topics that had emerged in interviews or that 
I had encountered using participant observation. These focus groups were used 
primarily with young informants.  
 
Focus-group discussions feature prominently in Chapter 5. In this instance, I brought 
together groups of five or six informants (including my research assistants) who 
attended either private or state-funded universities. I chaired the discussion, following a 
planned list of topics including descriptions of the university; the idea of community; 
life in Almaty; and both perceptions of risk and responsibility for risk. I encouraged 
conversation to flow naturally as best I could, and I let my informants speak freely on 
different topics if that was where the conversation led, bringing it back if we got too far 
off topic. It is interesting to note that my young informants quickly felt comfortable 
sharing private concerns, discussing rumours, and interrogating one another’s 
arguments. The feeling of a safe space in which to share private concerns was made 
possible because many of the participants knew of each other already, the focus groups 
took place in the familiar environment of a group-study room at a university, and all 
participants were of a similar age and studying at university in Almaty. 
 
Because I worked with my research assistants, I acknowledge that they had their own 
ideas and potential biases, having attended the private university themselves. However, 
with explicit permission I recorded audio and made transcripts of these focus groups so 
I could work directly from my informants’ words. In this way, I didn’t need to rely on 
the on-the-day translations of my research assistants, although these were very useful in 
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helping the conversation flow at the time. Agar and MacDonald (1995) see the ability to 
look back at transcripts as a particular benefit of using focus groups; subtleties in 
conversation, meaning, and intention can be analysed later, as conversation flows 
naturally and often at a quick pace. The relative degree of control the researcher has in 
introducing topics and chairing conversations allows for later re-evaluation and follow-
up interviews to supplement focus-group discussions. 
 
Most of the discussions in these focus groups were in Russian, although at times some 
respondents would speak in English. I noticed that when my informants spoke in 
Russian, their responses were generally more detailed. Only one informant, from a 
publicly funded university, spoke in Kazakh, although they also switched to speaking 
Russian when all the others in the room started speaking in Russian. I opened each 
focus group by reiterating that participants could speak whichever language they 
preferred, and their use of Russian is representative of everyday discussions between 
informants of different ethnicities in these contexts. Further discussion of these focus-
group participants is found in Chapter 5. 
 
 
Narrative life histories/biography 
 
In the literature review (Chapter 2), I discuss how anthropologists have used narrative 
life histories as a way of understanding environmental and social change over time. I 
situate this discussion in the context of wider anthropological debate on stories and 
narrative in general before concentrating on different types of discursive techniques 
used in everyday interactions, including gossip and rumour. 
 
 
Participatory drawing methods  
 
In one visualisation and research technique I used during the focus groups, I asked 
participants to visualise their social connections. As these were complex networks, 
creating drawings allowed me to complete further analysis later without taking the 
overly long-winded approach of having each informant explain their social networks in 
detail. This technique has been used in Social Network Analysis and is suggested as part 
of a mixed-method research methodology as a way of visualising data (Edwards, 2010). 
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Sociologists have shown that drawing diagrams as a technique for data elicitation can be 
good to visualise networks and social connections in urban contexts (Hogan, Carrasco, 
& Wellman, 2016).  
 
To produce these drawings and diagrams, I gave pens and paper to the research 
participants and asked them to draw their trusted social networks. Using diagrams 
allowed my research participants to describe hierarchies of trust, non-linear 
relationships, and groupings with ease. The diagrams my informants created included 
spider diagrams, in which people or groups were connected with lines; concentric rings 
showing groupings of social connections based on hierarchies of trust; and even a 
drawing of a Khrushchevka, with each room a different unit or group in society. Hogan 
et al. found that visualising closeness through nested concentric rings was an ‘intuitive 
and intelligible’ way for their informants to group their social connections (Hogan et al., 
2016, p. 119). There is more discussion of my findings from this research technique in 
Chapter 5. 
 
 
Photographic documentation 
 
With the ease of taking digital photographs at little cost, photographic documentation, 
collection, and presentation is becoming an integral part of fieldwork. I used 
photography as a form of note-taking, recording the places, people, and objects that I 
encountered. This was made easier in many ways due to the enthusiasm of some of my 
informants; for example, my long walks with Nuriya, whom I discussed in the preface, 
were an activity in themselves which we did together. I present photographs in the body 
of the dissertation to illustrate points more clearly and to help visualise elements I have 
described in the text.  
 
 
Additional ethical considerations of methodology 
 
My methodology includes a responsive approach to ethical research considerations 
specific to my research topic. I often spoke to my informants about sensitive topics such 
as damage to homes during floods, uncertainties around the risk of death in an 
earthquake, or their traumatic experiences of high crime during the 1990s. I was careful 
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with my questions when discussing traumatic events or turbulent periods of change in 
my informants’ lives, giving time to hear their stories in full and make the aims of my 
research as clear as possible. When speaking to informants, I reiterated that 
participation in my research was voluntary and they had the ability to withdraw their 
comments from the research at any point. This happened on one occasion where I was 
told an intimate account of trauma in relation to a flood years before. The informant 
later decided that they had shared more than they wished at the time and no longer 
wanted their story included. There is no further mention of their account in this thesis. I 
was open about my intentions as well as my own life and experiences, answering my 
informants’ questions truthfully and honestly. This was most important when talking 
with those whom I lived with, such as the Korean family I discuss later on in the thesis. 
Our open two-way dialogue built a strong friendship underpinned by high levels of 
trust; this was evidenced in the way that they gave me responsibilities when they went 
on trips while I stayed behind at their smallholding, as well as in our continuing 
friendship and communication since my extended period of fieldwork. 
 
My focus on narrative and stories meant that aside from times when I listened in on 
discussions in group situations, my presence as a researcher was often what elicited the 
telling of these particular narratives. As a result, my personal relationships with my 
informants were very important, influencing the type, content, and form of the stories I 
was told. For instance, my own personal journey through my fieldwork and my 
friendship and rapport with Nuriya was key to the revelation that there were two distinct 
narratives in her life story. Often, as a visiting international researcher, I was presented 
with public narratives. It was only through long-term immersion, interaction, and time 
spent with my informants that I was able to hear both onstage and offstage discourse. I 
was also able to hear offstage narratives with informants with whom I did not have 
long-term relationships when we were in places where they were comfortable, such as 
in their own homes, or when we were with trusted people who vouched for me. One 
example of this was when, at a wedding in the centre of Almaty, I was introduced to 
good friends of the host family with whom I lived in my third transect location. My 
hosts and their friends proceeded to gossip about other friends and continued their 
conversation, apparently unencumbered by my presence. 
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Research assistants 
 
I worked with research assistants throughout my fieldwork, and after I returned from the 
field, they also assisted me in producing transcripts, translating Kazakh and Russian 
into English. My research assistants performed multiple roles and were invaluable to my 
data collection. They helped me with activities, including arranging interviews, 
researching local contacts, using their own social networks to establish contact with 
specific individuals, reflecting on data together, and providing translation and 
transcription in multiple languages. When my informants agreed for me to record 
conversations, my research assistants were able to complete detailed transcripts that 
would supplement my data collected in field notes. When it was not possible to record 
interviews or discussions—for example, when research participants were worried about 
their offstage comments being shared—I would work with my research assistants to 
help verify and improve field notes taken during interviews. This helped to ensure that 
key points from conversations were recorded accurately. In most structured and semi-
structured interviews, I worked with research assistants to assist in accurate translation, 
with only a few exceptions when they were not available to help due to other 
commitments.  
 
In addition to the issue of translation, as discussed at the beginning of this section, there 
were specific instances when my research assistants’ language skills were influential in 
the progress of research. The majority of my interviews and interactions were carried 
out with my informants speaking in Russian; a few spoke in Kazakh. the instances when 
Kazakh was spoken, such as with the families living near the smallholding in my third 
transect location, I was limited in the research assistants I could work with: although 
they all spoke fluent Russian and some English, not all of them spoke fluent Kazakh. In 
these instances, I worked with my Kazakh friends and part-time research assistants; for 
example, when I interviewed Nurbakyt, Nuriya’s mother, Nuriya translated when her 
mother used Kazakh phrases. 
 
My research assistants became important informants in their own right. We built strong 
working relationships with a high degree of trust, and they would often share their 
thoughts with me. I worked predominantly with four main research assistants: Alma, 
Anna, Boris, and Nuriya. In Chapter 3, I discuss the background of my research 
assistants and how they acted as gatekeepers in different areas of my field site. Alma as 
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a gatekeeper to the Uighur community; Boris’s ethnicity was important for my 
introduction to an ethnic Korean host family; and Anna was able to use both her 
network of contacts and her well-known status in her university to help find informants 
and arrange interviews. Their local knowledge was extremely valuable. 
 
In an urban context, there are a large number of potential informants, but it is difficult to 
build personal relationships due to the types of interactions that strangers in an urban 
context are likely to have. My research assistants therefore played a key role in helping 
me use a ‘snow-balling’ approach to identifying potential informants. Just as a snowball 
picks up snow as it rolls down a hill, a ‘snow-balling’ approach gains momentum and 
size as it progresses. Thanks to this approach, each informant was then able to suggest 
other people who could take part in the research and connect me with them. Research 
assistants were already part of local social networks and were able to facilitate 
introductions within them. I was able to ask them questions about informants who might 
be good to discuss a particular topic with, and they would be able to investigate within 
their own personal networks in a culturally appropriate way. For example, when 
discussing community support in the Uighur community, Alma was able to speak with 
her parents to find out who in the community was responsible for organising community 
groups called meshrep, which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 6. Her parents were 
then able to speak to their friends, who would in turn suggest others who might be 
knowledgeable about a topic, have insight due to their role in the community, or simply 
have some time and be willing to speak to me. In this way, my research networks were 
linked through the social networks of my research assistants. 
 
Using research assistants as a basis for identifying potential informants has some 
drawbacks and limitations. For example, it is likely that groups of friends or those who 
know each other may share similar views, so a range of perspectives might be missed in 
certain situations. Using multiple research assistants, each with their own specific 
networks, reduced the risk of being limited to a snapshot impression of one group of 
friends, family, and acquaintances. To further address this limitation, I employed a range 
of sampling techniques depending on the specific topics that I was investigating. For 
example, in Chapter 4 I used a transect as a sampling methodology. This transect, which 
followed the destructive path of a flood, used a more random approach to selecting 
informants based on interviewing people in specific locations along the river. This 
involved knocking on doors, speaking to people in the street, and visiting local shops to 
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gain introductions to those living nearby. Being aware of the benefits and limitations of 
using research assistants as gatekeepers, I tried to strike a balance between using their 
networks and identifying individuals such as public figures and those in particular 
jobs—for example, government officials dealing with emergency situations—to 
approach independently by email, phone, or personal introduction. 
 
Important insights came from my research assistants when reflecting upon interviews 
and events between arranged meetings, at social events, and at mealtimes. On these 
occasions, my research assistants would act as a sounding board for ideas and give me 
their opinions on different subjects; as most of my research assistants could also be 
considered members of the young urban middle class, many of these insights are drawn 
upon in this thesis. However, there were also occasions—for example, when going 
about everyday business or joining in social events and activities—when I was less 
likely to be working with a research assistant.  
 
 
Thesis Overview 
 
This thesis develops my argument through its own narrative structure. Chapter 2 
reviews and analyses the relevant background literature, demonstrating the 
anthropological debates to which this thesis contributes. In Chapter 3, I use a transect to 
geographically situate my field site in relation to my informants, research assistants, and 
my own research experiences. Chapter 3 also lays out different generational narratives 
and distinguishes differences in how the young urban middle class narrate their 
everyday lives. In Chapter 4, I introduce the argument that a flood caused a citywide 
rupture in everyday narratives, exposing offstage uncertainty for informants from all 
walks of life. Through a discussion of how the transects in Chapters 3 and 4 articulate 
with each other, I argue that there is widespread distrust in public narratives and a 
polarisation of everyday narratives into onstage and offstage contexts. In light of my 
revelation that there is a strong divide between onstage and offstage narratives in 
Almaty, Chapter 5 focuses on my young middle-class informants to understand how 
they make sense of change. I explain how the young urban middle class differentiate 
themselves, discuss what their values, hopes and aspirations are, and find that they are a 
heterogeneous group united by a common onstage narrative. Chapter 6 analyses how the 
differences between middle-class informants can influence their lives. In this instance, I 
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choose ethnicity as a result of my strong set of data on different ethnicities, which 
encapsulates other differences in approaches to topics including religion, gender, and 
language. In the face of widespread societal uncertainty, my informants’ onstage 
narratives often clash with the way of life experienced by their parents’ generation. This 
is at odds with my young middle-class informants’ increased reliance on trusted social 
relations to help them negotiate offstage uncertainty— an uncertainty that comes as a 
result of a state-controlled shortage of information. This brings us to the conclusion, 
Chapter 7, where I comment on the thread of rumour that runs through all of the 
chapters. I argue that rumour is an alternative discursive technique that allows my 
informants, in particular the younger generation, to discuss private offstage concerns in 
public onstage contexts in order to help make sense of the change—and risk of further 
change—that they face in everyday life. 
 
 
Chapter narrative 
 
My literature review (Chapter 2) considers four areas of anthropological study: urban 
ethnography, narrative, risk and uncertainty, and Central Asia. These areas of topical 
focus provide the background for my thesis. As an urban ethnography, this thesis tackles 
the difficulties in carrying out research in an urban environment, including the issues of 
scale and complexity. This thesis contributes an additional perspective from a Central 
Asian urban context with a focus on the understudied and under-theorised urban middle 
class. I also contribute to ongoing debates in urban anthropology on the arbitrary 
delineations of an anthropological field site, as well as to discussions about the 
‘unboundedness’ of a city (Candea, 2010).  
 
Understanding how narratives are formed, communicated, and understood is central to 
showing how my informants make sense of change. I explore how anthropologists have 
discussed oral histories and biographies/life histories of ways of understanding 
informant-centric perspectives on local contexts. One such example is Cruickshank’s 
(2000) analysis of oral storytelling in the Yukon, where attention to the different 
contexts in which stories are told helps us understand how storytelling can be used to 
reflect on social situations at different points in time. I draw upon this literature for both 
methodological tools in the collection of life stories through interviews and theoretical 
tools for understanding how informants tie together events in order to make sense of 
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change. For example, a discussion of Hannah Arendt’s (1958) theorisation of the 
existence of a ‘subjective in-between’, where individuals use narrative to form their 
social selves, is particularly helpful in understanding the formation of my informants’ 
onstage and offstage narratives. In my section on narrative, I also delve into different 
examples and definitions of rumour and gossip, which I explore in relation to my data 
and which also offer an alternative perspective on narrative in the conclusion in Chapter 
7. 
 
Understanding change in the context of my field site requires an analysis of past, 
ongoing, and future change. Risk and uncertainty, which Alaszewski argues have not 
been ‘central themes’ in anthropological study over the last hundred years, are an under-
theorised set of concepts which are important in this thesis (Alaszewski, 2015, p. 223). I 
distinguish between risk as a measure of likelihood and uncertainty as an emotional 
response to a risk, using the literature to inform these definitions. I draw upon the wider 
literature of disasters, climate change, and living with war as sources of contextualised 
discussions of risk. This thesis contributes a further example of how risk and 
uncertainty can be understood through a situated discussion of social, political, and 
economic circumstances, providing evidence that narrative is an important factor to be 
studied in conjunction with risk and uncertainty. 
 
The anthropological study of Central Asia is a burgeoning field, containing important 
debates I have drawn upon to inform and develop my discussion and analysis. This 
includes the study of the ongoing effects of mass privatisation following independence 
(Alexander, 2009); the impact of Soviet ‘internationalism’ (Schatz, 2000); the 
experiences of different ethnicities (Chang, 2016; Davé, 2004; Davenel, 2012; Laurelle, 
2004; Oka, 2006; Peyrouse, 2008); the difficulties of life in urban Almaty in the 1990s 
(Nazpary, 2002); ethnic nationalism and Kazakh identity (Yessenova, 2005); aspects of 
gender in re-traditionalisation (Werner & Barcus, 2015); politics of language use 
(Aksholakova, 2013); religion (Dragadze, 1993; Dubuisson & Genina, 2011; Féaux de 
la Croix, 2016; Louw, 2007; Omelicheva, 2011; Rasanayagam, 2011); and modernity 
(Bissenova, 2013; Laszczkowski, 2016; Mostowlansky, 2017). I analyse the literature in 
two clusters, first considering wider changes in Soviet and post-Soviet contexts that 
impacted Central Asia and then those changes which had unique consequences in 
Central Asia. 
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Chapter 3 details a transect of my urban field site in three locations. This transect 
provides a coherent framework from which to understand the people, places, and contexts 
of my urban field site, as well as my own journey as an anthropologist through the 
research. In each location I introduce the physical context of the built environment, my 
research networks accessed through my research assistants, and the informants with 
whom I interacted. The chapter considers the stories of middle-class informants of all 
ages before investigating the differences between the young generation and their parents’ 
generation. 
 
I lived in the first transect location when I first arrived in Kazakhstan for an extended 
period of fieldwork. I explain the urban context of Khrushchevka (prefabricated housing) 
districts in this area in the west of Almaty. It was here that Nuriya, introduced in the 
preface, lived with her mother Nurbakyt. Through an additional example from my 
informant Aizhan and her mother Sholpan, I emphasise the generational differences in the 
way individuals narrate the story of their lives in response to past change and the risk of 
future change. In the second transect location, I introduce the downtown area of Almaty, 
where the bulk of my interactions with my young urban middle-class informants took 
place. Through a narrative account of my research assistant Anna’s family story, I explore 
complexities that I found were typical of my young urban middle-class informants’ 
backgrounds. I demonstrate how, by taking control of her own family narrative history 
and telling a specific story of her life, Anna was able to make sense of change and 
provide herself with the best possible opportunities available by obtaining a Russian 
passport that allowed her greater access to travel and work opportunities. 
 
In the final transect location, I consider the definitional limits of my field site. I 
emphasise the connection to particular flows of labour, goods, and utilities in a former 
kolkhoz (collective farm) that I argue mark the transect location’s inclusion in my urban 
field site. I analyse my informant Mikhail’s story of an urban middle-class narrative of 
escape from the detrimental health influences of inner-city life. In conclusion, I show 
how he and his family—my hosts when I lived in this location—are themselves part of 
the changes which have engendered the encroachment and influence of urban life in the 
area. Family events form the basis of my argument in the third part of Chapter 6 and 
warrant the inclusion of the family’s story at this stage in the thesis. In later chapters, I 
concentrate primarily on the young urban middle class. 
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Chapter 3 establishes the context and content of informants’ onstage narratives in which 
they explain a stable and coherent story of everyday life. In Chapter 4, I show how these 
narratives were challenged when a disruptive mudflow, or sel, intersected my west-to-east 
transect, flowing from the mountains to the south of Almaty across the city, out onto the 
steppe, and into Lake Balkash. Using narrative accounts of this particular event, I include 
a diverse range of perspectives to show how the rupture of everyday narratives and 
routine can expose vulnerabilities and a feeling of uncertainty for informants across the 
city. In the final part of the chapter, I show how my younger informants—the majority of 
whom live in the centre of the city—were affected by this sel on 23 July 2015. The sel 
undermined their onstage narratives, which they told to support the impression of a stable 
and secure everyday life. I contextualise this in relation to a widespread societal distrust 
of public narratives, including those produced by the state, which led my informants to 
experience growing offstage uncertainty. 
 
At this point in my thesis (Chapter 5), I shift my focus from considering the urban middle 
classes in general to concentrating on the young generation: a distinct group in society 
which I argue in Chapter 5 is bound by a common onstage narrative. Chapter 5 begins by 
analysing how my informants differentiate themselves as members of the young urban 
middle class, in the process piecing together the key tropes of their shared onstage 
narrative. This narrative sees the young urban middle class, according to Patico’s (2008) 
definition of the middle class as sharing a ‘set of moral and material aspirations and 
orientations’, as internationally oriented, business-focused, individualistic, materialistic, 
and consumerist. Following this, I analyse how the young urban middle class consider 
close friends and family as trusted social relations while voicing their distrust for state-
controlled public narratives—the result is a limited range of trusted sources of 
information.  
 
The final part of Chapter 5 explores how the young urban middle class live with different 
risks. I demonstrate how my informants have adopted a hybrid approach to risk, one that 
brings together the influence of Soviet-state paternalism and post-Soviet neoliberal 
attitudes to risk. I discuss what characterises these distinct approaches, examining their 
impact on my informants’ lives. I discuss neoliberal policies and attitudes to risk, 
foregrounded by organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990s, that 
focus on economic growth, and highlight the emergence of a middle-income group in 
society as evidence of the success of these policies. As a result of adopting outwardly 
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consumerist lifestyles as an important aspect of their onstage performances, my young 
urban middle-class informants are particularly affected by the unpredictable and ongoing 
devaluation of the tenge. Devaluation has also undermined the government’s public 
onstage narrative, increasing the disparity between these informants’ onstage 
performances and the offstage realisation of increasing vulnerability and uncertainty in 
everyday life. Through the example of corruption in academic establishments in Almaty, I 
show how this uncertainty begins to undermine everyday encounters: money is used to 
minimise uncertainty via corrupt practices such as buying favourable exam results. In a 
discussion of the topic of seismic risk, I illustrate how a society-wide positive attitude to 
risk-taking is causing a dramatic increase in offstage uncertainty. When my young urban 
middle-class informants have exhausted their networks of close friends and family in 
search of information, they turn to offstage discursive techniques such as rumour to find 
answers in the face of increasing uncertainty. 
 
The young urban middle class are a heterogeneous group; although their lives are 
grounded in a common onstage narrative, in Chapter 6 I explore how the differences 
between them—in this instance, their ethnicity—impact their experience. Although there 
are many other differences within this group, including gender, religion, and family 
background, I chose to focus on ethnicity as this area is where I had the strongest data 
available, allowing me to comment more authoritatively on how this one variable impacts 
my young urban middle-class informants. 
 
Chapter 6 provides an overview of the historical events leading to ethnic diversity in 
Almaty’s population, including the Soviet nationalities policy and successive mass-
migration movements over the 20th century. The tripartite structure of this chapter 
considers in turn what it means to be middle-class and Kazakh, Uighur, or Korean. Again, 
I chose these ethnicities as a result of the strong data that I had collected. It would also 
have been possible to discuss my Russian, Tatar, Dungan, Volga German, or Uzbek 
informants, among other ethnicities, but I was limited by the data I had collected. In this 
chapter, I argue that a shared middle-class onstage narrative has had a detrimental impact 
on members of the young generation who find that aspects of their ethnic identities, such 
as some traditional practices, often come into conflict with the young urban middle-class 
values described in the first part of the chapter. Consequently, my informants are not able 
to take advantage of the support and assistance offered within these communities and are 
increasingly isolated and vulnerable to the risk of future change in society. 
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In Chapter 7, I bring together the arguments from previous chapters to build on my initial 
observation in the preface: that there were distinct public and private narratives. Through 
providing further examples of this difference between public and private narratives, I 
explain how they have exposed the vulnerability of the young urban middle class and the 
private uncertainties therein. Reviewing the arguments of each of the body chapters, I 
show how, in response to this uncertainty, my informants turned to trusted social relations 
for information and support to help them deal with change.  
 
Chapter 7 then develops upon the topic of rumour as an alternative discursive technique 
that is used by my informants to voice private offstage concerns in public onstage 
contexts. I pull together the threads of rumour that are woven through each chapter in the 
thesis, discussing how my young informants perceive rumours to ‘have more power here 
in Almaty and in our post-Soviet Union countries than they have in the West’, in the 
words of my informant Arman. I discuss how existing ethnographies have shown that 
rumours are a feature of informants’ lives in Kazakhstan, as well as how rumours have 
been used to express concern about uncertainties faced in everyday life (Alexander, 
2009a; 2009b; Wheeler, 2016). I conclude that rumours are understood in culturally 
distinct ways: in Almaty, they are an important source of information and a discursive 
technique through which my informants can discuss offstage concerns in public onstage 
contexts. 
 
In a short afterword, I discuss the changes that have taken place in Almaty since my last 
fieldwork trip in 2017. These changes include Nursultan Nazarbayev stepping down as 
president and the renaming of Astana to Nur-Sultan in his honour. Does this new 
leadership signal a change in the state’s authoritarian rule, allowing for the public 
expression of offstage uncertainties? I give an example of the government’s stance 
towards protest, which my young urban middle-class informants spoke about while 
discussing a rumour during my fieldwork in 2016. I then contrast this with a news article 
about a public protest on 30 August 2019—in a rare occurrence, the government chose to 
allow a protest to take place. As this protest was by a youth organisation, I therefore pose 
another question: What role may this young generation have going forwards into the 
future? 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review: 
Urban ethnography, narratives, risk, and Central Asia 
 
There are four key areas of literature that I need to address in order to explain my thesis: 
urban anthropology, how humans narrate their lives, the anthropology of risk, and the 
anthropology of Central Asia. 
 
The first thing to address is the form of this thesis: an urban ethnography. I will review 
the development of this branch of anthropology and position my thesis in relation to the 
existing literature, which offers valuable insights into methodological challenges of 
fieldwork in an urban environment (Candea, 2010b; Kemper, 1991), as well as 
theoretical tools for thinking about the challenges of urban ethnography, including 
scale, anonymity, the heterogeneity of urban populations, class, ethnicity, and the urban 
built environment, among other topics (Low, 2014). Urban anthropology has 
interrogated definitions of class and explored how these broad theoretical concepts 
manifest themselves in different places and times (Kalb, 2014). Here, I will focus on the 
particular phenomenon of the post-Soviet urban middle class. I will explore the 
background of the first generation who have grown up after the Soviet Union and 
explain how their view of the world has been formed while living through a period of 
social, cultural, and economic change which has exposed them to new risks in the urban 
environment. 
 
Second, I will address how people narrate the stories of their lives. My thesis argument 
is that these strategies are used to make sense of both ongoing societal change and the 
uncertainty surrounding various risks to which those living in and around Almaty are 
exposed. I will consider anthropologists’ analyses of how informants narrate stories 
about their lives, including life histories and everyday conversations, focusing on a 
particular area of interest: the discussion of rumour and gossip. Using the insights 
offered in existing literature on the subject, I will contribute an analysis of the examples 
in my data in the final concluding chapter of the thesis. 
 
The third area of topical interest is risk and uncertainty. I define risk as the probabilistic 
measure of exposure to a hazard, and uncertainty as the emotional response to a risk 
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(Slovic & Peters, 2006). I will start by discussing my own journey as a fieldworker 
exploring the topic of seismic risk; this opened up myriad new avenues of research 
when I discovered that this was just one of numerous risks that Almatineans face on an 
everyday basis. While anthropologists and sociologists have grappled with the 
navigation of risk in everyday modern life, the social, political, and economic 
conditions of Central Asia present some unique circumstances (Boholm, 2015). This 
thesis contributes to a better understanding of these circumstances. 
 
The final section of the literature review contextualises the field of the anthropology of 
Central Asia. Just a decade ago, there was only a handful of academic scholars working 
on the region (Reeves, 2014a). Today, there are important threads of research including, 
but not limited to, the topics of water resource management; religious reconfigurations 
in post-socialist republics; the navigation of authoritarian and problematic democracy; 
and the challenges presented in negotiating ethnicity and identity across heterogeneous 
populations living within geopolitical borders inherited from Soviet administrative 
dicta. 
 
 
Urban Anthropology 
 
What is the ‘traditional home’ of anthropology? The tent,1 the rural village, the 
encampment of the forgotten tribe? It has been argued that the shift in anthropological 
study towards increasingly urban environments is a reflection of global trends in 
population movement over the 20th century and into the 21st. Foster and Kemper’s 
view is representative of a traditional view in anthropology that ‘to a large extent the 
transformation of traditional peasant societies and the mass exodus to the city explain 
new interest of anthropologists in urban research’ (Foster & Kemper, 2002 [1979], p. 
137). However, my research suggests that this one-way move from peasantry to 
modernity is an oversimplification which hides a multiplicity of other relevant factors 
 
1 In the introduction to Writing Culture, James Clifford draws our attention to a photograph of 
Malinowski’s tent in the Trobriand Islands (Clifford & Marcus, 1986). The ‘curious rite’ of 
writing in the tent places a particularly anthropological undertaking in the context of the other. 
Does the ethnographer still look out of place writing at a desk when they are surrounded by 
office blocks with similarly dressed office workers? What is exceptional about the work of 
anthropologists? 
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that contribute to population movement and change. Analysing the different types of 
movement that take place in Kazakhstan is important because the focus of this thesis is 
on change—physical, doctrinal, and personal. In particular, I concentrate on 
understanding the changes that have led to the emergence of a new middle class in a 
post-socialist urban context. 
 
Urban field sites present a whole host of challenges to a social anthropologist, and I 
encountered many of them during my fieldwork. Foster and Kemper, writing in the late 
1970s, comment that ‘accustomed as we are to working in small, “bounded” rural 
communities, anthropologists are often disconcerted by the amorphous and 
heterogeneous populations of large cities’ (ibid., p. 138). To the anthropologist, cities 
present a daunting challenge. We need to understand a variety of ethnicities, a range of 
class distinctions, and differing gender roles in crosscutting social and cultural 
groupings and communities. Key to the situation in Almaty is that urban environments 
present new manifestations of inequality that may be more difficult to discern amongst a 
complex framework of influence and power dynamics. Members of Almaty’s middle 
class, after facing significant societal change, are vulnerable to a range of threats, 
including natural hazards, economic collapse, and endemic corruption.  
 
How has anthropology made sense of these challenging research contexts, and what can 
be learned to help answer my research questions? In order to overcome the seemingly 
infinite complexity of urban environments, anthropologists have been challenged to 
redefine the field site and delineate the people, places, and topics under consideration in 
ethnographic fieldwork. Matei Candea reflects on the methodology of anthropological 
research through his ethnography of life in Corsica, questioning and analysing the 
arbitrary distinctions that anthropologists often make in the delineation of a field site 
(Candea, 2010a; 2013). As mentioned in the introduction, Candea uses the example of a 
drive from the village of Crucetta to a larger urban municipal area to question what he 
terms the ‘arbitrary locations’ which might be considered part of his ethnographic field 
site. He concludes that while it may be false to impose distinctions regarding where one 
place ends and another begins, understanding difference and similarity is a particularly 
worthwhile anthropological endeavour. This issue is underscored by a recent focus on 
marginality and how it should be investigated and represented (Thieme, Lancione, & 
Rosa, 2017). Anthropologists must be clear about the implications of the choices they 
make and discuss the impacts these choices have on the representation of the subject. In 
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chapters 3 and 4, I will follow similar journeys, describing in detail the boundaries of 
my field site and the decisions that led me to make these distinctions. 
 
Urban anthropology draws influence from across the social sciences. Setha Low stresses 
the influence of the Chicago school of sociology, the community-studies programme of 
slums in London and Nigeria, and the discussions at the University of Manchester—
including those with Gluckman, which I will touch upon later in my discussion of 
rumour (Low, 2005b). Aside from these theoretical schools, a few specific 
ethnographies are directly relevant to the discussions in this thesis. 
 
 
Power, religion, and economy  
 
There are three key areas in which urban anthropology has contributed to our 
understanding and study of cities, and which have helped me in my analysis of my data 
from Almaty. State power, manifested in the architecture of cities, is often a way for the 
state to intervene in the everyday lives of its citizens. Laszczkowski’s (2016) Central 
Asian urban ethnography considers how state power comes to take form in the everyday 
lives of the city’s inhabitants through the influence of monumental building projects in 
Astana (now Nur-Sultan), the capital of Kazakhstan. His work is complemented by that 
of Bissenova (2013), which analyses how the power of the Kazakh state is visualised 
through these ostentatious building projects. These ethnographies build upon the work 
of James Scott (1998), as well as Holston’s (1989) discussion of the role of construction 
in Brazil’s new capital, Brasília. Opening with the description of a journey across the 
Central Plateau of Brazil, Holston comments on the separation of Brasília from the rest 
of the country. Its concrete construction marks it out as a place of difference, a physical 
modernist endeavour that reflects upon the political intentions of the government 
(Holston, 1989, pp. 3–4). Low comments on how Rabinow (1989) ‘links the growth of 
modern forms of political power to the evolution of aesthetic theories and shows how 
French colonists sought to use architecture and city planning to demonstrate cultural 
superiority’ (Low, 2005a, p. 113). The city emerges as a readable text, indexing the 
strategic power moves of the state on the local populations. 
 
Religion influences the everyday perceptions of an urban population and affects the 
construction and negotiation of urban built environments. Examples of this include 
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Privratsky’s (2001) study of Turkistan, which focuses on the role of Muslim pilgrimage 
and religion in the Kazakh city. Paradise (2005), in an ethnography of perceptions of 
risk in Agadir, Morocco, discusses how perceptions of earthquake risk are influenced by 
religious teachings in which those who were more religious attributed earthquakes to 
divine will and took a more fatalistic approach to risk. Paradise further argues that 
Islamic teachings in the 99th Surah link earthquakes to the day of judgement, and 
therefore earthquakes are perceived as distinct from other hazards (ibid., p. 168). In a 
study of earthquake risk in the city of Baluchistan, Ainuddin found that fatalistic 
attitudes to risk do not equate to a lack of knowledge about a hazard; how one perceives 
risk, rather than one’s knowledge, is what influences their preparation for disasters 
(Ainuddin, 2014, p. 165). As different religious perspectives often coexist within the 
same urban field sites, urban anthropology sets a precedent in understanding the 
similarities and differences both within and between communities and how this can 
affect perceptions, including those of risk and dramatic change. 
 
Through urban ethnographies focusing on economy, we learn about the networks of 
trade, industry, and commercial development, in which cities often play the role of 
nodes in local, regional, and international networks. A key example here is Bestor’s 
study of Tokyo’s Tsukiji fish market. Starting with the early-morning fish auction, 
Bestor traces the connections to local, national, and international industries and 
businesses connected with the fish sold in the market (Bestor, 2005). The network of 
diverse markets is integral to the everyday practice of the market traders, demonstrating 
how local ethnography can investigate and comment upon much wider phenomena. 
This is just one example of how ethnographers have written about the city as a focal 
point for trade (Turner, 1995); industry (Willis, 2017 [1977]); and work (Rigi, 2003). 
Those living in Almaty have experienced dramatic changes in these areas, including the 
effect of devaluation and the privatisation of public industries. Like Bestor, I trace the 
local manifestations of wider networks to understand the influence of ongoing societal 
change on those living in Almaty. 
 
 
Methodological considerations addressed in the urban anthropology literature 
 
Urban anthropology presents the ethnographer with a unique set of methodological 
challenges. Foster and Kemper (2002 [1979]), first writing in 1979 and looking back at 
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existing ideas of the idealised anthropological field site, have commented that ‘under 
ideal circumstances we were able to live with village families, to sleep and work in a 
spare room, and to share meals with them’. Foster’s career focused on understanding the 
transformations Mexican peasants were undergoing in the 20th century; combined with 
Kemper’s attention to the development of urban anthropology, this perspective—
ethnography’s necessity to follow changes as peasants move from rural to urban 
environments—is still relevant today (Kemper, 1979; 1991). The tendency for 
anthropologists to live and work in small communities with a defined group of people 
has been an important tool in order for them to obtain rich data through close 
observation and participation; as these authors show, however, this is much harder to do 
in urban contexts. 
 
In urban environments, anthropologists face methodological challenges with serious 
epistemological ramifications. These challenges include difficulties in building 
networks of informants; difficulties in meeting and interacting with locals; the increased 
isolation of the fieldworker; and coming to terms with the incredible complexity of 
urban environments undergoing rapid change. These issues have the potential to 
become overwhelming due to the sheer number of potential research participants and 
divergent perspectives that the ethnographer comes across in the field. Thieme suggests 
that urban ethnographies can offer ‘granular’ portraits of urban life that counteract this 
overwhelming complexity by offering a ‘grounded’ basis from which to understand 
aspects of everyday life that may go unnoticed (Thieme et al., 2017, p. 130). A range of 
novel methodologies have been trialled in urban research contexts, including De 
Certeau’s (1984) focus on walking as a way to make connections between people and 
place, an idea echoed in Ingold’s (2007) focus on the paths and lines that form 
connections; Nazpary’s (2002) methodological focus on an urban housing block in 
Almaty; Ringel’s (2016) investigation into how a post-socialist urban housing block can 
be a way to understand how informants conceptualise of both the past and the future; 
Laszczkowski’s (2016) analysis of Astana’s architecture as a way of understanding 
urban dynamics; and Low’s (2014) emphasis on the study of urban space. The range of 
these approaches demonstrates that urban fieldwork must be responsive to the 
challenges particular to the chosen field site. 
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For anthropologists today, priority is placed on establishing a network of welcoming 
informants, forming an achievable research methodology, and scoping out the field site. 
It is often difficult to know precisely how representative data collected may be for large 
populations; where possible, I draw upon local census data and statistics to help me 
frame my discussion. However, statistics—for instance, the proportions of different 
ethnicities living in a particular area—are a highly political topic, and it is difficult to 
know how reliable the statistics are in Kazakhstan. For example, Catherine Alexander 
found that a large number of people living in and around Almaty, particularly those who 
are recent rural migrants to the city, are not documented or represented in official 
statistics (Alexander, 2018a). In Chapter 3, I will address some of these challenges and 
pay particular attention to the selection of my field site, reflecting on the sampling of 
informants and the limitations and difficulties in representing their views. I 
acknowledge the fragmentary and partial nature of the data I have collected, explaining 
how my focus on the young urban middle class and on particular topics helps me to 
comment more authoritatively on the potential insights that emerge from my data. 
 
Setha Low acknowledges that anthropologists have benefited from borrowing 
methodological tools from researchers in other disciplines, many of whom have 
experience working in urban contexts (Low, 2005b, p. 21). This includes political 
economy, architectural and planning theory, urban sociology, and cultural geography 
(ibid.). However, ethnography provides us with a different type of data, rich in nuanced 
detail and contextualised within networks of kin and community relations. 
 
Despite the challenges, Low argues, anthropology still has a lot to offer studies of urban 
contexts: ‘The contributions of anthropological fieldwork still retain the power to 
demonstrate the how, why, and when of urban processes, but are even more effective 
when linked to theoretical frameworks that provide a grounding for further study and 
discussion’ (Low, 2005b). She demonstrates how this can be put into practice with her 
ethnography of public space in Costa Rica. Through a detailed comparison of two 
public squares, encompassing the buildings which surround them, the people who 
frequent them, and the political, social, and celebratory events which play out in them, 
she documents their changing uses, public perceptions, and local history. Despite the 
seeming impenetrability of the urban milieu, Low’s insights emerge from an analysis of 
everyday encounters, contextualised in a specified and well-explained manner. As Low 
comments, ‘There is no unified experience of being in Park Central [one of the squares], 
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but fragments of its social production are reproduced in the everyday practices and 
feelings of users’ (Low, 2005a). Low’s ethnography highlights a key distinction which 
recurs throughout my thesis: the dynamic between public and private, state and 
population, visible and invisible, onstage and offstage. In the following section on 
narrative, a theoretical analysis of these dichotomies will be developed further in 
relation to rumour. 
 
Section summary 
I draw upon the anthropology of urban contexts when establishing my field site in 
Chapter 3 and when discussing the limitations and difficulties that I have encountered 
while carrying out fieldwork. Societal change is writ large in the city. Economic change 
can be seen in the construction of new developments and the deterioration of old 
buildings. As the state attempts to exert its influence in the urban landscape, political 
power is monumentalised in the architecture of new capitals. Social change can be seen 
in the transformation of neighbourhoods through processes of gentrification and 
deterioration following deindustrialisation. Cities offer a rich research context in which 
to investigate the delineation and conceptualisation of both public and private space. As 
anthropologists, the key value of the information, knowledge, and understanding that 
we gain is drawn from the voices of those living and working in the city on an everyday 
basis in their places of work, at their local cafés, houses, and apartments, on public 
transport, in shopping centres, and at workplaces and schools. 
 
 
Narrative 
 
Stories, narratives, life histories, and biography 
 
I argue that stories—in particular the narratives which my informants formed to explain 
their lives—are essential to understanding how the post-Soviet young urban middle 
class try to make sense of change by producing a stable and secure narrative to provide 
structure and meaning in everyday life. To do this, I need to question what is unique to 
these stories and what aspects have been documented elsewhere.  
 
Are stories, structured by narrative, a human universal to be found in cultures across the 
world? In The Golden Bough, James Frazer (2009 [1894]) compares and contrasts 
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different stories from across the world, including explanations of origins, stories of 
misfortune, creation tales, and religious parables. He comes to the conclusion that while 
there is an ‘essential similarity of man’s chief wants everywhere and at all times’, there 
is also a ‘wide difference between the means he has adopted to satisfy them in different 
ages’ (ibid., 804). Frazer makes wide-ranging conclusions, but through the analysis of 
stories and how they were articulated and structured by narrative, he acknowledges the 
diversity among local strategies of satisfying universal human needs. Frazer suggests 
that stories and narrative are therefore a human universal, a strategy for explaining and 
giving meaning to lives, a cross-cultural phenomenon through which anthropologists 
are able to compare and contrast dramatically different human societies. 
 
Can we go further and say that narrative defines us as humans? Michael Carrithers has 
argued ‘that our capacity to participate in a uniquely human form of complex social life 
is founded in the ability to find and follow a thread of narrative through a skein of 
events’ (Carrithers, 2005, p. 443). To qualify his statement, Carrithers outlines what he 
sees as the constituent parts of narrative: ‘(1) characters, with their feelings, memories, 
intentions and attitudes, (2) their actions, (3) effects of those actions on others’ feelings, 
memories, intentions and attitudes, (4) so on, as those others may respond to the actions 
of the first, making up an unfolding plot’ (ibid.). Building upon Carrithers’ argument, 
this thesis seeks to establish how my informants described the characters, places, and 
objects in their lives, and—crucially—how both actions and the effects of these actions 
bring about change on an everyday basis. Carrithers’ argument is that narrative is about 
making sense of change, understanding which actors brought about that change, what 
their motivations may have been, and the ongoing significance of change to everyday 
life. He quotes Evans-Pritchard to make the point that ‘it is through stories that we have 
come to understand “the moral significance of a situation”’ (Carrithers, 2005, p. 443; 
Evans-Pritchard, 1969, p. 53). Narratives therefore form a guide as to what is morally 
acceptable within a society. In this thesis, the narratives of my informants are often 
challenged by the risk of changes in the future, thereby causing them to question their 
moral map and unsettling the basis on which they give meaning to everyday 
interactions. 
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Narratives also make sense of many different ‘scapes’ other than a moral landscape, as 
Appadurai (2016) has elucidated.2 Tim Ingold (2007) stresses the importance of stories 
in making sense of space, arguing that storytelling and mapping are not just a way of 
describing, but a way of knowing. The important thing to consider, therefore, is the 
significance of stories and narrative to my informants. First and foremost, it is through 
the telling of stories—whether to each other or to the anthropologist in the field—that 
thoughts, feelings, and events come to be known. Ingold says that ‘to tell a story, then, 
is to relate, and narrate, the occurrences of the past, retrace a path through the world 
that others, recursively picking up the threads of past lives, can follow in the process of 
spinning out their own’ (Ingold, 2007, p. 30). This anthropological literature establishes 
the potential function and methodology by which things come to be known and can help 
us learn about how stories are told. I begin with a discussion of oral histories, from 
which we can begin to link the telling of informants’ stories to the anthropological 
fieldworker’s process of recording and analysis. 
 
Oral histories provide a strong example of the insights that anthropologists can gain 
from documenting and analysing narrative. Julie Cruickshank has argued that ‘in 
 
2 Appadurai’s theoretical idea of understanding a ‘global disjuncture’ through a consideration of 
different scapes has been influential in anthropological discussions of urbanism, globalization, 
and cosmopolitanism:  
‘I propose that an elementary framework for exploring such disjunctures is to look at the 
relationship among five dimensions of global cultural flows that can be termed (a) 
ethnoscapes, (b) mediascapes, (c) technoscapes, (d) financescapes, and (e) ideoscapes. 2 
The suffix -scape allows us to point to the fluid, irregular shapes of these landscapes, 
shapes that characterise international capital as deeply as they do international clothing 
styles. These terms with the common suffix -scape also indicate that these are not 
objectively given relations that look the same from every angle of vision but, rather, that 
they are deeply perspectival constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political 
situatedness of different sorts of actors: nation-states, multinationals, diasporic 
communities, as well as subnational groupings and movements (whether religious, 
political, or economic), and even intimate face-to-face groups, such as villages, 
neighborhoods, and families. Indeed, the individual actor is the last locus of this 
perspectival set of landscapes, for these landscapes are eventually navigated by agents 
who both experience and constitute larger formations, in part from their own sense of 
what these landscapes offer’. (Appadurai, 2016, pp. 296–97) 
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northern Canada storytellers of Yukon First Nations ancestry continue to tell stories that 
make meaningful connections and provide order and continuity in a rapidly changing 
world’ (Cruickshank, 2000, p. xii). Her analysis of stories builds on the work of Walter 
Benjamin, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Harold Innis, who ‘deplored the consequences when 
oral storytelling becomes marginalised by more powerful knowledge systems’ (ibid.). 
Tonkin (1992) argues that oral storytelling is one way that a balanced and insightful 
account of the past can be placed together through multiple subjective perspectives. 
 
The anthropological study of oral history emphasises the importance of the context—as 
well as content—of stories. Writing down an oral history ‘petrifies it’; therefore, the 
subjectivities of storytelling as a performative human action are an important 
consideration when documenting both how stories are told and how they are received 
(Dauenhauer & Dauenhauer, 1995, p. 102). Lwin (2017) pays attention to narrativity, 
the quality of the interaction between the storyteller and the audience, a focus which 
introduces additional meanings that may be missed if looking at the text alone. Duranti 
(2003) discusses narrativity as part of a third paradigm of linguistic anthropology in the 
20th century, which has extended the study of language ‘at first confined to interview 
situations’ to a point where it has ‘entered the more spontaneous domains of speakers’ 
lives’ (ibid., p. 332). The study of narrative and oral history must therefore cover the 
social context in which stories are told. 
 
Looking again at Cruickshank’s example and following the story of one of her 
informants, Angela Sidney, whom she worked with over a period of 17 years, we learn 
how ‘meanings do not inhere in a story but are created in the everyday situations in 
which they are told’ (Cruickshank, 2000, p. xv). A dramaturgical lens helps us to 
consider the wider contextual influences associated with a performance, including the 
audience, set, actors, timing, plot, social references, dramatic conventions and more, 
which come together to reinforce certain meanings that the performance or performer 
wishes to convey. For example, Hoffman (2005, p. 321) discusses how a ‘dramaturgy of 
warscapes’ was drawn upon by insurgent groups in Liberia and included ‘a global 
currency of imagery and upon narratives that circulate internationally’. Referencing 
Moran’s comments, Hoffman notes the impact that the insurgents’ narratives had on a 
global Liberian diaspora that then, in turn, affected homeland politics (in Lubkemann, 
2004). The insurgents’ performance had a global reach because of the tropes that it drew 
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upon, influencing local politics through the particular audiences that responded to those 
narratives. 
 
In the context of my fieldwork, attention to situational context is important for a 
reflexive ethnographic methodology: ‘[e]thnographies always begin as conversations 
between anthropologists and our hosts’ (Cruickshank, 2000, p. 25). When the informant 
tells us a story, there is a reason; often it is a response to the anthropologist’s question. 
In Chapter 4, discussions of a mudflow in Almaty evoke particular responses, but these 
have only emerged in a post-flood context in dialogue with an inquisitive 
anthropologist, and they should be evaluated in this context. 
 
As a methodological technique, life histories are a good way to build up the timeline of 
a person’s life in relation to the context in which they live. Like Dauenhauer and 
Dauenhauer, Crapanzano emphasises the transformation involved in the 
anthropologist’s recording of informants’ stories: ‘The life history is usually constituted 
through transformation—the transformation from an oral production to a written 
product’ (Crapanzano, 1984, p. 957). Crapanzano asks us to question the role of 
biography, reflecting on how the intentions of the fieldworker influence the data 
collected. In a review of five examples of life histories, he criticises the authors2 for 
their incomplete presentation of a life, but also states that completeness may well be 
unachievable. Faced with a research methodology that only documents fragments of 
lives, how appropriate is this life-history approach to understanding change in 
Kazakhstan? In Crapanzano’s words, ‘Indeed, given its retrospective nature, are we 
analysing “real”- options—the options at the time—or selected options that justify 
choices already made?’ (ibid., p. 959). In understanding the potential for retrospective 
re-evaluation, biographies can be analysed as means of dealing with dramatic 
changes—specifically, how these fragments of life are retold.  
 
Chanfrault-Duchet (1991) has highlighted the value of what she describes as a ‘life-
story approach’, which is able to provide a fuller picture by bringing fragments of life 
together through the inclusion of underrepresented voices. Chanfrault-Duchet eschews 
the gendered term ‘life histories’ in order to deal specifically with the representation of 
 
2 The authors include Langness and Gelya, 1948; McKinley, 1982; Sexton, 1981; Buechler & 
Buechler, 1981; and Shostak, 1981. 
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women’s voices. Her argument is that ‘the life-story approach has, in recent years, come 
to be seen as a successful medium for collecting women's words, that is, for reaching a 
social “group:” that does not often speak on the social stage’ (ibid., p.77). Rather than 
the fragmentary elements that Crapanzano suggests are a limitation of taking a narrative 
approach, Chanfrault-Duchet shows how they are a tool to accessing and representing 
underrepresented voices and points of view: ‘the life story approach has to be 
considered a methodological tool providing access to a body of information that is more 
detailed, more discerning, but also far more complex to analyze than that collected 
through other approaches’ (ibid., p. 89). In addition to this approach as a 
methodological tool, Chanfrault-Duchet also emphasises the literary forms which these 
stories can assume, many of which are informed by diverse sources including ‘oral 
tradition, written literature and television series’ (ibid., p.80). Particular forms are 
relevant to a Soviet and post-Soviet context, and a discussion of these helps to situate 
the theoretical discussion in the historical context in which my fieldwork is based.  
 
Since 1917 and the Bolshevik revolution, the stories of ordinary people have played an 
important role in the development of a new Soviet society. Although there may have 
been a public emphasis on the importance of a collective identity and struggle, Hellbeck 
(2001) argues that this was not to the detriment of individual self-expression. The 
writing of personal biographies was one way that individuals were encouraged to re-cast 
their own stories as part of a wider societal process grounded in revolutionary politics, 
which ‘centred on creating revolutionary selves, on making Soviet citizens think of 
themselves and act as conscious historical subjects’ (ibid., p. 341). 
 
Soviet-era avtobiografia (autobiographical texts) were central to this process and are the 
focus of Hellbeck’s (2001) research. Soviet citizens were required to submit memoirs to 
the authorities at regular intervals in their lives, and Hellbeck’s research theorises the 
potential role that these recently uncovered NKVD (secret police) texts might play in 
revealing potential ‘hidden transcripts’—a term which references James Scott (1985) 
and forms part of a discussion which I develop in more detail in the following section 
on p. 67). 
 
The aspect of Hellbeck’s research most relevant to this thesis is the discussion of an 
important nexus between private and public, self and society—described through 
different forms of autobiographical life story. He describes the apparent difference 
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between memoir, which ‘had the educational advantage of presenting a cohesive, 
unified narrative of self-development’, and the diary narrative, which was ‘choppy and 
resonated with competing voices in the process of self-constitution’ (ibid., p. 344). 
Arguing that neither is closer to experience, both forms of self-expression are different 
ways in which the individual makes sense of themselves and their place in society. In 
this thesis, I tease apart different threads of narrative offered by my informants in 
different times and places; Hellbeck’s research highlights the importance of looking at 
the form, context, and content of these narratives. It is difficult to know if these 
autobiographical forms of self-expression, originating in the 1930s, still resonate in 
post-Soviet Kazakhstan today. However, a further example of the changing personal 
biography of one Uzbek woman underscores how autobiographical representations can 
change over time and gives an insight into the ways that current circumstances can be 
reflected in individuals’ biographies and life stories, just as Cruickshank’s informant 
Angela Sidney adapted her storytelling to the contexts in which it was taking place. 
 
‘Communist, Uzbek, Survivor’ is how one woman, Saodat Shamiseva, is described in 
the title of Kamp’s (2001) paper, which discusses ‘three versions of her life history at 
three historical moments’ (p. 21). Kamp argues that ‘her agency is seen in her ability to 
interpret her experience and to re-cast her identity as new politics and new narratives 
enable and constrain her choices’ (ibid.). In an example from a 1961 autobiography, 
Saodat reflects on the public narratives of Soviet socialist society in her account of her 
own actions: “[W]e carried out a great deal of work together to educate liberated 
women, and to liquidate illiteracy among housewives, directing them to clubs and 
workplaces” (p. 28). Here, her personal experiences are cast within the ideological 
framework of Soviet socialism. In a side note, relevant to my own thesis, Kamp 
indicates that ‘nothing in this autobiography suggests difficulty or uncertainty’ (p. 31). I 
found that in my own informants’ narratives, they often avoided discussing 
uncertainties, instead presenting a coherent public-facing persona. The strength of a 
narrative is related to the coherence of the message it sends; in this case, Saodat is 
emphasising her contribution to Soviet society and chooses to highlight events which 
support that message. 
 
However, the message that she chooses to emphasise changes over time. In each of the 
three versions of Saodat’s life story, the accounts are different: ‘[M]any details of her 
first memoir conformed to normative Communist images, but were made into a more 
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“patriotic” story in the 1988 version. In [the] post-Soviet version, there is no heroic 
story’ (ibid., p. 56). These changes in the message of Saodat’s life story reflect both her 
personal journey through life and the zeitgeist of the time. The argument that is 
emerging from the literature is that individuals’ stories, collected through 
autobiography, oral history interviews, or police reports, are heavily influenced by 
wider societal narratives and in turn form part of a social discourse of the times in 
which they are produced. This thesis’s task is to uncover and analyse contemporary 
influences on both life stories and narratives of everyday life. Understanding how my 
informants form and present these narratives can therefore give us an insight into much 
wider societal influences on the lives of individuals.  
 
The above examples discuss the important role of narrative in Soviet and post-Soviet 
contexts. An additional point to be developed is concerned with theorising the use of 
narratives by individuals as a relational tool—a key to sociality. Drawing on the work of 
Hannah Arendt, Michael Jackson (2013) explores the various uses of storytelling; this 
discussion provides a theoretical basis for the next section of the literature review. 
 
Jackson (2013) draws upon Arendt’s (1958) idea that there is a ‘subjective-in-between’, 
a gap between direct experience and the way in which that experience can be rendered 
comprehensible to others (ibid., p. 15). Storytelling and the use of narrative are 
hypothesised as one way in which individuals bridge this divide: ‘When one tells 
stories, therefore, one is never simply giving voice to what is on one’s own mind or in 
one’s own interests; one is realizing, or objectifying, one’s own experience in ways that 
others can relate through experiences of their own’ (p. 15). Navigating this subjective-
in-between is an everyday challenge for my informants, made all the more difficult in 
the context of state influence of public narratives through the monopolisation and 
control of media and the censorship of public protest and debate. 
 
Jackson (2013) argues that there are many uses for storytelling; in his fieldwork with 
refugees, he explains that stories and narratives act as ‘cover stories, defences against 
danger and hurt’ (p. 15), ‘to escape from terror, to cross a border to be selected for 
emigration […] and persuade officials to look kindly on one’s petition for family 
reunions’ (p. 14). Storytelling, as Jackson frames it, is a way that individuals are able to 
act in the world by bringing about a response in others. Jackson cites Arendt’s two 
theses: the first that ‘storytelling is a strategy for transforming private into public 
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meanings’, and the second, which ‘is existential, seeing storytelling as a vital human 
strategy for sustaining a sense of agency in the face of disempowering circumstances’ 
(ibid., p. 34). These two theses are very important to the context of my own thesis as I 
explore how narratives are used by my informants in the face of uncertainty on an 
everyday basis. As I discuss in the conclusion, my informants’ narratives hold the key 
to understanding how private uncertainties are discussed in public.  
 
My informants, the young urban middle class, are undergoing a constant process of 
sculpting, moulding, and justifying what it is to be middle class, especially when there 
is not a local historic model from which they are borrowing. Oral histories, biography, 
and life history have been important anthropological tools for research and analysis, 
helping to understand people’s lives and the subjectivities involved in ethnographic data 
collection. Not all narratives behave in the same way; while there are numerous strands 
of anthropological research into narrative, in the following discussion I focus on rumour 
and gossip, two forms of narrative that I found to be of critical importance in my field 
site. 
 
Gossip and rumour 
 
As I had originally set out to discuss an earthquake risk, my informants often saw me as 
an alternative source of information and a carrier of timely rumours, insights, or stories. 
I was clear in explaining that I could only talk about what I had heard, and in 
acknowledging the sources of that information. However, for both my informants and 
me, an important part of everyday conversation often involved putting forward 
information, then openly discussing its credibility. I will engage with this in relation to 
specific examples: a flood in Chapter 2, and the middle class in Chapter 4. This raises 
some important methodological considerations: To what extent can the anthropologist 
be party to rumour and gossip? Was I part of these groups because I was privy to certain 
information? How did my role as an outsider influence the topics that I discussed? The 
literature on both gossip and rumour provides some unique insights which are relevant 
in helping to understand this situation. 
 
The distinguishing factors of gossip are their function, as a marker of group 
demarcation; their form, as a text shared between members of a group about a non-
partisan other; and their context, as they are shared in intimate and everyday places. The 
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distinguishing factors of rumour, on the other hand, also involve an intimate and 
everyday context and a concern with unofficial, unverified, and potentially interesting 
information. Crucially, with rumour, the source of the information is anonymous. As I 
will show throughout this thesis, the anonymity of rumours is used to provide unofficial 
narratives that counter state hegemony.  
 
Rumour and gossip emerged from my data as important themes across all the topics I 
researched for this thesis. The context in Kazakhstan is such that there is little to no 
opposition media; few contrary public opinions to official narratives; and a desire—
shared by all parties—not to upset a precarious status quo. The literature on rumour and 
gossip provides important insights which can help with research in this context. For 
example, Bruckermann has commented on rumours’ function as an important tool for 
Shanxi citizens in China, where, faced with an earthquake scare and a lack of official 
information, they turned to fireworks, car horns and sirens to express these rumours in 
public action ‘as people took crisis prevention into their own hands letting those around 
them to the threat of catastrophe’ (Bruckermann, 2018, p. 189). Bruckermann (2018, 
198) also writes that ‘in order to secure safe, adequate and affordable housing as part of 
long-term livelihood strategies, Shanxi residents turned towards each other, rather than 
official media and government outlets, for trustworthy information and reliable 
support’. The situation in Kazakhstan, much like the case in Shanxi before a rumoured 
earthquake, can be summarised as a public presentation of civil obedience alongside a 
private search for information. The search for information through rumour also emerges 
as an important theme discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
An important distinction has been made in the literature between gossip and rumour. In 
an influential paper that has informed the study of gossip, Gluckman (1963) argues that 
its primary function is group demarcation. This includes indicating who belongs, 
marking others as outsiders and delineating the boundaries of a group. Gluckman cites 
an example of Colson’s discussion of the Makah: ‘In this analysis Colson clearly 
establishes the important point that specific and restricted gossip within a group marks 
it off from other groups, both like and unlike. The gossip and scandal which are so 
biting in Makah life unite them into a group outside of general American society’ 
(Gluckman, 1963, p. 311). The point which Gluckman stresses is that ‘gossip is not idle: 
it has social functions and it has rules which are rigidly controlled’ (ibid.). 
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Rather than focus on function, Paz emphasises context, explaining that we can 
recognise gossip as ‘any text transmitted between ratified participants about a 
discursively non-present group other’ (Paz, 2009, p. 119). Gossip can take the form of 
both oral and written communication. Paz also sees context as a key distinguishing 
factor between gossip and rumour. He differentiates studies of rumour from those of 
gossip, commenting that the former are often based on texts that ‘seem to have a wider 
circulation, and go beyond the interests of any one small group’ (ibid.). In defining 
gossip, Besnier emphasises locations in which gossip can be found in order to 
distinguish it from other types of information, opinion, or comment (Besnier, 2009, p. 
2). Specifically, Besnier argues, gossip exists within intimate and everyday contexts. 
 
I follow these definitions with a more detailed discussion of the analysis of gossip and 
rumour in an ethnographic context. In his ethnography of a Latino community in Israel, 
Paz argues that gossip addresses the issue that ‘a highly marginalised group does not 
have a voice in the Hebrew press’ (Paz, 2009, p. 133). His study looks at chisme, a form 
of gossip. He analyses chisme in both the context of a local football game, with its 
associated social gathering, and in written form in the local Spanish-language newsletter 
Alcachofa (Artichoke). Paz demonstrates how gossip is gendered, localised, and 
culturally specific, arguing that chisme is a culturally specific way to reflect on the 
goings-on within a community. Gossip, in particular Alcochofa’s chisme page, gives the 
community a public voice and the opportunity to reflect as a group when the 
mainstream press may not represent or give voice to their views.  
 
Paz’s discussion connects us to a wider debate in the literature of gossip as a tool for the 
marginalised or oppressed. James Scott’s discussion of ‘everyday forms of resistance’ is 
cited by both Paz and Besnier as an important discussion which broadens the scope of 
academic attention to gossip, specifically the consideration of gossip as a ‘weapon of 
the weak’ (Besnier, 2009, p. 2; Paz, 2009, p. 118). Scott discusses how a local village 
elite can monopolise onstage power; ‘only “backstage,” where gossip, tales, slander, 
and anonymous sabotage mocks and negates the public ritual order, does elite control 
fall away’ (Scott, 1985, p. 27). Scott makes the crucial point that, ‘as a form of 
resistance, then, gossip is a kind of democratic “voice” in conditions where power and 
possible repression make open acts of disrespect dangerous’ (Scott, 1985, p. 282). As in 
Paz’s example, gossip gives a voice to those who may be oppressed, but does so in a 
way that protects the villagers through anonymity. In the context of present-day Almaty, 
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my informants are forced to negotiate these different public and private narratives in 
order to make sense of ongoing change, define their identity, and deal with uncertainty 
about the future. 
 
Besnier takes up and develops Scott’s distinction between ‘“public transcripts”: social 
action that takes place in the open, particularly when interacting with the oppressor[, 
and] “hidden transcripts,” forms of speech and behaviour that occur when the 
subordinated congregate “offstage”’, arguing that ‘through expressions of stories, songs, 
rituals, or gossip, the subordinate reflect on their subordination, defy its agents, and 
forge solidarity’ (Besnier, 2009, p. 8). This theoretical analysis is based on the 
influential work of Goffman, who first proposed a dramaturgical analysis of social 
interaction (Goffman, 1959). In Kazakhstan, public onstage criticism of the state is a 
rare, difficult, and dangerous undertaking. The state has clamped down on peaceful 
protest in recent years, most notably in the response to protests by oil workers in 
Zhanaozen in western Kazakhstan and recent protests in Almaty regarding the lack of 
transparency in the process of appointing a new president (NEWS, 2011; TCA, 2017). I 
therefore look to the ‘hidden’ and ‘offstage’ interactions that my informants used in 
everyday life, culminating in an analysis of the role of rumour in Chapter 7. 
 
In response to an authoritarian state, as currently seen in Kazakhstan, rumour comes 
into its own, mediating a potentially harmful and traceable flow of information with 
unofficial narratives. However, rumour also played a role in the ‘implosion of state 
authority’ following revolutionary protests in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in 2010 (Reeves, 
2014b, p. 73). Reeves (2014b) details how the public responded to a lack of official 
information through the proliferation of ‘densely circulating rumors’, asking questions 
such as, ‘Had the water system been poisoned? […] Had looters attacked TsUM, the 
Central Department Store and the prime landmark of modern, commercial, peaceful 
Bishkek?’ (Reeves, 2014b, p. 73). These rumours are concerned with the effect of the 
revolutionary protests on everyday life as the public try to establish the extent to which 
their way of life is threatened, has been forced to change, or is beset by new risks. These 
apprehensions are similar to those that motivate the rumours circulated by my 
informants in Almaty. 
 
Rumour is often attributed to an anonymous source, divorcing the individual from 
bearing the burden of responsibility for what is said. Bruckermann suggests that 
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minjian—a term with a similar meaning to ‘rumours’ that directly translates as ‘between 
the people’—were used for exactly this purpose, allowing local Shanxi residents to 
discuss alternative narratives and sidestep ‘local government assurances’ to come to 
their own conclusions about potential risks (Bruckermann, 2018, p. 190). As indicated 
in the introduction, and developed in further detail here as it corresponds to relevant 
discussions in the literature, I argue that rumour is a narrative form that provides an 
opportunity to discuss, challenge, verify, interrogate, and reflect upon official 
narratives, personal concerns, and the various risks and uncertainties faced in everyday 
life. 
 
 
Risk and Uncertainty 
 
Risk and uncertainty are both central themes through which we can understand how my 
informants conceptualise and deal with the consequences of past and future change. 
Both concepts are discussed using the term ‘risk’ in the majority of the literature; I will 
acknowledge when the literature differentiates between the two concepts. 
 
Alaszewski argues that over the last hundred years, ‘risk and uncertainty have not been 
central themes’ in anthropological study (Alaszewski, 2015, p. 223). However, this 
misses the importance of risk perception in everyday decision-making, a central focus 
of anthropological research. Everyone lives with risk, but many among Almaty’s urban 
middle class are learning to live with a combination of risks for the first time, few of 
which were experienced by their parents’ generation. The challenge for the 
anthropologist is to understand which risks are prioritised and how others are dealt with 
in a local context. In the words of Mary Douglas, ‘Since no one can attend to 
everything, some sort of priority must be established among dangers; otherwise, merely 
counting risky objects would make us defenceless’ (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 3). 
Through the lens of Cultural Theory, which Boholm (2015, p. 10) considers a ‘major 
theoretical contribution’ to the anthropological study of risk, Douglas seeks to 
understand how ‘each social arrangement elevates some risks to a high peak and 
depresses others below sight’ (ibid., p. 8). She argues that there is a strong tie between 
the way we live and how we assess risk: ‘the choice of risks and the choice of how to 
live are taken together’ (ibid.). In the context of Almaty, looking at different 
communities (middle-class students at the university, ethnic Uighurs, ethnic Koreans, 
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ethnic Kazakhs, and ethnic Russians) shows how they prioritise risks in different ways 
despite living in close proximity to each other. 
 
Douglas’s Cultural Theory tackles the difficult problem of distinguishing between 
perceptions of risk and feelings of uncertainty: ‘How can we know whether […] 
dangers are actually increasing or whether we are more afraid?’ (ibid., p. 188). Boholm 
summarises the findings of cognitive psychologists’ research into this distinction, 
referencing the work of Paul Slovic (Boholm, 2015; Slovic, 1987, 2012): ‘When 
laypersons make estimates of risk they do not merely calculate the bad outcome in 
accordance with statistical (probabilistic) information[…] they resort to heuristic 
cognitive devices—mental guidelines that make knowledge about risk readily 
accessible’ (Boholm, 2015, pp. 32–33). A result of these ‘heuristic cognitive devices’ is 
that cultural differences are equally, if not more, important than probabilistic measures 
of risk in determining how risks are perceived, since judgements are often made quickly 
without logical and rational analysis (Slovic & Peters, 2006). 
 
Major theoretical studies of risk within the social sciences, such as the work of Beck4 
(1992 [1986]) and Giddens (1991), emerged from a perceived need within Western 
academia to understand the accelerated globalisation of Western ideas. These authors 
asked a crucial question: What does it mean to be modern? This question has also been 
the focus of recent scholarly work in the anthropology of Central Asia, focusing on how 
ideas of modernity travel along the Pamir Highway (Mostowlansky, 2017), and how 
Kazakhstan’s new capital can be understood as a manifestation of Kazakh ideas of 
modernity (Laszczkowski, 2016). Originally, Beck and Giddens were addressing the 
problem of how to understand a fundamental change emerging in Western societies. 
How applicable is their discussion to understanding post-socialist contexts such as 
Almaty? Both writers’ work focuses on the idea of risk in relation to individualisation, 
secularisation (a move away from fatalistic ideas), and neoliberalism—the dominant 
social paradigm of the West, which at that time marked it as fundamentally distinct 
from the East. It is no coincidence that this work coincides with the collapse of the 
 
4 As summarised by Brian Wynne in the preface to the 1992 edition of Risk Society, Beck’s 
central argument is that industrial society, structured by class, is being replaced by an 
individualised risk society. As a result, it is not the ‘goods’ of an industrial society that are 
important, but the attribution of ‘bads’—the responsibility for unavoidable risks (Beck, 1992 
[1986], p. 3). 
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Soviet Union. It follows the fervent belief at the time—at least in the West—that there 
would be an inevitable ‘transition’ from socialism to capitalism. Authors including 
Burawoy and Verdery have taken issue with this teleological outlook, instead arguing 
for a view of ‘evolution rather than revolution, that see[s] hybrid societies rather than 
polar extremes’ (Burawoy & Verdery, 1999, p. 1). Returning to the question posed by 
Beck and Giddens regarding what it means to be modern, the answer is not found in a 
global theory of cultural homogeneity, but in the multiplicity of differences found in 
rapidly changing everyday lives in different cultural contexts. For Burawoy and 
Verdery, these places of rapid change, of which Almaty is a prime example, are ‘social 
spaces in which the ethnographic eye might be most fruitfully trained’ (ibid., p. 3). 
 
In her edited volume of risk, Caplan (2000) outlines a third approach to risk which 
focuses on the benefits of an ethnographic methodology. Boholm describes how 15 
years on, the contextualised methodological approach used by the contributors to 
Caplan’s reader remains relevant. In comparison to broader theoretical approaches, it is 
‘both more ethnographic and more diverse, with a focus on how events and phenomena 
are voiced by “particular informants”, thus situating them in “particular times and 
places”’ (Caplan, 2000, p. 25; Boholm, 2015, p. 10). This approach explores how ‘risk 
issues are embedded in local context, taking into account the ways in which culturally 
framed experience and knowledge shape how risk is understood, managed, negotiated 
and contested in terms of power, identity and social belonging’ (Boholm, 2015, p. 10). 
The merits of this approach closely follow the benefits of ethnography in general, but 
here, Caplan shows the efficacy of an ethnographic approach in the study of risk. 
 
We need to look to other strands of anthropological enquiry, such as the anthropology 
of climate change, to discover many of these contextualised ethnographic accounts of 
risk. In her survey of the anthropology of climate change, Susan Crate (2011) argues 
that ‘anthropologists are strategically well suited to interpret, facilitate, translate, 
communicate, advocate, and act in response to the cultural implications of 
unprecedented change’ (Crate, 2011, p. 178 [Crate & Nuttall, 2009]). In contrast to the 
wider literature on the anthropology of risk, the field of anthropology and climate 
change has a strong applied agenda, focusing on how anthropologists can work with 
communities to better understand how global issues play out in local contexts. Perhaps 
this advocacy for the rights of subjects is a direct consequence of studying the wider 
context in which their vulnerability to risks has emerged. In providing ways to 
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understand and theorise cultural approaches to change, this body of literature is relevant 
to my research in Almaty. 
 
While many of the changes in Kazakhstan are not linked to climate change, the 
anthropology of climate change is also helpful to my study of Almaty because it 
‘presents novel challenges, especially by rendering what were once suitable survival 
strategies as obsolete’, just as many of the ongoing changes in Kazakhstan have done 
(Crate, 2011, p. 182 [Oliver-Smith, 2009]). Ethnography with a focus on climate change 
explores strategies for making sense of significant change. For example, in her 2008 
work ‘Gone the bull of winter?’, Crate explores what happens when the stories that 
people have used to explain the environment around them no longer make sense. 
Recognising that traditional narratives personifying the winter as a fierce bull have been 
rendered obsolete by a warming climate, Crate explains that changes to local narratives 
were not just the result of a changing climate, but also reflected changes in household-
level production. As in Almaty, these changing narratives reflected a wider gamut of 
societal changes. 
 
The threat of future change is often a pressure on life in the present. In Lazarus’s 
ethnography of the governance of vulnerability in Tuvalu, the threat of ‘sea level rise, 
surface and sub-surface temperature increases, ocean acidification and coral bleaching, 
coastal erosion, increased intensity but decreased frequency of rainfall, and an increased 
frequency of extreme weather events, including drought’ jeopardises the existence of 
those who live there. Lazarus argues that because people are denied access to power 
structures, they become increasingly vulnerable (Lazarus, 2009, p. 242). In the 
conclusion to this thesis, I discuss how my young informants’ ability to protest in public 
is restricted by the government. This leads to a feeling of helplessness, which often 
magnifies existing worries and intensifies informants’ perceived vulnerability to a range 
of environmental, political, and social hazards. 
 
Ibañez-Tirado documents an experience of helplessness in Tajikistan through an 
analysis of two events described locally as folia (disasters): the ongoing effects of a 
flood, experienced alongside a state campaign to build a hydroelectric dam (Ibañez-
Tirado, 2015, p. 5). Ibañez-Tirado suggests that ‘Kulob residents do not see disastrous 
events and stagnation as ruptures, risks or circumstances that they can prevent and 
administer. Instead, Kulob residents often refer to disasters as “normal”’ (ibid.). Other 
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such ‘disasters’, such as ‘constant debt and chronic illnesses, combined with a lack of 
sustainable sources of income and affordable medical care’, were not considered as 
events, ‘but rather constant aspects of people’s daily lives’ (ibid., p. 3)—a phenomenon 
which Ibañez-Tirado describes as living with ‘everyday disasters’. The author cites 
‘joking’ and ‘cunning’ as local strategies which informants adopted to talk about and 
deal with everyday disasters; this is another example of a linguistic strategy used on an 
everyday basis to fold difficult, unwanted, and threatening circumstances into everyday 
life. Ibañez-Tirado uses Hoffman and Lubkemann’s (2005) discussion of war to 
exemplify how ‘the distinction between event and the everyday is difficult to define’ as 
everyday uncertainty becomes a certainty (Ibañez-Tirado, 2015). Like climate change, 
war has been described as a ‘dynamic pressure’ which increases existing vulnerabilities 
in society as what are normally considered long-term risks are forced into everyday 
decision-making (Wisner, 2004 [1994], p. 53). Hoffman and Lubkemann suggest that 
‘contemporary modes of ethnographic representation still fruitfully carry forward a long 
legacy of marking specific moments for their ability to reveal the unremarkably 
common patterns that operate at the general level’ (Hoffman & Lubkemann, 2005, p. 
317). In Chapter 4, I make a similar assertion, using the rupture of a sudden flood 
event—and the consequent responses of my informants and the general public—to 
understand the everyday negotiation of uncertainty. 
 
Yet the secrets to everyday understandings of risk and uncertainty are not always 
revealed by dramatic events. Sometimes they are only uncovered through close analysis 
of how particular concepts are understood locally. In his ethnographic study of Aralsk, 
in the Aral Sea region of Kazakhstan, William Wheeler explores how the ambiguous 
term ekologiaa is used to talk about ‘the entanglements of economic and ecological 
problems which preoccupy so much of the discourse of the town’, illustrating how his 
research informants see these areas as part of an interlinked whole (Wheeler, 2016, p. 
248). Wheeler’s informants use the term ekologiaa in relation to pollution; personal 
health issues such as high blood pressure; the unknown effects of rocket explosions at 
the Russian-operated Baikonur cosmodrome; and the anecdotal healing properties of 
local sand. Everyday concepts’ ability to acquire a diverse range of meanings suggests 
that no term should be taken at face value and that meanings can shift depending on 
context. Breaking down how stories of change, risk, and uncertainty are narrated by my 
informants, I will analyse the intersection of influences on everyday life, including 
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ethnicity, life aspirations, the politics of language use, urban/rural stereotypes, 
educational attainment, corruption, and trust in kinship and close friend networks. 
 
When local populations have little or no say in the risks to which they are exposed, local 
strategies emerge for folding risks into the everyday, either creating coping strategies or 
normalising the severity of risks. In The Nuclear Peninsula, Zonabend describes how 
living with the potential of catastrophic risk is part of everyday life for those who work 
at a nuclear-waste processing plant (Zonabend, 1993 [1989]). The everyday reality of 
living with risk extends to the families of workers and the communities who live in 
close proximity to the plant. As the plant is one of the main employers in the area, the 
risks involved are a necessary part of local employment. In order to cope with the risks 
on an everyday basis, workers undertake novel strategies of naming potential risks, 
normalising their existence and incorporating them into everyday practice. 
 
Through harnessing and controlling personal narratives, members of the public can find 
ways to handle difficult situations which are otherwise out of their control. Petryna 
(2003) describes how citizens in post-Chernobyl Ukraine took advantage of the 
additional health support offered by the state to those who had been affected by 
radioactive pollution, thus mitigating the withdrawal of state health provision that 
followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Petryna explains that citizens took control of 
their personal narratives to create sviaz (ties) with the state, which entitled them to 
health care provision. In this way, they took advantage of governmental support for 
those affected by Chernobyl in a process she describes as ‘biological citizenship’: 
‘Biological citizenship became a complex bureaucratic process by which a population 
attempts to secure a status as harmfully exposed and deserving of compensation’ 
(Petryna 2003, p. xxv). Petryna’s study shows that in facing risks, citizens can take 
control of a situation and find novel ways to overcome significant change and the 
hardships that accompany it. As citizens seek to negotiate changing social and political 
and ecological landscapes, responses to risk are not just coping strategies, but can offer 
the potential for empowerment. 
 
Anthropologists look at risk through the quotidian. Even in examples of living with risk, 
climate crisis, and war, the study of everyday strategies has been shown to be 
important—and this informs my thesis’s focus on the everyday lives of my informants. 
The rapid changes experienced in post-socialist contexts, particularly in Central Asia, 
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have significantly impacted everyday life in Almaty. It is to this geographical and 
topical focus that I now turn. 
 
 
Anthropology of Central Asia 
 
The anthropology of Central Asia is a relatively young yet thriving field of academic 
study. It sits within the context of the wider body of literature on the anthropology of 
socialism and post-socialism. Key topics covered in this section include changes in late 
socialism; privatisation and decentralisation; nationality and ethnicity; language; 
nationalism; religion; and modernity. I divide my discussion between two clusters of 
topics. The first cluster includes those aspects of socialism and post-socialism 
experienced across the former Soviet Union, referencing the particularities of the 
Central Asian context of these issues. The second cluster focuses on how change has 
taken place in Central Asia and Kazakhstan in particular. 
 
Only a few ethnographic studies took place during the Soviet era.5 Following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, it became easier to carry out fieldwork, and there was an 
increase in international and local scholarship in formerly impenetrable field sites. This 
led to what Berdahl et al. (2000) describe as an ‘avalanche’ of new research, focused on 
documenting and understanding the realities of both socialist and unfolding post-
socialist experiences. 
 
Many Western academics, including political scientists and economists, have employed 
triumphalist narratives which frame capitalism as having overcome socialism (Berdahl 
et al. 2000, p. 1). This narrative has also been described as a ‘rescue scenario’ where 
Western advisers are either seen as doctors or gods, intervening to heal an illness or to 
create a new world from scratch (Verdery, 1996a, p. 225). These narratives were the 
result of an influx of Western advisers from institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Travelling to areas of the former Soviet 
Union, these advisers assumed that there was an inevitable role for neoliberal policies in 
these places (Berdahl et al., 2000, p. 2). In response to this, anthropologists have 
encouraged more nuanced approaches to understanding the existing processes of change 
 
5 Notable studies include Humphrey (1983), Verdery (1983), and Ries (2009). 
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that were already underway in the early 1990s, which were influenced by existing 
Soviet policies and local political, economic, and social contexts. This has been 
described in terms of following a ‘trajectory of change’ (ibid., p. 9). 
 
 
Aspects of socialism and post-socialism experienced across the former Soviet Union 
 
The various Central Asian experiences of post-socialism can be understood by building 
on the foundation of literature covering the wider geographical area of the Soviet 
Union. Alexei Yurchak draws our attention to changes in ‘late Socialism’ in Russia 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union. He argues that ideological discourse shifted 
from a semantic model, which followed the literal meanings of ideological doctrines, to 
a pragmatic model which simply reproduced the form, but not the substance, of 
ideological discourse (Yurchak, 2003, p. 481). Soviet state policies shifted with 
perestroika, and Nancy Ries (1997) found that Soviet populations discussed these 
policies on an everyday basis using lived examples and stories of suffering and 
misfortune. These discussions of perestroika are limited in the extent to which they can 
be applied to other former Soviet countries, however. Mandel explains that ‘Poland, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan and Mongolia undertook similar policies in the 1990s […] yet the 
consequences have been very different’, suggesting that we must be careful in applying 
findings from one area to another (Mandel & Humphrey, 2002, p. 11). For this reason, I 
focus on how general trends in the study of the former Soviet Union have been 
understood by anthropologists studying Central Asia.  
 
Different perspectives on how to understand decentralisation have been put forward in 
the literature, from Luong Jones’s (2002) focus on institutional change and political 
continuity in Central Asia, to Haghayeghi’s (1997) focus on the politics of privatisation. 
With the collapse of Soviet rule in Central Asia, power was devolved to newly 
independent states. Within the new republics, a national power vacuum was filled by 
those who already had political influence. In Kazakhstan, the first secretary of the 
Communist Party, Nursultan Nazarbayev, was elected as president, only stepping down 
in 2019. Roy argues that, faced with forming all the complexities of a functioning 
nation-state, it is no surprise that many Soviet-era structures were reappropriated—at 
times only the names of organisations, policies, and institutions were changed (Roy, 
2000).  
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One significant change that took place was the privatisation of state assets. This led to 
deepening inequality as those with political influence, such as state bureaucrats and 
apparatchiks (functionaries of the Communist Party), took advantage of their existing 
positions. Beginning in 1991, privatisation in Kazakhstan expanded to include state-run 
factories, mines, refineries, housing, and utilities, among other areas (Haghayeghi, 
1997). In her work on privatisation in Almaty, Catherine Alexander argues that the 
former ubiquity of the state in the everyday lives of citizens was only revealed in its 
absence (Alexander, 2009a). Describing the privatisation of a sweets factory and textile 
Kombinat, Alexander explains that the rights of Soviet citizens used to be administered 
through the workplace; with privatisation, however, many of these links with the state 
were broken. Mass privatisation therefore led to a ‘fracturing of unity, multiplying of 
difference and an introduction of instability’ (ibid., p. 271). Shreeves argues that in rural 
areas of Kazakhstan, privatisation did not replace state influence with new businesses, 
but instead led to the ‘withdrawal and collapse of services and living standards’ 
(Shreeves, 2002, p. 216). It was during this time, in the context of rapid societal change, 
that the young urban middle-class informants with whom I formed close relationships 
during my fieldwork were born. The Soviet worlds their parents had grown up in were 
replaced by a period of uncertainty marked by economic crisis, increasing crime, and 
difficulties in sourcing everyday goods (Nazpary, 2002). This uncertainty resulted from 
the collapse of supply-and-demand networks as the state withdrew its involvement in 
the everyday lives of its citizens. Therefore, when studying the young urban middle 
class, I consider generational comparisons a key tool in understanding ongoing change.  
 
 
Aspects of socialism and post-socialism unique to Central Asia 
 
Soviet policies played out in unique ways in Central Asia. The Soviet Nationalities 
Project, which has an ongoing impact today, is the first policy I will consider. I will 
explain the impact of this policy alongside an analysis of my data in Chapter 6, but here 
I discuss the literature I have used to develop my understanding of it. By using the 
wider anthropological debates on the topic of identity, and examining how the 
conceptualisation of identity in relation to a nation-state impacts the conceptualisation 
of ethnicity, I situate my discussion of the Central Asian context in which my fieldwork 
was undertaken. 
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Perhaps the most important subject for anthropologists of identity has been dispelling 
the determinism of culturalism. Wikan (1999) argues that culturalism is a ‘notion of 
culture as static, fixed, objective, consensual and uniformly shared by all members of a 
group’ and that this ‘is a figment of the mind that anthropologists have done their share 
to spread’ (p. 62). Vertovec (2011) ascribes this ‘assumption of common beliefs and 
practices within a discrete ethnic group’ as being a common feature ‘within 
contemporary policies of multiculturalism’ (p. 243). As I explain in this section, in a 
Central Asian context, the frequently referenced multinational society is predominantly 
a result of Soviet policies which introduced a particular framework. Within this 
framework, identities have been constructed in the post-Soviet republics, including 
Kazakhstan. In order to dispel culturalism as essentialising and an oversimplification of 
fluid identities, it has been proposed that anthropologists ‘eschew homogenous, reified, 
static and unchanging notions of culture and emphasize its dynamic, heterogenous, 
changing, contested and transformative nature’ (Grillo, 2008, p. 32; cited by Vertovec, 
2011). In following this suggestion, I also acknowledge that culturalist models of 
identity exist as social facts; therefore, I also study how these models have come about 
and their impact on Kazakh society. 
Focusing on the use of symbols is one way in which I analyse how identities are 
constructed by both the state and members of the public. Anthropologists have 
examined how reactions to ‘cultural differences are structured by particular images, 
narratives and symbols of national culture’, as Vertovec (2011) discusses (p. 242). This 
is particularly important in Chapter 6, where I consider how symbols of a nomadic past 
are used as reference to a common, and historically rooted, notion of ethnic Kazakh 
identity. It also recurs in the concluding chapter, where the use of symbols and 
metaphor is shown to be a way for my informants to reflect on their current situation. 
 
Drawn from discussion of theory in the discipline of international relations, 
anthropologists have used the Identities, Borders, and Order (IBO) model to help 
understand the perception of identity in relation to nationalism and nation-states (Albert 
et al., 2001). Vertovec (2011) explains that this model is based on particular 
assumptions that ‘a) some sense of cultural identity is presumed to characterize a 
people; (b) this identity/people is believed to be contiguous with a territory, demarcated 
by a border; (c) within the border, laws and a moral economy underpin a specific social 
and political order’ (p. 245). Lapid (2001) advocates for the utility of the model, arguing 
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that ‘the dynamic nexus constituted by interrelated processes of bordering, ordering, and 
collective identity building opens a uniquely well-situated analytical window to observe 
issues of mobility, fluidity, and change in contemporary world politics’ and as such, it is 
a useful tool to help think through these topics (p. 2). 
 
This is relevant for my thesis argument as I document and analyse the mechanisms by 
which identities are formed and then communicated to others. Vertovec draws our 
attention to the mechanisms by which this nexus of processes affects identities, 
including a ‘system of narratives, public rituals, representations and institutions, 
informal social relationships, written and unwritten regulations, and expectations of 
civility and public behaviour’ (2011, p. 245). While acknowledging the fluidity of 
identity, I interrogate the role of these mechanisms in affecting certain perceptions of 
identity in the context of my field site. To do this, however, we first need to understand 
both the historical and contemporary influence of the Soviet Nationalities Project. 
 
Launched by decrees following decisions made during the 1924 Communist Party 
conference, the Soviet Nationalities Project had the ‘aim to create a multi-ethnic empire 
and […] system of governance. A process “defined as “inter-nationalism”’ (Roy, 2000, 
p. ix). This has an ongoing impact today, as it formed the basis of the new republics 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Schatz (2000) explores the continuing 
effects of Soviet ‘internationalism’ in the formation of post-Soviet Kazakhstan, arguing 
that a dual emphasis on ‘lingering’ Soviet internationalism and the promotion of an 
ethnic Kazakh state has led to societal divisions. Furthermore, Roy (2000) discusses the 
intricacies of how this policy impacted the formation of the modern delineations of 
states and ethnic groups. 
 
Davé (2004) explores the proportions of different ethnicities in Kazakhstan over time 
and their impact on Kazakhs, who found themselves as a minority ethnic group upon 
independence. She gives particular focus to how this fuelled the Kazakhstani state to 
undertake a range of nationalising policies, designed to shift the balance in favour of 
ethnic Kazakhs. Sarsembayev (2010) argues that these nation-building policies led to 
ethnic Kazakh nationalism becoming the default position of Kazakh nationalism in the 
1990s. Yessenova (2005) has discussed the importance of traditional Kazakh systems in 
recognising lineage, as well as the role they play in how Kazakhs make sense of the 
physical journeys they have taken in life. Dubuisson and Genina (2011) explore the 
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ramifications of state support for an ethnic Kazakh identity that created the notion of 
Kazakh-shylykh, a ‘Kazakhness’ that stretches across both time and space. Catherine 
Alexander (2018b) explores how, despite a shared international notion of Kazakh 
identity, there are differences in how Kazakhs from different places are treated. She 
focuses in particular on the societal perception of oralmen, Kazakhs returning from 
outside Kazakhstan’s borders. Werner and Barcus add to this discussion, commenting 
on how the re-traditionalisation of Kazakh identity has led to disparities between gender 
roles, as male heroes are valorised and Kazakh women are framed as ‘reproducers and 
homemakers’ (Werner & Barcus, 2015, p. 11). 
 
Nation-building policies have also affected other ethnicities in Kazakhstan. Davenel has 
explored how the state’s encouragement of ethnic-group identity played out for Tatars 
in Kazakhstan: while they were encouraged to build their own ethnic identity, they were 
not able to perform the role of ‘fully-fledged citizens’ (Davenel, 2012, p. 27). Oka 
(2006) has written about how different ethnic groups, namely Russians, Uighurs, and 
Koreans, have had different experiences in the post-independence years, as Kazakh state 
nation-building policies play out differently for each ethnic group. I will focus on such 
experiences in more detail in Chapter 6, but here I will provide an overview of some of 
the ongoing debates regarding these ethnic groups. 
 
Russians, referred to by Peyrouse as the ‘imperial minority’ in Kazakhstan, have faced 
their own significant changes over the last 50 years (Peyrouse, 2008, p. 2015). Peyrouse 
(2007, 492) argues that Russians have been emigrating from Kazakhstan to Russia since 
the 1970s. This phenomenon accelerated under perestroika and changed again after 
independence, with the potential for regional destabilization: thousands of ethnic 
Russians found themselves ‘abroad’ as administrative boundaries transformed into 
national borders after 1991 (Laurelle & Peyrouse, 2004; Peyrouse, 2007). Davé (2004) 
reports that significant numbers of ethnic Russians left Kazakhstan to live in Russia in 
the 1990s. Additionally, she comments on the geographical variation of ethnic Russian 
populations: the north of Kazakhstan is home to a higher proportion of ethnic Russians. 
Peyrouse suggests that the issues facing Russians were ‘gradually solved by a double 
phenomenon—the emigration of those who wanted to leave the country and a 
depoliticisation of those who preferred to stay or who had no choice’ (2007, p. 41). 
Matthew Blackburn argues that despite having no lived experience of the Soviet Union, 
a young generation of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan see a ‘cultural continuity with how 
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the past is imagined’, stating that the “cultural colonial’ habitus of the Soviet period has 
survived in a new post-Soviet generation’ (Blackburn, 2019, p. 230). The ongoing 
influence of Russian culture and language can be seen most keenly in urban areas, 
including Almaty, which remain mainly Russophone. In Chapter 5, I discuss how the 
young urban middle class is a mainly Russophone group, despite the fact that it is a 
heterogeneous mix of ethnicities. Aksholakova discusses the role of the Russian 
language in Kazakhstan in a post-Soviet context. Although Russian is the official 
language of international (inter-ethnic) communication, it is steadily being replaced by 
Kazakh in state administrative procedures (Aksholakova & Ismailova, 2013). 
 
Oka (2006) has written about the linguistic Russification of the Uighur community in 
Kazakhstan, and Roberts (1998; 2007) discusses everyday Islamic practice in a Uighur 
neighbourhood of Almaty. Clark and Kamalov (2010) write about the migration of 
Uighurs across borders, an issue which is discussed by my informants as one way in 
which the Uighur population has dealt with societal change. 
 
Kokaisl (2018), as well as other academics such as Chang (2016), consider the distinct 
groups of ethnic Koreans living in Central Asia to be a result of Stalin’s deportation of 
Koreans from the Russian Far East in 1937. Kokaisl has found that Koreans in 
Kazakhstan have assimilated with the national population to a greater extent than those 
in other Central Asian republics. Yem and Epstein (2015) explore this from a different 
angle, studying Korean inter-ethnic marriage practices in a historical study of marriages 
in Almaty between 1937 and 1965. These debates are drawn upon in Chapter 6, where I 
will discuss how a Korean informant’s marriage caused a rupture in everyday life. Other 
aspects of Korean culture have caused Korean identity to impact Soviet culture (Song, 
2016). This can be seen in terms of food; in terms of music, where individuals such as 
Victor Tsoi, lead singer of the band Kino, informed fashions across 1980s Soviet 
popular culture; and in terms of films such as Needle (1988), which sparked the Kazakh 
New Wave film movement (Abikayeva & Zhamanbalina-Mazur, 2003). 
 
Religion is an important influence on the population of Central Asia. Following Soviet-
era repression and control of religious practice in favour of atheist and secular policies, 
independence has brought about a ‘Christian revival’ alongside an ‘Islamic renaissance’ 
(Omelicheva, 2011, p. 250). It is important to understand trends in religious practice, as 
historically religion has been a way for people to deal with uncertainty and existential 
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threats. The literature engages with the influence of religion on everyday life; personal 
morality; the understanding of rapid social change; narratives of modernity; syncretic 
practices such as spiritual healers and the flourishing of medical pluralism; and the 
‘securitisation’ of Islam in public culture. 
 
During my fieldwork, I found that religion was not as important for the young urban 
middle class as it was for their parents’ generation. My young informants often faced a 
disjunction between following what they perceived to be a ‘proper’ Islamic way of 
life—for example, as a model Kazakh—and the values and way of life adopted by the 
young urban middle class. Understanding the context of these divisions, and the 
consequent issues that arise for my informants, is an ongoing discussion throughout my 
thesis. 
 
Dragadze (1993) discusses how religious practice was officially banned during the 
Soviet era, but continued to be practised in domestic contexts. This brought one’s 
religious adherence closer to a personal moral practice as opposed to an act of collective 
worship. Féaux de la Croix argues that the analysis of religious practice in Central Asia 
is often studied in isolation from other aspects of life. However, in her discussion of 
mazars, holy sites and places of Islamic pilgrimage—a topic that is also explored by 
Dubuisson and Genina (2011, p. 472)—she encourages a perspective that sees mazars 
embedded in everyday life. She compares them to dams and jailoo (pastures), which 
would normally be conceptualised as existing in different spheres of life (Féaux de la 
Croix, 2016, p. 133). The role of Islam in everyday life has been a fertile area of 
research. Louw, who carried out fieldwork in Bukhara, Uzbekistan, explains that 
‘people’s engagement in Islam, their efforts at creating a satisfying social existence, 
took place against the background of profound social changes that had made the ground 
shake beneath their feet, making them feel deprived of the means to adapt to these 
changing conditions for their lives’ (Louw, 2007, pp. 174–75). In this respect, religion is 
one way of dealing with the ‘scale and rapidity of changes’ experienced in post-Soviet 
Central Asia (ibid., p. 176). These changes have played out in different ways in different 
places, ranging from Kazakhs in Turkistan in the south of Kazakhstan, where 
pilgrimage has become an important spiritual and economic resource for the town 
(Privratsky, 2001), to Uighurs in a neighbourhood in Almaty where, even within a 
single event marked with ceremonial toasts, each speaker had a different perspective 
and personal take on how religion informs everyday ceremonial practice (Roberts, 
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2007). In my thesis, I argue that in urban contexts such as Almaty, religion is more 
important for some demographic groups than others and that this has an impact on all 
my informants. However, religion has not been a source of support to which my young, 
urban, middle-class informants have turned to help them deal with uncertainty. 
 
Religion and religious practice impact the lives of my informants in Almaty in various 
ways as a result of their relevance for an older generation, their wider kin groups, and 
some of their friends. Syncretic practices, such as the use of magic, fortune-telling, and 
shamanic healing, have been folded into everyday life in such a way so that they are not 
considered specifically religious. Féaux de la Croix describes the ‘exotic cache and 
political role’ of ‘Islam and Shamanism’ that has led many academics to study various 
practices in Central Asia (Féaux de la Croix, 2013, p.542). Penkala-Gawęcka, who has 
studied spiritual healers, argues that there has been ‘a surge of medical pluralism in the 
post-Soviet period’ based around the role of healers, whose ‘relations with biomedicine 
are shaped by complex economic, social, and political factors’ (Penkala-Gawęcka, 
2013, p. 37). Penkala-Gawęcka adds that ‘the government’s acceptance of ‘folk’ 
medicine, including spiritual healing, […] mainly lies in its interest in the resurgence of 
Kazakh culture and history, important to the legitimacy of the newly independent state’ 
(ibid., p. 47). 
 
Being Muslim as a cultural, rather than religious, distinction is an important aspect of 
post-independence Central Asian culture for many ethnicities. Rasanayagam (2011) 
argues that his informants in Uzbekistan did not make a distinction between the practice 
of religion in a mosque and the Islamic influence on life-cycle rituals, such as 
circumcision in the home, which continued during the Soviet era and into the post-
Soviet period—these are all aspects of being culturally Muslim. The tie between 
religion and ethnicity is also strong. As Omelicheva (2011, 246) argues, ‘for Kazakhs 
[in Kazakhstan], ethnic identity is a Muslim one; being Kazakh means being Muslim’, a 
point I will return to in Chapter 6 to discuss Kazakh identity alongside comments from 
my informants. 
 
As Islam isn’t always brought into everyday practice, the contrasting angle is the 
‘securitisation’ of Islam, a narrative which frames Islam as a threat to society in 
reference to its radical and/or militant factions (Omelicheva, 2011). Louw illustrates 
how this enters everyday life for her informants in the form of a narrative of ‘extremists’ 
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or wahhabis, which is seen as the opposite of what it meant to be Muslim in post-Soviet 
society for her (Louw, 2007, p. vi). 
 
One reason my informants are not turning to religion is because religion does not play 
an important role in their onstage narrative performance of what it means to be modern. 
Mostowlansky has explored what being modern means to those living along Tajikistan’s 
Pamir Highway, arguing that his informants perceive modernity as ‘non-linear, 
overlaying, and in need of perfection’, bringing together aspects and understandings of 
Soviet ‘“projects” of modernity, the places they live and “worlds beyond’’’ 
(Mostowlansky, 2017, p. 149). People along the Pamir Highway see modernity as ‘an 
endangered condition that is in need of revival, reconfiguration, and improvement’; it is 
therefore an existing narrative to be reformed, retold, and expressed as a way of 
understanding ongoing change (ibid., 153). Along the Pamir Highway, religion plays a 
role in a narrative of modernity, as opposed to a universal shared notion of what 
modernity is or should be. My informants have formed their own idea of what it means 
to be modern in what I describe as a young urban middle-class way of life. 
 
Laszczkowski and Bissenova both look to Astana, Kazakhstan (renamed Nur-Sultan in 
2019) to understand the role of modernity in Kazakhstan as both a ‘space’ and a ‘place’ 
where Kazakh politicians sought to ‘claim their place on the “global” stage’ by 
physically building a utopian idea of the future in the present (Laszczkowski, 2011; 
2016, p. 179; Bissenova, 2013). Laszczkowski argues that ‘the Astana project has 
served to revive, for Kazakhstani citizens, the faith in progress and “modernity” that has 
been bitterly lost with the atrophy of the Soviet Union’ (Laszczkowski, 2016, p. 178). 
Ultimately, however, he finds that ‘“the spectacular’ is always complexly enmeshed 
with ‘the mundane’’’ (ibid., 181). It is these quotidian contexts, then, upon which I turn 
my analytical lens in order to understand how my informants fold ongoing and often 
large-scale change into their everyday lives. 
 
 
Concluding Comments 
 
My thesis builds upon the academic debates introduced in the literature review. As an 
urban ethnography, I contribute a new perspective focusing on the young urban middle 
class of Almaty. Bound by a unique post-socialist urban identity, they are a demographic 
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group that has not yet been studied by anthropologists because of their age, despite 
being distinct as the first generation to come of age since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991.  
 
I build upon existing anthropological studies of narrative by focusing on the way that 
stories are told, the contexts in which they are told, and the shared narratives that my 
informants reproduce on an everyday basis. Focusing on the role of rumour in Almaty, I 
analyse how it is used to explore and verify private concerns in public contexts when 
public narratives are no longer trusted by my informants. 
 
My informants face myriad risks in everyday life, including seismic risks; the risk of 
flooding; the persecution of ethnic groups; pollution; a lack of trust in professional 
qualifications; and the threat of continuing currency devaluation, among many others. 
The literature provides ways of understanding risk as folded into everyday decision-
making. Through an emphasis on the quotidian, rather than on large-scale threats, I seek 
to understand the threat of various risks and the uncertainty they trigger in the lives of 
my informants. 
 
The anthropology of Central Asia, and its broader basis in the anthropological study of 
socialism and post-socialism, provide a foundation from which multiple and ongoing 
societal changes underway in Kazakhstan can be understood. Examples of cultural 
strategies for dealing with decentralisation, privatisation, ethnic differences, the role of 
religion in post-Soviet society, and ideas of modernity call for methodological attention 
to a constantly changing social and cultural context. Members of the young urban 
middle class are both the product of past change and a social group from which further 
societal changes are emerging. This thesis contributes an original study into the 
background, motivations, and challenges faced by the young urban middle class of 
Almaty.
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Chapter 3 
A Transect from West to East:  
Fieldwork, movement, and making sense of change 
 
This chapter discusses three locations along a transect of the city of Almaty. These 
locations are key sites from which I based my fieldwork, but they also reflect three 
distinct areas from which we can question the constitutive parts of an urban field site 
and weave together narrative accounts of my informants’ lives. The three locations are a 
Khrushchevka housing district, downtown Almaty, and a village on the site of a former 
collective farm. I explain the connections between these locations by focusing on 
various types of movement, including migration; commuting; shopping trips; the flow 
of gas, information, and transport; movements towards modernisation; and movements 
in search of health, prosperity, and safety. The accounts we hear juxtapose the 
narratives of a generation who grew up in the later years of the Soviet Union with those 
of my young urban middle-class informants. These narratives show different approaches 
to forming coherent stories, as well as to making sense of past change and the various 
uncertainties in everyday life which are linked to the places in which people live, work, 
socialise, relax, and go shopping. 
 
 
Transects 
 
Here in Chapter 3 and in the following chapter, I adopt the approach of using a transect 
to structure my presentation, discussion, and analysis of my informants’ lives and my 
fieldwork in Almaty. As Krebs and Pilz (2013) have argued, ‘[T]he application of a 
transect, a methodology originally used in the natural sciences, specified and 
implemented for urban planning, seems to be a promising tool for urban anthropology’ 
(p. 4). Their support for the approach lies in their experience in Baku and Tbilisi, two 
post-Soviet urban contexts where they found that a transect proved a fruitful way of 
providing a snapshot of a changing cityscape at a certain point in time. Specifically, 
they found that transects allowed them to ‘classify typical and non-typical interrelations 
between the general structure of a city and certain places. It makes it possible to 
recognize the interplay between different levels like 1st the global, the local, and the 
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regional, 2nd the past and the contemporary, 3rd the collective and the individual’ 
(ibid., p. 8). 
 
Methodologically, the anthropological use of transects has little association with the 
New Urbanists’ approach, dominant within the wider social sciences, of categorising 
cities into six zones based on building density—an approach rooted in the New 
Urbanists’ mapping of industrialised North American cities (Duany & Talen, 2007; 
Duany, 2010). The transect approach I adopt in these chapters is closer to both Margaret 
Kusenbach’s (2016) ‘go-alongs’, which entail following an informant in their everyday 
movements, and Elke Krasny’s (2008) ‘city telling’, an experimental go-along where, 
for example, the researcher might pick a specific route, taking a narrative approach to 
constructing a path through the city. In this chapter and the next, the transects I explore 
benefit from what Krebs and Pilz (2013) detail as the role of the informant in classifying 
these areas, as transects allow for a discussion of the ‘ways in which these [transect] 
sites form part of the routes of everyday life and how they are appropriated by 
memories or narrations of the city’ (p. 13). As such, transects are narrated tales of the 
city; the lives of informants are contextualised in a description of the built environments 
in which they live, work, and go about their everyday business. 
 
Finally, I want to stress the importance of using a transect at this point in the thesis. 
Although Krebs and Piz (2013) argue that the ‘urban transect is an instrument for the 
start of fieldwork; a first exploration of the diverse urban conditions in a cross-section 
from the center to the outskirts’ (p. 17), I argue that a transect, for many of the same 
reasons, is a good way for me to introduce the field site to the reader, structuring the 
movement of both the informants we hear from in the thesis and my own movements 
through fieldwork as a researcher. 
 
 
Khrushchevka Housing District 
 
The online weather forecast said that it was -15° Celsius in Almaty. Thick ice covered 
the city’s footpaths, and cars were left idling at the foot of the block of flats where I was 
staying. They emitted clouds of steam into the frosty air as their engines crept up to 
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temperature and their owners sipped warming tea in their flats.1 It was the second day of 
my extended fieldwork stay in Almaty. I stepped out of my host’s apartment, through 
two fortified steel doors, and onto a communal staircase. The walls were painted floor 
to ceiling in the Kazakh national colour, koq (a bright bluish turquoise). The front doors 
of four apartments opened onto each staircase landing. Walking down from the top 
(fifth) floor, I passed a mosaic of different doorframes bordered by a messy spaghetti of 
utility wires. During my time there, most of the neighbours stayed boxed into their 
apartments, escaping the winter cold. The few interactions I had were limited to brief 
exchanges, passing neighbours on the stairs. Many of the apartments sharing this 
podelka (staircase) were rented on a short-term basis with a carousel of changing 
occupants. Other apartments housed whole families in four square rooms, common to 
many Khrushchevka. 
 
Khrushchevka is a colloquial name given to apartment-block housing made of 
prefabricated concrete panels. These are named after Nikita Khrushchev, who first 
championed the buildings’ design and strategy.2 Typically four or five storeys high, 
these buildings could be constructed quickly and cheaply. The Soviet Union was 
plagued by chronic housing shortages from the outset, a result of rapid industrialisation 
and urbanisation. Shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the government 
seized luxury apartments and converted them into multiple-family-occupancy 
kommunalka, communal apartments where families lived in a single room and shared 
cooking and washing facilities. Over the next 74 years, Soviet urban planning was 
characterised by significant state intervention and monumental architectural 
 
1 Many cars in Almaty are retrofitted with remote controls so that in the cold weather it is 
possible to start the car while keeping it locked outside. This means that when it is time to leave, 
cars have reached a temperature at which they can operate, even on the coldest winter days. 
2 In January 1951, Khrushchev held a conference for the development of low-cost and quick-
build housing as a solution to the growing housing crisis. After the death of Stalin and 
Khrushchev’s subsequent rise to power, the changes first proposed in the conference were 
instigated. 1955 saw a decree for the ‘liquidation of excesses’, which led to a simple and 
functional architecture, typified by the archetypal Khrushchevka housing blocks. Discussing the 
dramatic effects of this policy within Russia, Varga-Harris describes how ‘between 1956 and 
1970, it yielded approximately 34 million units of living space, and more than 126 million 
people—more than half the country—moved into them’ (Varga-Harris, 2008, p. 561). 
Khrushchevka benefitted many families, providing them with their own apartments. 
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interventions (Scott, 1998). As Varga-Harris notes, the ‘housing construction campaign 
that Khrushchev instituted entailed a broad transition from communal to “one-family” 
living’. This now characterises the majority of housing in Almaty (Varga-Harris, 2008, 
p. 561). Khrushchevka are known for their small rooms and low ceilings, a result of a 
design focus on economy, functionality, and rapid construction. These identikit and 
prefabricated models were erected across the Soviet Union, and similar buildings can be 
found in cities as far away as Yerevan and Ulaan-Baatar. Varga-Harris argues that the 
resultant domestic realm that typified the Khrushchev era was ‘ideologically charged, 
constituting a material cultural “artifact” of de-Stalinization and communist 
construction’ (ibid., p. 564). In Almaty, these blocks have undergone their own 
transformations since independence—Nazpary has analysed such transformations, 
suggesting that the stairways of these structures can tell us about changing urban social 
relations. Nazpary argues that the transformation of many of the hallways, where 
wooden doors were replaced with steel ones, was a sign of the dangers he might face 
during his fieldwork in Almaty and of locals’ general fear of each other (Nazpary, 2002, 
p. 25). During my fieldwork, 15 years later, these feelings of immediate danger had 
subsided, yet the increased isolation of urban living during the 1990s had eroded some 
of the community aspects which these housing blocks, built with communal courtyards, 
had been intended to promote (Nazpary, 2002). 
 
I stayed the first three months of my fieldwork in this Khrushchevka, which sits 
between two main roads. Locals wouldn’t refer to its address, and instead would give 
the nearest crossroads (Zhandosova/Gagarina). This habit is a reflection of the 
directions given to informal taxi drivers that buzz around the city—unlicensed, 
unregulated, and with prices negotiated on the spot. I would often travel around the city 
using them, as would my middle-class informants. Normally costing 200 to 300 tenge 
for a short 10-minute ride, by the end of my fieldwork the price for the same journey 
had risen to 300 to 400 tenge as a result of significant currency devaluation3 (discussed 
in detail in Chapter 5). To hail a taxi, stand at the roadside and point your index finger 
down until a car pulls over and its driver winds the window down. State the crossroads 
you wish to travel to and a suggested offer for the fare. The driver may nod in 
 
 
3 Devaluation appears throughout this thesis; during my fieldwork it had a significant effect on 
the lives of everyone across Kazakhstan. See Chapter 5 for discussion of how it affected the 
young middle class. 
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agreement, reply with a higher suggested amount, or simply drive off with no comment 
if the destination is not in the direction they are travelling. To indicate a local journey, a 
gesture more often used as you move farther from the city centre, rotate your hand in 
small circles while pointing at the ground. These taxis provide a vital transport solution, 
moving people within and between city districts. More expensive than local buses, 
trams, and trolleybuses, they were often used by my middle-class informants when they 
were not driving their own cars. 
 
Stepping out of the Khrushchevka on the second day of my fieldwork, I set off on foot 
in search of somewhere to get a new key cut so I could come and go when my hosts 
were not present. I walked south in the direction of the mountains, heading towards the 
major Al-Farabi Ring Road which encircles the city centre to the south. Trudging 
through icy streets, with busy rush-hour traffic growling along the congested roads, I 
ducked into a small covered market. Metal kiosks with heavy shutters and grocery 
stores fronted by UPVC double glazing dotted the gaps between the large concrete 
housing blocks or were installed in their bottom levels. Local movements on foot can 
secure access to basic foodstuffs and goods through small convenience stores. I was 
able to find a small kiosk that could cut a copy of my key. This configuration of Soviet-
era housing blocks interspersed with small shops is typical for this area of the city. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 3.1, following page: Map of Almaty showing the three transect locations 
discussed in this chapter. The base map is copyright OpenStreetMap contributors used 
under Creative Commons License 2.0. 
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The housing area where I lived is located in the southwest of Almaty. Transect location 
1 (Image 3.1) includes the Bostandyk district of Almaty city (total population 
1,877,584), which was reported to have a population of 345,764 on 1 July 2019 
according to the Kazakh government’s official statistics bureau (Republic of 
Kazakhstan Statistics Committee, 2019). The neighbourhood, a heterogeneous mix of 
buildings, ethnicities, incomes, and occupations, is experiencing a general trend of 
ongoing change from a mainly residential housing district to a mixed-use commercial 
satellite, with flows of people from across the city coming to shop or visit the Presidents 
Park to the south of the ring road. The area is heated by a communal coal-fired power 
station. I met Kazakhs, Russians, Uighurs, Korean Kazakhs, and Germans living here. 
Many residents commute to other areas of the city to work using buses, taxis, or private 
cars. The buildings in this district include mikro-raion (micro-district) Khrushchevka 
housing, single-storey wooden houses that were formerly dachas (summer houses with 
gardens), and some industrial units, as well as a large shopping centre called MEGA. 
Two blocks down, a large gold-topped mosque was being built, with the help of Turkish 
funding,4 when I first moved in, and was completed by the end of my fieldwork. 
 
While living in this location, I carried out 31 interviews, informal conversations, and 
discussions with my informants. These ranged from long-form life-history accounts 
over multiple hours to short discussions with my research assistants and informants 
where we discussed everyday life or topical events. I spoke to both men and women 
among a broad range of ages from 18 to 67. My informants were from different ethnic 
backgrounds, including Kazakh, Uighur, Korean, Volga German, Ukrainian, Uzbek, 
Tajik, and Turkish. My sampling targeted those with expertise in disciplines influential 
to the study and management of seismic risk, my research focus in the early stages of 
fieldwork, although these conversations also brought a broad set of insights into other 
topics. Consequently, in this location I interviewed and had interactions with architects, 
scientists, public relations professionals, archive officials, a Christian priest, a Muslim 
imam, a driver at an international oil company, taxi drivers, students, a graphic 
designer, a shop assistant, and a mother who stayed at home looking after young 
children. 
 
4 Since independence, both the Turkish government and Turkish non-governmental religious 
organisations have sought to extend their influence in the region. As Kazakh is a Turkic 
language, there is some affinity between the countries based on a supposedly shared heritage. 
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This transect location features in Chapter 4, where a description of the destructive flood 
includes a discussion of informants living in both Bostandyk and the adjacent 
Nauryzbai city district. I will also return to a neighbouring housing district in Chapter 6, 
where I discuss a Uighur neighbourhood and the challenges faced by the Uighur 
community, as well as cultural strategies for mitigating risk in the neighbourhood. 
 
A 500-metre walk to the south of where I was staying brought me to the apartment 
block of one of my informants, Aizhan. Due to the scale and complexity of urban field 
sites, it is difficult to survey large populations; hence, my examples focus on the 
accounts of specific families and contextualise them within the makeup of the city. 
Aizhan’s family was not randomly chosen. I met them because they were friends of my 
hosts, and they later became informants. Explaining these social connections helps to 
build a clear picture of the people with whom I spoke and helps to explain the context 
from which their opinions come. Aizhan’s family story is an example of some of the 
significant historical changes and risk of future change that people in Almaty live with. 
What is striking here is how significant ruptures and disruptions to the family’s life are 
given stability and coherence through the way they are narrated and structured in their 
recounting to me as a fieldworker. 
Aizhan: People are nervous here. There are, like, earthquakes and stuff because 
we live in one of the most dangerous cities in the world. In social life, we don’t 
have stability. There is tenge devaluation and political stuff. For example, our 
president is super old and we don’t know who else is coming up to follow him. 
Aizhan and I were sitting on a playground bench in the shared courtyard of her block of 
apartments. Her opening comments were in response to my question ‘What is it like 
living here?’ She cited different sources of worry—natural hazards, social instability, 
currency fluctuations and political uncertainty—and suggested that they make people 
feel nervous in Almaty. These issues are all examples of potentially disruptive change. 
A plethora of subjects for discussion were opened up by this comment, but where to 
start? Informants’ comments often increased the apparent complexity of a situation 
rather than clarifying it. The combination of concerns Aizhan mentioned and the 
reasons that she worried about them only start to make sense when told with the added 
context of her and her family’s lives, which makes the potential for catastrophic change 
feel like a much more probable occurrence. 
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Aizhan is Kazakh and was 24 years old when we first met in 2014. She had recently left 
her job as a graphic designer and was focusing on freelance projects while she looked 
for permanent employment. She completed her studies at the university which is the 
focus of my discussion in Chapter 5. It was through university’s programme coordinator 
that she knew my hosts after having spent time as a FLEX student studying in the 
USA.5 She spoke fluent English and helped me with translation from Russian when we 
interviewed her mother. During conversations, Aizhan would often add her own 
comments, which offer their own interesting insights and are included here. 
 
I spoke to Aizhan’s mother Sholpan, aged 47, on a number of occasions. Sholpan had 
time to speak while taking her young six-year-old son to play in the park, or while I 
accompanied her on trips to the local neighbourhood supermarket to buy groceries. Her 
account is therefore pieced together from various separate interviews. Sholpan’s 
narrative brings together the family’s biography. It also situates Aizhan’s life in the 
context of wider societal change and demonstrates generational differences in the way 
that the present is perceived. 
Sholpan: I was born in Eastern Kazakhstan near Oskemen [Kazakh name for the 
city also known by the Russian name Ust-Kamenogorsk]. It is around two hours 
from the Chinese border. I was living in a village called Akzhar and it was a 
central village, so quite big. There is also a micro-district in Almaty which goes 
by the same name. I think a lady who was born in Akzhar named it after there. I 
came to Almaty to study. I was the only person in the village to get a gold 
medal. [Aizhan interjected, ‘She didn’t say that comment about the medal but I 
am adding it in’.]  
 
5 ‘Begun in 1993, the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) program is a competitive, merit-based 
scholarship program funded by the U.S. Department of State. FLEX students who pass multiple 
rounds of testing earn a scholarship to spend an academic year in the United States living with a 
volunteer host family and attending a U.S. high school. FLEX students gain leadership skills, 
learn about American society and values, and teach Americans about FLEX countries and 
cultures. FLEX is a highly competitive program with over 26,300 alumni who have contributed 
over one million hours [sic] of community service in cities and towns across America. The 
students return home to active alumni networks that carry out inspiring activities’. 
http://discoverflex.org, accessed 28 June 2019 
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My mum was a teacher and died in October. She was 91. My granddad was 
serving in World War II. He came home and someone had shot him in the leg, 
so he couldn’t bend it. I met my husband here in the university. I wanted to go 
into chemistry and because of my sister I ended up in physical chemistry and 
carrying out research into metal processes. My husband has an engineering 
degree in mining, and mine is in physics and chemistry. 
In the literature review, I mentioned Tim Ingold’s description of telling a story as the 
relating of constituent parts by ‘picking up the threads of past lives’ (Ingold, 2007, p. 
30). We can see examples of these threads in Sholpan’s account: the common name 
‘Akzhar’ ties the place she has come from to the place where she now lives. Looking 
back at a life, it often appears fragmented, punctuated by memorable events. In 
Sholpan’s account, these are significant moments of change, including deaths in the 
family, war, injuries, and education. These threads make a coherent story—until there is 
a point of rupture. A similar phenomenon was found by Wheeler in his research in Aral 
in Western Kazakhstan, where changes between past and present are hooked on 
moments of rupture in everyday life (Wheeler, 2016, p. 113). A key turning point in 
Sholpan’s story is narrated through a discussion of changes to everyday life and their 
effect on the family: 
Sholpan: Then I had Aizhan and after that I didn’t work. I only began working 
again by selling stuff—buying things in Almaty and then selling them in 
Oskemen, in very cold weather. I was doing that for a while and then I was 
selling cigarettes. Aizhan was born in 1991. It was the end of the Soviet Union, 
and all the factories they had which were relevant for my husband to work in 
were all shut down. We had to work out something to do to make money. You 
know, we didn’t have any foreign companies… we didn’t have anything. There 
is a big bazaar on Rozybakieva and I was working there selling cigarettes. Then 
I got a job working with cash machines. After that, I opened my own company. I 
went to another university 12 years ago, got another degree, and right now have 
my own company working as an accountant… I like the time right now because 
of the stability. There are no revolutionary changes. 
Aizhan perceives both the present and future to be uncertain. In contrast to this, her 
mother Sholpan emphasises the stability of the present, following a period of significant 
change after 1991. Generational differences in these two perspectives are a result of 
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different life experiences at different stages in life. The end of the Soviet Union 
coincides with a new chapter in the story Sholpan told. However, Sholpan does not 
mark these changes by macro-discussions of significant political change, but through 
important personal life events, including the birth of her daughter Aizhan; changes in 
the availability of employment; and the new movements that she had to undertake in 
order to generate an income, travelling between Almaty and Oskemen. Pragmatic 
solutions were made possible by drawing upon her existing links to other areas of 
Kazakhstan.  
 
The specialist skillset that Sholpan gained in physical sciences and chemistry was no 
longer relevant when state-run industries were shut down. As Alexander discussed in 
relation to the closure of a sweets factory and fabric Kombinat in Almaty, ‘mass 
privatisation entailed a fracturing of unity, a multiplying of difference and an 
introduction of instability, mobility, and a new short-term temporality’ (Alexander, 
2004, p. 271). These circumstances meant that Sholpan was forced to reinvent herself 
and change direction on multiple occasions by seeking out new ways to generate 
money. These experiences appear to have built her resilience to change in a way that her 
daughter has not yet experienced. These life experiences explain the generational 
difference between Aizhan and Sholpan in their perception of the present. Movement 
has been key to the survival and success of Sholpan, who was able to adapt to previous 
change. Movement has also been key to Aizhan’s life, where her foreign-exchange 
programme in the USA and her ongoing involvement with AISEC, an international 
student organisation, have created an international set of connections. 
 
I argue that Aizhan’s international connections increase her resilience to local change in 
Kazakhstan because she is able to draw support from a wider base of social connections. 
As many of these are farther afield, they are less likely to be affected by local changes 
such as currency devaluation. In many ways, this wide base of connections parallels the 
benefits of traditional Kazakh kinship networks, which spread a risk burden across 
different geographical areas through a cultural practice of exogamy (out-marriage) 
(Esenova, 2002, p.26). In a traditional pastoralist subsistence society, this would allow 
for kin to offer assistance if there were a geographically localised degradation of 
pasture. As Wheeler suggests, environmental and political issues are bound together 
when it comes to discussing resilience and vulnerability in Kazakh society (Wheeler, 
2016, p. 21). For the young urban middle class, the terrain has shifted. With the 
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liberalisation of the economy, it is now economic independence and resilience to 
localised economic change that ensure stability and security. As a result, Aizhan’s 
international social connections offer both actual resilience and an increased feeling of 
resilience. This is because the threats are in the future, and so she is dealing with issues 
of both risk and uncertainty (Boholm, 2003, p. 167).  
 
Reflecting on my own situation as an international researcher working in Kazakhstan, 
perhaps the willingness of many members of the young urban middle class to participate 
in my research was a result of them building their social network. A year after my 
fieldwork, I was asked to provide a reference for one of my research assistants; my 
English-language conversations for another informant, Sasha, who is introduced in the 
third transect location, helped him prepare for an interview with an international 
company where part of the interview was conducted in English. These are examples of 
how my presence impacted the lives of my informants, and this can also speak to how 
international connections are valued locally. However, it is difficult to say whether 
these are conscious motivating factors for Aizhan specifically or whether they are wider 
trends in society which we see reflected in my informants’ everyday practice. In 
Chapter 5 I discuss further examples of the moral and material aspirations of the young 
middle class in Almaty.  
 
Aizhan’s personal connections were also important links for my informant networks 
during my fieldwork. I met one of my primary research assistants Alma because at the 
time she was head of the AISEC international student group, of which Aizhan was also 
a member. Alma is a young Uighur in her early 20s who was studying at a private 
university in downtown Almaty but who lived in a neighbouring district, also in transect 
location 1, where there is a majority Uighur population (see Chapter 6). She lived with 
her family in a detached house which I visited on numerous occasions to interview her 
family and to share meals together. Alma was very active in her international student 
group and is now, in 2019, completing a masters in Malmo in Sweden. 
 
The land between Aizhan’s apartment and mine is a bulldozed rectangle of scrubland, 
formerly an area of single-storey housing that had been demolished to make way for 
new developments. On the other side of the scrubland is a large shopping centre called 
MEGA. It houses shops, bars, fast-food restaurants, cinemas, and a large supermarket. 
During my fieldwork, the first-ever Starbucks in Kazakhstan opened. There was 
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massive hype on social media and long queues formed around the shopping centre. 
Branded cups and mugs became the new fashion item of choice and could suddenly be 
seen in the hands of young Almatineans in the universities, on the streets, and sitting at 
the tables of the local cafes in the centre of town.  
 
The excitement for new Western products was not universal. During one of our joint 
shopping trips to the large supermarket with Sholpan, we had a long discussion about 
the different products for sale. ‘We still buy Sultan pasta—I think it is closest to the 
Soviet pasta, and the quality of everything was better then. It wasn’t a business, and so 
the government ran those factories and the quality was better. The quality of everything 
was better. Even clothes… [the only benefit is] now you have choice’. As we stood in 
the queue at the checkout, I counted 21 different types of chewing gum for sale.  
 
While Sholpan sees the past as unstable and punctuated by dramatic change, there are 
some aspects of Soviet life which she sees in a nostalgic light. This is not uncommon 
and has been documented in many other post-Soviet places (Berdahl, 1999; Boym, 
2007; Reifová, 2017). Reifová, considering the dynamics in Czechoslovakia/the Czech 
Republic during the 1990s, argues that the Soviet past is often remembered for its 
difficulties, whereas nostalgia for aspects of everyday life ‘served as the venue through 
which continuity with socialism was redeemed’ (Reifová, 2017, p. 1). In this sense 
Sholpan is again forming a narrative which helps to bring continuity to the everyday 
change that she has experienced. While products in the supermarket can mean a 
nostalgic link to the past for Sholpan, other international brands can have a different 
meaning for Aizhan and her generation as a link to international markets, trends, and 
fashions. The shopping centre is therefore a place of both nostalgia and contemporary 
trends, and differences in generational narratives can be witnessed in everyday 
interactions in residential areas. 
 
 
Moving on 
 
After the first three months of my fieldwork I chose to move closer to the city centre, 
nearer to the local university and into a more central location from which to travel out to 
meet people for interviews. As Foster has commented, ‘[W]hen anthropologists study a 
general social institution or a group of people spread throughout the city, we nearly 
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always find an apartment or house in a convenient area, then commute to visit 
informants’ (Foster & Kemper, 2002 [1979], p. 139). As many of my interviews and 
interactions were taking place downtown, and it was the focus of social life for my 
young, urban, middle-class informants, I chose to move to a more convenient apartment 
in what became my second transect location. 
 
In summary, the first transect location was a residential area of the city, with small 
commercial businesses and a large shopping centre. As a result of the flows of goods, 
people, and services, this transect location is linked with other areas of the city. Many 
local and citywide movements from this transect location occur on a daily basis in the 
form of commuting, shopping, and local service provision. These movements range 
from slow-paced walks to the fast journeys of the highway and the steady rhythm of the 
regular trolleybuses. General ongoing trends of change include large-scale shopping-
centre consumerism taking over from local fruit and vegetable markets. To reach 
downtown, my next transect location, the options for travel included a 300-tenge taxi 
ride, a 60-tenge bus ride, or an hour and a half’s walk. You travel down Gagarina, 
turning onto Rozybakieva, passing Nuriya’s family apartment and the local market 
where Sholpan had sold goods, and turn onto Abay, the oldest street in the grid-planned 
area of the town centre. At the end of this road is a university, the focus for my research 
while I lived downtown and the second transect location discussed in this chapter. 
 
 
Downtown 
 
The second area where I lived and carried out research, downtown, is a hub where 
different paths intersect. I lived in a three-storey kerpich (fired-brick) apartment 
building constructed in the 1930s. Right in the geographical centre of the city, east of 
the first transect location, the second transect location proved a useful base from which 
to travel to meet and interview different informants. Many people from other areas of 
the city would also come into the city centre to go shopping, meet people, or visit the 
large central parks, and living here provided a good opportunity to meet with them. I 
lived in a commercial district with many cafes and restaurants, where I could join social 
gatherings with friends and informants or arrange to meet people in public places. 
Urban ethnography requires a focused methodological approach to sampling for 
interviews when we are surrounded by potential informants on a daily basis, and Foster 
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reminds us that ‘only a few of the people urban anthropologists meet in the course of a 
day are potential informants. Although casual encounters may offer insights into city 
life, researchers must work at building a network of informants’ (Foster & Kemper, 
2002 [1979], p. 139). In order to enrich my sample and understand the context and 
connections of my informants, I expanded my network out from my research assistants, 
who acted as gatekeepers to the young middle class. In addition to this, I contacted and 
interviewed specialists in areas of relevance to my discussion of risk. 
 
While living in transect location 2, I carried out 62 interviews. As in the first location, 
my interactions were with a range of people, including university lecturers, students, 
UN officials at UNISDR and UNDP, British Council employees, archive officials, an 
emergency planning consultant, architects, local and national government officials, 
journalists, Kazakh artists who are part of the Kyzyl Traktor (Red Tractor) collective, a 
security officer and former soldier, the regional director of a European airline, a film 
critic, an oil worker and businessman, a photographer, bank workers, a marketing and 
sales professional, an inventor, language teachers, a scientist at the Nuclear Research 
Institute, the lead researcher at Tien Shan Astronomical Observatory, an IT 
professional, an evangelical church pastor, a fortune teller, and street traders. The 
different transect locations gave me access to different sets of people from various 
professional backgrounds, all of whom can be considered part of the wider urban milieu 
that makes up my field site. 
 
I also chose to expand the network of informants connected to my research assistants 
due to the access I was able to obtain. One condition of obtaining a Kazakh research 
visa was to establish an association with a local university, taking at least one course. I 
chose to take Central Asian history and politics, which turned out to be a great way to 
meet people and discuss these topics. As a legacy of Soviet bureaucratic processes, 
Kazakhstan is a difficult country to navigate, with mountains of paperwork and 
idiosyncratic procedures. My personal experience of this was the more than 20 stamps 
and signatures I had to physically collect from different institutions in the city, mainly 
by different doctors and specialists in hospitals, to certify that I was fit to be able to stay 
in the country. This included chest X-rays for TB, an HIV test at a local clinic, and 
certificates of financial independence. Catherine Alexander cites one of her informants 
as saying that ‘Kazakhstan is infact ‘Qaghazhstan: ‘land of documents’, punning on the 
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name of the country and the similarity in the sound of the phrases (Alexander, 2018a. 
p.8). 
 
In discussing my second transect location, I ask two questions: Who did I find in this 
part of my field site, and what is the view from those in the centre? An introductory talk 
for new students and exchange students at the start of the university term discussed how 
the city is talked about in relation to particular symbols. Zabira, the university’s 
international student representative, gave an overview of the city, highlighting both the 
assets and the risks it is associated with: 
Zabira: We have big beautiful mountains, and they come with earthquakes. The 
city is at the bottom of the Illy River, which flows through the city, keeping it 
green, and so we have mudslides and floods. We have a busy urban centre, and 
as a result there is lots of pollution [from traffic].  
Zabira’s comments draw upon common symbolism used to talk about the city. The 
community interest group Urban Almaty (now known as Urban Forum) surveyed 
people on the streets of the city centre, asking them what they thought of when they 
thought of Almaty. The group is putting together what they have described as a ‘brand 
for the city’. The public responses included mountains, nature, Medeu (a high-altitude 
ice-skating rink), architecture, apples, and Kok Tobe (a raised hill overlooking the city 
with a cable car, radio tower, and small theme park).6 An additional point, discussed in 
Urban Almaty’s monthly meetings which I attended at the university, was Almaty as a 
‘commercial capital’.7 Urban Almaty and the international student representative 
therefore stressed the location of the city as a middle place between the mountains and 
the steppe, a place where flows of water, people, ideas, commerce, and business pass 
through and where opportunity is balanced with risk. 
 
Coming from those living in the centre of the city, these responses are very much an 
objective view of the city. They feel sterile without any mention of how people factor 
into the city’s makeup. Combined, the responses appear as a view of how an outsider 
 
6 https://urbanforum.kz/, accessed 12 July 2019 
7 Since the capital of Kazakhstan moved to Astana (renamed Nur-Sultan after I completed 
fieldwork) in 1997, Almaty, still the most populous city in Kazakhstan, is often referred to as 
the country’s economic or commercial capital. 
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might see the city—how it would be presented in a student prospectus, for example. 
These shared symbols suggest that they might be a specific urban perspective. However, 
while my informants may be sharing space and a common idea of that space, more often 
than not they don’t share the same backgrounds and life experiences, as my next 
account from my research assistant demonstrates. 
 
I first worked with Anna when I moved to the centre of town. She was the editor of the 
student newspaper and agreed to help me out with the transcription of focus groups and 
student interviews. I was introduced to Anna through Aizhan’s contact Alma, who was 
head of the university branch of AISEC at the time; Alma is Uighur, and her family 
story is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Anna became my long-term research 
assistant, and we are still good friends today. She is a dedicated hard worker with strong 
and passionate ideas. The most critical insights often came from our post-interview 
debrief discussions: we would sit and discuss in detail the responses informants had 
given me, and she would let me know her thoughts on the topics. Foster argues that ‘the 
best and most accurate data come from persons who like and trust [the researcher]’ 
(Foster & Kemper, 2002 [1979], p. 133). This was the case with Anna. It wasn’t until 
later that year, after we had spent many hours together and I had visited her family 
home in Kyrgyzstan for her father’s birthday party, that she opened up about her family 
history. I discuss her family story for two reasons. First, it gives some idea of the 
heterogeneity of the city and how diverse individuals’ life stories can be. Second, 
Anna’s comments appear throughout this thesis, and her backstory contextualises these 
thoughts and opinions. Anna’s family’s backstory introduces the complexities and 
changes facing the young urban middle class. It gives some idea of the different 
movements my informants have undergone and continue to undergo—migration, 
persecution, the arbitrary delineation of borders, ethnic identity and belonging, language 
and nationality—as well as the impact these movements have had on their lives. 
 
 
Anna’s story 
 
Anna describes herself as Russian. She lives in Almaty and works as a journalist, and 
we met when she was at university in her early 20s. She was another of my main 
research assistants who I worked with throughout my fieldwork and became an 
important informant in her own right. She first came to the university in Almaty from 
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Kyrgyzstan, where she was born. She is from the town of Tok Mok, close to the 
Kazakh/Kyrgyz border and around four hours’ drive from Almaty, which is relatively 
close by Kazakh scales of distance. After independence, her family found themselves 
split between two countries as villages were divided between Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. There is an important point to be made here about the changes in 
administrative and state borders—both the wider context and specific ways in which my 
informants’ lives were affected. 
 
The break-up of the Soviet Union brought about a change in both the function and 
everyday public experience of borders. Across the former Soviet Union, borders that 
had previously been mainly administrative between Soviet republics became state 
boundaries. Laura Assmuth discusses the everyday realities and public experience of 
these changes at the former administrative border between the countries of Estonia and 
Russia (Assmuth, 2013). Assmuth gives the example of ‘Külli, a 37-year-old Seto 
woman who lives on the Estonian side of the border in a village just ten kilometres from 
the border crossing’. Külli had crossed the border 57 times in the first six months of 
2000 to visit her sister and, very importantly for the Orthodox Christian Seto, to ‘tend 
her father’s and grandparents’ graves’ (ibid., p. 150). This brought her into a wider 
experience—documented by Assmuth on both sides of the border, and echoed in the 
comments of my informants in Almaty—where ‘people complained about the actual 
practices at frontier crossing points: long lines and waiting times, the need to present 
endless documents, the hassling and outright harassment by border guards and customs 
officials’ (ibid., p. 152). Assmuth describes how these encounters bring out local 
differences and inequalities, including both gender and generational disparities, with the 
impact of these new state borders. 
 
In locations such Tok Mok, where my informant Anna was from, the impact of these 
border changes was that everyday movement, such as commuting to work, became 
international travel. The story of Anna’s family, in her own words, gives an example of 
the common complexity of ethnicity, identity, and nationality experienced by those 
living in Central Asia, illustrating how the transformation of the Kazakh/Kyrgyz border 
appears as an arbitrary delineation imposed on a multi-ethnic family. This story helps to 
situate Almaty’s young urban middle class in a wider societal context: 
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Anna: My father is from Siberia and he was in a gang there before he left. He 
says he didn’t have a father; his mother had three husbands and four kids. They 
grew up with their mother and grandparents. My grandfather went to fight in the 
Great Patriotic War.8 While he was away, my [paternal] grandmother got a new 
husband; when he came back from the war, he found out, and so decided to 
leave again and fight in Japan. He was killed there. People said that my 
grandfather was a gypsy, and as far as she knows, her grandfather’s mother was 
also a gypsy. My grandmother says that it was her husband that destroyed her 
life. The whole family moved from Siberia to Kyrgyzstan, I think it was because 
my grandmother got a job there. She worked in a radio electronics microphone 
factory and she lost her job with the end of the Soviet Union. 
Anna’s family has experienced the trauma of multiple wars, family conflict, and 
migration in search of work. It is with this migration that the first split in family identity 
is seen. 
Anna: My father has always said, ‘I am Russian’, but for me my homeland is 
Kyrgyzstan. It was only when I reached high school that people started to 
differentiate, for example telling me that ‘you are Russian’. 
Anna’s mother’s story brings further complexity to Anna’s family history:  
Anna’s mother: My great-grandmother was from a really rich Chechen family 
who were affected by raskulachivaniye (dekulakisation). [It was] a time when 
they would attack and kill rich families, especially at the ‘edges’ of the Soviet 
Union. Grandpa [Anna’s great-grandfather] was a poor Tatar guy working on 
the goldmines of her family. They came and killed her family and her grandpa 
stole her away from there to save her. It’s all fucking tragic! 
Dekulakisation was a significant historical event in the Soviet reform of class 
distinctions, based on the Marxist principle that accrued wealth was evidence of the 
expropriation of workers’ labour. As a result there were many conflicts and strategies 
by which family histories were reworked and redrafted in order to break potentially 
dangerous associations (Fitzpatrick, 1994, p. 234). For Anna, this traumatic experience 
in her family history is folded into the context of a rescue story: the efforts of her 
 
8 ‘The Great Patriotic War’ is the name given to World War II in the former Soviet Union. 
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grandpa and the fate that befalls her great-grandmother’s family are part of a personal 
family history, rather than the descriptive pages of a history textbook. Anna’s 
generation is once again benefiting from growing wealth, freedom of choice, and 
opportunities not seen since the turn of the 19th century. In this respect there is a clear 
distinction between her Soviet family history, the difficult period experienced in the 
1990s, and the relative prosperity of the present. 
 
With her parents’ generation, another chapter unfolded in the story of Anna’s family. 
She recounted, ‘My grandparents [on her mother’s side] were Volga German. Mum’s 
father was a Lutheran priest and Mum learnt German at their house. They were 
generally well off’. However, the ethnic differences within the family after the marriage 
of Anna’s parents were still the subject of everyday discussion. As Anna told me, 
‘When my mother and my siblings went to the [German] mother’s family, they were 
called “invading Tatars”, and when they went to see the [Tatar] father’s family, they 
would say, “The fascists are here!”’  
 
Describing ethnicity with Anna’s family is incredibly complex. In the 1990s Anna’s 
parents decided to go to live in Germany as returning Volga Germans. When her 
mother’s grandfather had been asked to complete documents detailing their nationality, 
he had written that Anna’s mum was Tatar. Anna told me, ‘You can’t say, “Both”, and 
you can’t say, “No Identity.”’ This document came back to haunt them. There had been 
tragedy in the family: Anna’s mum’s youngest sibling, Anna’s aunt, had left her partner. 
He killed her in the street, then went home and killed himself. They had a daughter who 
was taken in by the partner’s mother. The grandmother did not want Anna’s mum to 
leave Kyrgyzstan for Germany with the orphaned daughter, so she sent documents 
stating she was Tatar to the German authorities. This meant that Anna’s parents 
couldn’t emigrate, as it invalidated their claim, and they were forced to stay in 
Kyrgyzstan. However, there was a benefit to being Tatar: it allowed her mother to get 
into the university, as Anna told me that ‘there were strong anti-German sentiments at 
the time’. 
 
Anna is a blonde, fair-skinned woman living in Almaty. People often make assumptions 
and Anna is labelled as ‘Russian’. I witnessed this firsthand when other informants 
would switch language to talk about us in Kazakh while both Anna and I were present, 
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because we had both been speaking in Russian and English and it was assumed that we 
did not speak Kazakh. As Anna was brought up in Kyrgyzstan, she also speaks and 
understands Kyrgyz, which is in the same language family as Kazakh, so she could 
often understand what they were saying. I was surprised that many people were so quick 
to generalise and make assumptions, as the complexity of Central Asian identity was a 
recurring theme for most of my informants. 9 Anna held claim to being Russian, 
Kyrgyz, Tatar, German, and Kazakhstani. Depending on how the story of a life is 
narrated, different ethnicities can be emphasised and can result in access to different 
entitlements. 
 
Over the last hundred years, Anna’s family has experienced massive turmoil as well as 
dramatic and damaging events. The complexity of this trauma is both a burden and an 
asset. Telling a certain story, for example emphasising an aspect of one’s experience, 
history, or identity, can allow for access to further opportunities. Anna chose to apply 
for—and gained—Russian citizenship and a Russian passport during my fieldwork. 
Anna is a career-driven journalist and a young member of the middle class. The 
narrative of Russian identity provides her with the most opportunity, and so she chose 
to follow this path. In Almaty, members of the young urban middle class, including 
Anna, have a strong focus on the present and the future, yet drawing upon the past is 
often what enables them to carve out their own identity. 
 
The opportunities that Anna experienced in Almaty, in particular through the university, 
are seized on as a tool for change, development, and progression. Through the 
university, I explore the urban middle class, highlighting how the city can be a good 
place to initiate an anthropology of the region through the personal stories of individuals 
who are brought together in a fast-paced context of change. 
 
In the light of Anna’s story, as an informant who could be considered typical (in the 
complexity of her background and life experience), how should we understand the 
centre of town? I see it as a place where individual lives come into contact—running 
 
9 A clear and interesting account of the complexities of ethnicity and the interaction of language, 
passports, identity, and nationality can be found in Louw’s account of Bukhara (Louw, 2007, 
pp. 68–70). Out of the conflicting influences and state policies emerges a distinct—but not 
unproblematic—‘Bukharan’ identity. 
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parallel, crosscutting, colliding, and joining together. Students travel to the centre of 
town on a termly basis. Workers commute across the city to work on a daily basis. 
Goods flow into the city to supply a high concentration of humans living an 
increasingly consumption-based lifestyle. These qualities also make the centre of the 
city good for fieldwork. For example, I brought together focus groups of students at the 
university; I was able to join groups of friends in cafes and bars; I attended weddings, 
birthday parties, and other celebrations. With the help of my research assistants, I was 
able to speak to people from different businesses and government institutions, 
architects, and local and national government officials, following threads in 
understanding the architecture, history, and risk profile of the city as I explored urban 
perceptions of risk, particularly seismic risk. What emerged from these discussions was 
a wider context of how risk is dealt with on an everyday basis through the narratives 
that people tell about their lives. 
 
The centre of the city is often a stop along the way on a different journey: the time it 
takes to study for a degree, the contract length of a job, or the time it takes to visit the 
central market before returning to other areas of the city. The city’s web of influence 
stretches out beyond the centre to the places where workers live, priced out of the 
expensive central accommodation; the areas where outdoor leisure pursuits take place; 
and the places where goods such as food are produced and products are manufactured 
before being transported into the city. The city is also a place where journeys can 
change direction through difficulties, trauma, or opportunity. In trying to understand 
what constitutes an urban identity, the obvious question becomes: What is an urban 
identity different to? In this case, what is it to be rural? 
 
At this stage, it is good to further question the ‘unboundedness’ of the field site 
(Candea, 2010b, p.16). The final destination of my transect of the city pushes 
conventional notions of urban boundaries. I ask my informants what they see as 
different while also documenting what they see as an encroaching urban influence, 
debates which I argue are required to be part of a discussion of what ‘urban’ means in 
Almaty. 
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Former Kolkhoz (collective farm) 
 
The journey is 45 minutes by car or an hour by bus, with a further 10-minute taxi ride. 
To reach this final location of my transect, I travelled from the main bus station, located 
next to the Central Mosque and north of the main Zelenyï Bazar (Green Bazaar). Taking 
a shared taxi, I weaved around the original krepost (fortress), a Russian military 
fortification built in 1854 which grew to become the city of Almaty. The minibus 
continued on past the city’s ring road in the direction of the airport. After passing the 
turning for the terminal, the road was lined with car dealerships, small industrial units, 
and a crumbling Soviet-era brick factory. Official signs flitted past the window, 
marking the beginning and the end of separate villages, now amalgamated into the 
urban sprawl. Traffic was heavy and at times moved slowly in a constant train of 
vehicles. Having reached the final stop, the bus pulled into the town of Talgar. As an 
informant who moved there five years ago from the city centre described to me, 
‘Almaty and Talgar [is] the same conglomerate’. The people on the streets of Talgar 
suggested that there is a much higher proportion of Kazakhs living here than other 
nationalities, but there are no official statistics to corroborate this. From here I would 
either take a taxi the last few kilometres or start walking up the road, towards the 
mountains, flagging down a car for a lift. After five minutes, I reached my destination: 
two villages which formed part of a kolkhoz (collective farm) during the Soviet era. 
 
I carried out 44 interviews on the farm and in the surrounding areas. These were less 
frequent than my interviews downtown, as they needed to fit into the working schedules 
of different jobs, many of which involved waking up early to feed the animals and 
sleeping during the middle of the day. Although I joined in many of these activities, it 
was more difficult to sit down for longer interviews, with the exception of those held 
over meals or planned weeks in advance; even these would only sometimes take place, 
despite the advance planning. I interviewed agricultural farm workers, smallholding 
owners, a horse breeder, a shepherd, staff at the leisure complexes, a paediatric nurse, a 
computer programmer, tractor mechanics, two former accountants, a Uighur community 
representative, an executive in a multinational company, a local politician, market 
traders, a member of local disaster-preparation committee, a carpenter, taxi drivers, a 
teacher, and a military veteran. What drew the majority of this heterogenous group of 
occupations to this place were the qualities of the place itself. 
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This has always been a good place to live. As I was told by my hosts, ‘It has been a 
place where Kazakhs herded animals for hundreds of years; there was even an ancient 
battlefield there’. There are rich green grasses and good summer pasture for animals, as 
well as fresh water from a mountain stream. While the stream still flows, many of the 
problems, challenges, and risks that the villagers reported to me are linked to 
insufficient flows of different kinds which have gained or lost importance as the area 
has entered the urban milieu and which interrupt the movement of goods, services, and 
information to and from the area. These include the privatisation of spring water; the 
pollution of the stream; no gas flow to overground pipes; intermittent mobile phone 
signal; a lack of internet; increased vehicle traffic from the city; the construction of a 
new road; the demolition of the only local shops; the drying up of funding from the 
local government for a local health post; and a lack of village employment. During my 
stay, these issues of flow—and the unpredictable cessation, delay, and withdrawal of 
promises made by both the local and regional akimat (mayor’s office)—caused an 
increase in local uncertainty, prompting me to ask: To what extent are these flows 
evidence of connection or dislocation from the urban environments of the city? 
 
 
Villagers or urbanites? 
 
Bakyt is a 77-year-old Kazakh woman who was introduced to me as a ‘village elder’, 
someone who would be able to answer my questions. She told me, ‘I’m the oldest 
person here in the village. There is an older person, but she is very sick and can’t 
remember a thing about the past anymore’.  
 
Children are taught from a young age to respect elder members of their community, in 
particular elder family members. At a Kazakh traditional meal, such as that eaten at 
Nauryz (the spring festival), a sheep’s head is boiled and parts are symbolically given to 
different members of the family. The youngest person is given a piece of an ear to 
symbolise their need to listen. When I arrived at Bakyt’s house in the village, I found 
five generations of her family present. We held an open discussion, with contributions 
from all members of the family (except the young baby who was present). Bakyt, as the 
grandmother and the oldest person present, told me about her family and the area: 
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Bakyt: I was born in 1942; my parents used to live in this house before I did. 
They were born in this oblast [an area roughly equivalent to an English county], 
but not in this village. They would spend one part of the year in one area and the 
other in another [herding animals]. This village is in a place called a jailau; this 
was the summer pasture. Now there are 100 or 120 houses in the village. There 
are a lot of new houses being built now. The village started as a kolkhoz 
[collective farm]. The farm was really big in the past, and this village was the 
fourth part of it. There weren’t many houses here when it was first established, 
possibly just nomads here. This place was chosen because it is close to the 
mountains and there is a river here; it is good for the animals here. The apple 
orchards were part of the collective farm, and famous Almaty apples also come 
from here. I remember planting the apple orchards in the 1960s. The village is 
made up of Uighur, Kazakh, and Russian people. There were no major changes 
and no racism. 
This introduction gives a good idea of the village as a place which appears to have a 
rural context, with mention of pasture, animals, rivers, and orchards. Part of Bakyt’s 
description of the area is a discussion of the flow of information, goods, and utilities. 
Yet her discussion begins to show the connections—and difficulties in connections—
that link the area to the greater urban environment: 
Bakyt: We have satellite TV, but we don’t have internet. There is some 
cellphone internet, but that is not good. The gas pipes arrived two or three years 
ago, but there isn’t any gas and so at the moment we use charcoal. Gas would be 
better for the ecology, first of all; it would be less work for the heating, too. 
[We] used to have oil here and still have the container outside [but] the prices 
got too high. It is also a problem that there is no drinking water here. You can 
drink the river water if you boil it. 
As the villages are becoming increasingly involved in urban flows, their need for 
connection to flows of information and utilities is increasingly important. The village 
has been particularly impacted by the flow of people coming from the city centre, 
through the village, and on to the nearby Ak-Bulak ski resort and international boxing 
academy. For many villagers, these new developments came as a surprise. As Gulzhan, 
a Kazakh woman in her late 60s told me, ‘I didn’t know we lived in paradise until they 
built Ak-Bulak resort’. Gulzhan’s statement came with an exaggerated look over her 
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shoulder and around the land near her home. She continued, ‘Each of the families used 
to have home animals, but Ak-Bulak took away the grazing land. When the kolkhoz 
split, the fields were given to those working there on a 99-year lease, but later on, in 
1997 or 1998, the government changed it to a 49-year lease and took the land to build 
the resort’. Unpredictable government changes, such as the reduction of the lease 
length, increased uncertainty for villagers and undermined the certainties they required 
for everyday life. 
 
The development of the leisure facilities near the village is perhaps the most significant 
change that has taken place in the last 25 years. Currently, the ongoing rebuilding of the 
main road through the village is a conspicuous and potentially transformative change. 
Workers were present during the entire 18 months of my fieldwork. The sides of the 
roads were cleared so that a much bigger multi-lane highway could be built, as the 
current road was only a single track. The development of the road was framed by the 
local akimat (mayor’s office) as bringing development to the village, but those living 
there have mixed experiences of akimat promises in the past. For example, the ghostly 
shell of a half-built health post sits prominently on the main road, with successive local 
akims (mayors) starting and then never finishing the project. Those living nearby 
blamed this abandoned construction on corruption and a lack of intention to ever finish 
it in the first place, and the project influenced perceptions of the road’s construction.  
 
The new road was a requirement for bringing the ski resort, biathlon training village, 
and boxing academy into the plan for Almaty to host the Winter Olympics in 2022. The 
construction of the new road necessitated the demolition of the only two shops in the 
area, both of which stand at the side of the main road. Their demolition would sever the 
autonomy of the village, requiring villagers to travel farther into town for basic goods. 
Construction workers cleared all around the buildings until they sat as awkward 
reminders of the detrimental effect of the road. The construction work was intended to 
be conspicuous, and the next winter I saw the International Olympic Committee being 
driven in a cavalcade of police cars and minibuses to view the facilities. Unfortunately, 
Almaty’s bid was unsuccessful, and this marked the end of any further development. 
The road remains unfinished; piles of rubble and large concrete drainage pipes are 
strewn along the roadside, but the shops remain open. 
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The promise of a new road has also fuelled new construction along its route 
encroaching upon the old orchards that were part of the farm. The urban middle class 
have been buying up land and constructing massive concrete houses with high walls and 
metal gates. Nazym Shedenova, a Kazakh academic based at KazGU in Almaty, has 
written about how these new detached houses are the physical evidence of an expanding 
middle class and also provide places in which the middle class fix their position in the 
physical landscape of Almaty (Shedenova, 2012, p. 31). 
 
The connection of flows is considered part of development, but the connections which 
are actually made tell us about the motivations behind decision-makers’ choices. While 
villagers are increasingly brought into urban flows through working in the city, 
providing services to the leisure resorts, producing farm products consumed in the city, 
and furnishing a place for otdykhat (rest), they also see themselves as differentiated 
from those in the city in a number of ways. Moldir, a Kazakh woman in her early 70s, 
commented on the ongoing changes in the village and also how she saw herself as 
distinct from city dwellers. 
Moldir: When the farm fell apart, the name changed. Now the village is growing 
as relatives and others come to live here. There are no distinct groups in the 
village, only nationalistic [ethnic] groupings. The new people who come here are 
more nationalistic than those that have been here for a while. Those who have 
been here a while will just talk to each other, as all nationalities [ethnicities] are 
equal. If there is a funeral, then everyone helps. On 1 April, one child in that other 
house died, and everyone came to help. It does not depend on whether we are 
Muslim or Christian; we are all neighbours… If there is conflict, it is over in two 
days and we drink tea together, as we are drug/podruga [literal translation ‘male 
or female friends’]. When there was a kolkhoz, there was community. For you 
[Alex] to know what it is like, you have to live here… the shop knows all the 
gossip, the humans are the wildlife here… 
…I want another century to go by without disaster. Anything can happen; you can 
predict, but you can’t say for sure. They have never had a social or political 
disaster in the village. A sel [flood, mudflow, or landslide] happened in Talgar 
two years ago, and that did kill people. My daughter saw the flood, but she is not 
afraid of God or the landslide. If the water and river come here, then it will just go 
into the ditches. I don’t remember anything happening in the distant past, but they 
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say that the big stones that you see in the river come from a flood a long time ago. 
You can see in some places that it is really rocky; rocks are linked to the flood. If 
you dig down, you find sand, soil, and stones. I know this because it’s hard when 
you have to put a toilet in. 
While Moldir is confident there is something different about the village, she is also 
aware of processes of ongoing change and the threat of future change. Many of the 
changes underway are bringing the city closer. The example of the Koryo10 family 
allows us to explore these changes in more detail and think about the different types of 
movement and changes associated with family life, helping us to understand their 
motivations for taking action through the stories they tell. Through these, we can 
understand the interweaving of village narratives and city narratives, which I argue 
shows an increasing amalgamation of the two. 
 
 
Mikhail Koryo: ‘Life is like a river: if you stop, you will be swept backward’. 
 
Continuing south on the road towards the mountains and the ski resort, low single-
storey buildings give way to ageing apple orchards. The road forks right, to the biathlon 
training camp, and left past a shiny new petrol station to Ak-Bulak ski resort and the 
boxing academy. Between these two roads there is a smallholding, accessed by a dirt 
track lined with 50-metre-high poplars. Getting out of the car and opening the metal 
farm gate brings you onto a curving dirt track along the edge of a hayfield where a herd 
of cows graze. The track is bordered by a fast-flowing shallow stream, heading north 
from the mountains out towards the steppe. 
 
On my first visit, the taxi couldn’t get farther than the turning from the main road, so 
my research assistant and I trudged the final stretch on foot. Boris, my research assistant 
at the time, was a colleague of my hosts in the first transect location and worked with 
me throughout my fieldwork. He worked at a non-governmental organisation that was 
funded by the United States. A few of his colleagues were American and he often 
assisted them with translation although his primary job there was IT systems. As Boris 
 
10 I use the name ‘Koryo’ instead of the actual family name to preserve anonymity. Koryo-
Saram is the phrase used by some Koreans living in Kazakhstan to refer to their 
nationality/ethnicity. 
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is a Korean-Kazakh man in his early 30s, other villagers suggested that we visit the 
family living near the mountains because they were also Korean-Kazakhs. When we 
reached the farmyard, we were greeted by Nastya, who by the end of my fieldwork 
would introduce herself as my ‘Kazakh mum’ to my friends. Nastya stood in the 
farmyard wearing a wide-brimmed sun visor, small dark sunglasses, a thick winter coat 
with a heavily stained apron, and rubber galoshes. Always happy to welcome guests, the 
family’s time away from their animals was often spent entertaining. Nastya welcomed 
us into the house, where we met her husband, Mikhail, also Korean-Kazakh and in his 
mid-50s. Mikhail has a jovial face and was wearing small square sunglasses. His strong 
handshake and warm smile made him instantly likeable. After being invited in, we were 
greeted with a heady mix of vodka, steaming pots of herbal tea made from local 
wildflowers, and dozens of hours of conversation. We sat around the table and talked, in 
Russian, about their lives, politics, culture, news, families, food, and travel, among 
many other subjects. 
 
Mikhail and Nastya have two children, Sasha (32) and Alona (28). Sasha became a 
good friend during my fieldwork, and I will discuss his personal story more in Chapter 
6. The family describe themselves as ethnic Koreans. Many Koreans, who had migrated 
to Siberia in search of land to farm in the 1860s and ’70s, were moved by Stalin in 1937 
to stop them joining in any conflict, as they had been associated with the Japanese 
infiltration of Soviet Siberia (Oka, 2006). During the late 1930s, families were forcibly 
moved to Central Asia; Nastya’s father worked as a railway engineer, and her parents 
were among those moved. Mikhail was born in Stalinsk, Siberia. He spent his childhood 
there and finished school in 1977; as he said himself, ‘We are Soviet’. Mikhail came to 
work in Almaty in business and accounting. Although they never talked much about this 
time of their lives, even when asked, they emphasised their life on the farm: ‘We live by 
a Chinese philosophy. There is zero and there is one. If you prioritise health, then you 
have one; if you don’t, then you have zero in front, you have nothing’.  
 
Health issues led to change, and in 2004–2005 they bought land and erected a yurta, a 
traditional Kazakh tent used by nomads, in this location just outside the village. Nastya 
and Mikhail would come with their children from the city to relax here, and they were 
keen to describe to me why they bought this land: 
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The altitude here is 1400 metres. [Mikhail disappeared into a nearby room, 
returning with a hunting rifle.] […] Deer would come to this place because there 
is a national park nearby; there used to be a lot of wildlife around here. Ak-
Bulak resort was not here when we first bought this place—it seems like 
development follows us wherever we go. 
To what extent are Nastya and Mikhail part of this ‘development’? Are they one of the 
people that Moldir described as coming from the city with their relatives? In some 
ways, yes, but they have also embraced the rural lifestyle, looking after the apple 
orchards and raising animals. In many ways, some of the more traditional industries in 
the village continue precisely because others have come from the city to practise them, 
while those living in the city undertake higher-paid work in the city: 
Our philosophy is to create, not just to consume. When we bought this place, the 
orchards were abandoned. Now they are producing fruit up to 400 or 500 grams 
[…] in the 1990s nature was everywhere; now there is nothing. Children in 
Almaty may not be okay, as they’re not able to find out about nature here 
anymore. 
The family considered their move to the farm to be a positive change. They 
differentiated this rural lifestyle from their previous urban lifestyle by their interaction 
with nature. They told me with pride that rural means cleaner air, quietness, fresh water, 
plants, and animals. They also said that they ‘live on a mainly organic lifestyle, but not 
everybody lives in a natural way, because natural products are not affordable’. Since the 
1990s, a healthy lifestyle appears to have become a commodity for purchase and 
consumption by urbanite Almatineans. In contrast to the assessment of rural life, the 
family described how urban environments are synonymous with risk: 
A lot of people there are not prepared for an earthquake. A lot of our friends went 
to Astana [now called Nur-Sultan] because they were scared of the earthquake. If 
it happens, then it’s your fate. There are other reasons, though. During the Soviet 
time, nothing was built higher than 12 storeys, and they were made to work up to 
eight bal [a measure of the intensity of shaking]. If you want to know about 
earthquakes, you should talk to the government. They are the ones who allow up 
to 30 storeys high now. These buildings are mostly made from glass—this is a 
disaster. Modern ways of building Almaty are not even good for five bal. In 
Soviet times there were strict ways to build, and now there are no rules: money, 
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corruption, and business have led to bigger buildings. Also, the qualifications 
people get now are in economics and law; there are not so many technical people. 
Mikhail suggested that there is a generational difference marked by people who grew up 
during the Soviet era: ‘I’m 50 years old; changes happened when I was 30, therefore I 
have a Soviet education. Nepotism is now the way things go: there is 98 per cent 
literacy and this is the legacy of the Soviet Union. Now the 98 per cent literacy is only 
because of this legacy. Who are the middle class? The middle class are earning 100,000 
tenge’. 
 
Mikhail provided an example of how things that might be taken for granted in other 
countries were sources of worry for people living in Almaty. His daughter Alona works 
in a hospital in Almaty, and during this discussion he commented that ‘only 30 per cent 
of doctors are professional; the others are rich. There is one answer that closes all other 
questions: that is money. [For] this reason, people are afraid of devaluation. Who is not 
afraid? Only those who do not have money!’ Mikhail gave a bleak view of the city, one 
which reinforces the positive situation in which his family now lives. His ‘escape to the 
country’, as the common English phrase goes, is exactly that: an escape from the 
uncertainty, risk, and danger of the city to the rural and therefore healthy lifestyle. 
However, the life his family leads involves a much more connected and symbiotic 
relationship than he presents. Their large 4x4 and city friends keep them connected to 
the flows of the city, even if they look a bit odd in their country attire amidst the city’s 
gleaming shopping centres. 
 
These examples from the third site in my transect demonstrate encroaching urbanisation 
in a village context. Escaping urban life was Mikhail and Nastya’s goal. They decided 
to make choices to support a healthy lifestyle, while at the same time drinking vodka to 
excess and lamenting the increased urbanisation of the village. Is health a luxury to be 
bought? Many of the commercial industries that have sprung up around the village turn 
health—the quality which the area is perceived to have in abundance—into a 
commodity for consumption by urban residents. For those living in the city, there is a 
feeling of lack of control due to corruption and nepotism, and this is what Mikhail and 
Nastya have tried to escape. But as Mikhail puts it, it appears that development follows 
them. Dacha (summer houses) and luxury villas have appeared in the village; four-
bedroom concrete-block family homes have replaced the older tradition of small 
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wooden buildings next to small gardens. With these new villas came the privatisation of 
one of the two water supply points in the village as the land was bought and walled off, 
preventing access.11 While they may be physically located in the village, it could be 
argued that these villas are satellites of the city, not participants in the local ethos. For 
example, part of my stay in the village required me to get involved in reciprocal 
community obligations, for example with the hay harvest. Although it was not directly 
discussed by my host family, their relationship with other people in the village was 
clearly different to those who came just for relaxation at their villas or for exercise and 
leisure at the ski resort. 
 
Some of the flows to the village—such as leisure and tourism—bring change. Other 
examples of disconnection and a lack of flow—for example, in gas, internet, and 
information—mark something that, for villagers, hasn’t changed fast enough. There is a 
constant balance to be reached between having right of access to goods and services 
(e.g. utilities) and sharing village resources (e.g. nature, clean air, organic goods, and a 
healthy lifestyle) with the city. 
 
My time in the village was an interesting and unique part of my fieldwork. Unlike the 
relative isolation I experienced in my city-centre accommodation, I was quickly brought 
into community relations while staying on the farm. Many of Mikhail and Nastya’s 
friends travelled from abroad or from a long distance across Kazakhstan to visit them, 
often because the farm was considered a healthy place to visit. Group activities 
commonplace in everyday life, such as helping to mend farm machinery, taking care of 
the apple trees, and having discussions with neighbours, allowed me to have 
interactions that were much harder to achieve in the city centre. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the family’s search for rural life had brought the area into the sphere of 
greater city influence. They were not an exception, but in fact they were themselves part 
of a wider process of the growth of urban life—the focus of this thesis. 
 
11 Zabord (literally ‘fence' in Russian) is the process of ‘fencing’ or border delineation between 
properties which my research assistant Alma described as becoming increasingly prominent in 
Almaty in the 1990s where higher walls were built around private properties. Mikhail lamented 
the erection of fences and talked about the land ‘150 kilometres from here where you will find 
no fences and there are wild ducks’. These small-scale manifestations of liberal economic 
policies of privatisation are writ large in the everyday lives of those living with change. 
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Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced both the places and the people who are the subject of this 
research, arguing two main points. First, these three areas of Almaty should be 
understood as being part of the greater urban milieu. Understanding the breadth of 
opinions and backgrounds of the young urban middle class therefore requires me to 
consider the lives of those informants living in the three transect locations which 
constitute my urban field site. 
 
Second, members of the young urban middle class narrate their lives in a unique way 
that is differentiated from that of the older generation. The older generation, from my 
examples, are able to tie together multiple traumatic, damaging, or life-changing events 
and bring a common thread to their life narratives which promotes a feeling of stability 
in the present. In comparison, my young urban middle-class informants are all too 
aware of the uncertainty that undermines their public ‘onstage’ narratives. 
 
In the first transect location, Sholpan recounts a life that involves dramatic change, 
finding the present a prosperous and stable time. In comparison, her daughter Aizhan 
focuses on the uncertainty she sees in the present, a result of her age and her focus on 
what the future may hold. In the second transect location, we hear of Anna, cut adrift 
from any one place by her family’s traumatic history, which includes many threads to 
different ethnicities and places. Anna seizes upon certain aspects of her story—
particularly her ability to claim a number of different nationalities in order to obtain a 
Russian passport and greater security for her future employment as a journalist—
through framing her life’s onstage public persona in a certain way. In the final transect 
location, Mikhail takes a philosophical approach to life, making choices that ensure his 
own health and well-being and taking hold of the freedoms he has to make what he sees 
as healthy life choices. As I will explain in detail in Chapter 6, his son’s challenge to 
this stability is met with unexpected and harsh punishment from his family. In each of 
these examples, narrative ways of telling life stories give meaning to the present and 
help my informants to understand the past. In the following chapter, I will ask what 
happens when these narratives are ruptured and the foundations on which they are built 
are called into question. 
 
 
Chapter 4 
A Transect from South to North:  
Tracing the disruptive flow of the Kargalinka River 
 
During my fieldwork, a large sel (mudflow) came from the mountains, flooding a 
number of neighbourhoods in the south of the city and triggering widespread panic. In 
this chapter, I explore this exceptional event and discuss how it can be seen as an 
ethnographic moment which brought my informants’ background worries and concerns 
to the fore. The sel also changed my perspective as a researcher. My informants’ 
narratives of uncertainty didn’t fit the reality of the hazards faced; there was a social 
force that was driving this disparity between perception and reality. This event showed 
me that I should be focusing on narratives of risk, rather than the physical hazards 
themselves. 
 
I undertook multiple visits to the city district of Nauryzbai, where people were directly 
affected by the sel. On these trips, I was accompanied by my research assistant, Anna. 
We walked south, following the flow of the river, from a dam on the outskirts of the city 
to a more built-up area, and finally on to housing districts adjacent to where I lived in a 
Khrushchevka, described in the first transect location in Chapter 3. The conversations 
cited in this section are a result of the random encounters we had with the people we 
met along our transect walks, as well as with people we were introduced to by those 
living there. As we progress along the transect and reach the more built-up areas, I 
include further comments from other informants living across the city. These comments 
are drawn from discussions of the sel in the context of everyday conversations and from 
structured interviews I carried out, in which I discussed a broader range of natural 
hazards as a result of my initial focus on seismic risk. Considering accounts from 
informants among a range of ages, I examine what characterises the responses of my 
young urban middle-class informants. I have included an array of responses to represent 
the diversity of backgrounds and opinions of those affected by the sel. These 
diversifying factors—including where one lives, their ethnicity, life experience, age, 
gender, worries, and fears, as well as notions of who is responsible for dealing with 
hazards—all influenced the way that the events were experienced, interpreted, and 
narrated. 
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My description is parcelled into three sections for the purpose of analysis. My 
discussion of the first section focuses on the firsthand experiences of those living in 
close proximity to the dam. The second section corresponds to an area where the river 
burst its banks and houses were flooded. The third section includes people living in less 
directly affected areas across the city who only heard about the sel from others through 
word of mouth or online reports. I try to avoid imposing false divisions between these 
places—what Ingold terms the ‘assemblies of connected elements’, which he argues are 
an artefact of ‘modern metropolitan societies’ (Ingold, 2007, p. 24). Instead, I 
emphasise the flow of the river—a thread which, like the paths of those travelling 
between different areas of the city, and my own walking transects following the river, 
comprises journeys which cross over and overlap. Through exposure to a sel, these 
everyday paths through life are broken.  
 
 
Exposure to a Sel 
 
The word sel is used to describe a broad category of hazards that can include mudflows, 
debris flows, landslides, and floods. The word originates from the Arabic word sayl 
(torrent) and has entered common usage in both Russian and Kazakh. Because the 
buildings in Almaty have been constructed in at-risk areas, the city is vulnerable to 
infrequent but severe flooding. The rivers that flow across Almaty are fed by snow melt, 
glacier melt, and rainwater. The foothills of the Alatau Mountains are mainly formed of 
loess—windblown sediment that is easily eroded and carried by water—and granite 
boulders that have broken off major rock formations. When these factors combine, and 
when the flow rate of the river increases, it is able to erode and transport material from 
the mountains, often in combination with larger-scale ground movement such as 
landslides. This material ranges from smaller pieces of sediment to large granite 
boulders. When the suspended material reaches more than 60 per cent of the volume of 
the water, it is considered a debris flow in Western scientific classification (Hungr, 
Leroueil, & Picarelli, 2013). Major instances of sel in the past have led to large-scale 
engineering projects by the government of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. One 
example is the construction of the Medeu Dam, built to mitigate the risk of flooding. 
However, Almaty is exposed to multiple river channels that each have their own 
associated risks and are liable to flooding (Elie, 2013). 
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This transect follows one of these channels: the Kargalinka River, which runs from high 
in the mountains south of Almaty, through the city, and out onto the steppe until it 
reaches Lake Balkash. On 23 July 2015, the moraine wall of unsorted glacial sediments, 
which was holding back a pool of melt-water, gave way. This sent a massive flow of 
water down the Kargalinka River. Image 4.1 shows a comparison of the river before the 
rupture on 11th of July, where the turquoise melt-pond is visible at the top of the picture, 
and on 27th of July, where the lake has disappeared and there is a higher volume of 
water visible in the river leading down towards the anti-mudflow dam. The dam is 
designed to hold back large rocks and debris such as trees while allowing water to pass 
through, draining the lake which forms behind it and reducing the percentage of 
suspended material in the water. The Kargalinka flows through areas of the city which 
used to be apple orchards, but are now packed with dachas (summer houses). Houses 
have been built here by their owners rather than through government led schemes or 
large-scale commercial developments. Many houses have been constructed here as 
exclusive residences for businessmen and government officials. Following the flow into 
town, the buildings become higher. As we reach the area in the vicinity of the Al-Farabi 
main ring road, the river flows past Soviet-era microdistricts, mainly comprised of 
Khrushchevka housing developments. These are the areas in which my informants live 
and work. 
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Image 4.1: Before-and-after comparison of floodwater in the Kargalinka River. 
Copyright NASA Earth Observatory images by Jesse Allen, using Landsat data from 
the U.S. Geological Survey. Accessed 20 July 2019 from 
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov. 
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Image 4.2: Anti-mudflow dam on the Kargalinka River after the sel. Image taken by 
author. 
 
First section: Close proximity to the dam and firsthand experience 
 
Göksu and Firat sat on the bonnet of their dusty red car while they chatted to Anna and 
me, squinting and shielding their eyes from the sun with their hands. The large structure 
of the concrete anti-mudflow dam loomed in the near distance (Image 4.2). Their car 
was parked alongside a gravel track that follows the edge of the current river channel, 
bordered by steep earthen banks over six metres high and falling into the fast-flowing 
stream at the base. Behind the car were single-storey dwellings with square foundations, 
two front windows, walls of breezeblocks and roughly rendered bare concrete façades. 
 
Göksu and Firat are in their mid-30s and from Turkish families1 living in the housing 
surrounding the Soviet-era concrete dam. We spoke in Russian, the official language of 
‘inter-ethnic communication’ in Kazakhstan. 
 
1 Turkish migration came in two distinct periods. First, Meskhetian Turks were forcibly 
deported from Georgia to Central Asia in November 1944 during WWII under accusations of 
spying for the then-enemy outside of the Soviet Union (Khazanov, 1992, p. 3). Second, since 
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When I asked them if they had experienced the flood, they responded that they were 
alerted that something was wrong at 2 a.m.: ‘Nashy [Our] hunters were high in the 
mountains and heard a big noise and understood that water was coming, and so they 
came down to the houses to warn people’. The hunters were considered part of Göksu 
and Firat’s community, and so the information they brought was accorded a high level 
of trust. With this information, members of the community took the preventive step of 
leaving their houses and moving to higher ground, where they ‘gathered with friends 
and families, everyone gathered together in the field’. To illustrate their point, Firat 
lifted his arms, gesticulating towards the raised ground above the houses. 
 
Anna asked if the dam had broken, as this was one of the rumours she had heard from 
friends living in the centre of the city. Göksu and Firat shook their heads. ‘[The sluice] 
was opened up and it worked as it was supposed to. The dam did a great job because it 
kept back all the stones and trees, which were the most dangerous hazard’. In this case, 
their personal experience allowed them to dispute the rumours Anna had heard 
discussed among her friends in the city centre. Their distance from events, both in terms 
of community and physical location, introduced uncertainty. Describing the reasons for 
the sel, Göksu referred to a merena, a river that forms melting ice. ‘Small rivers form 
from the lake and water starts to come out slowly. Supposedly a big piece of ice fell in 
the lake… which is what caused this flood’. The glacial lake he mentioned is located 15 
kilometres south, high in the mountains. His information likely came from a secondary 
source, as the lake is very difficult to reach and there is some uncertainty about what 
supposedly happened. 
 
When I asked them about the official government response to the flood, Göksu argued 
that the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MChS) was conspicuous in their 
demonstration of help, possibly because they didn’t want people to be angry with them, 
and that the action taken was the result of a higher authority: 
Göksu: MChS arrived at around 6 a.m. For the first two weeks after the flood, 
MChS were really active and they brought all the necessary things. We were 
 
independence, there has been a growing Turkish influence in Kazakhstan. The Turkish 
government has instituted a policy to promote a ‘pan-Turkic union’ between Turkey and those 
countries in Central Asia that speak Turkic languages, including Kazakhstan (Aydin, 2004, p. 7). 
 123 
grateful for that. They wanted to calm the people affected by the flood. The 
higher authorities learned about it, and that is why local authorities did 
something. I don’t think it was the akim (mayor), but some higher authority that 
pushed him to do it. There was also compensation for those affected. It wasn’t 
much, but at least it was something. 
Göksu’s comments could be considered a rumour. He doubted the urgency was a result 
of local officials and so attributed a higher authority with the ability to get things done. 
This is illustrative of how he perceives local political structures, particularly 
government actions on a local basis. To some extent, this suggests that there may be a 
disconnect between the local neighbourhood context, where the flood was experienced, 
and the citywide administrative context, in which the official response was organised. In 
a study of the aftermath of a 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, India, Simpson describes how 
the state sought to ‘strengthen and extend its reach’ in the political and social turmoil 
that followed (Simpson, 2014, p. 55). Commenting on the government’s rebuilding 
work following the earthquake, Simpson remarks that it is not inherently bad, ‘but it is 
never as neutral or innocent as people often claim and sometimes appear to believe’ 
(ibid., p. 1). As in Simpson’s example, the sel was a rupture which not only disrupted 
everyday life on a local basis, but was also seized upon by the state as an opportunity to 
further its own agenda of increasing its local influence and support. 
 
These experiences have not changed how people in Göksu and Firat’s community 
perceive where they live; they continue to feel that it is a good area to live in, despite 
the uncertainty that it introduced into their lives. Göksu spoke in the present tense, 
commenting simply, ‘We like living here’. The flood has not changed that. In some 
ways, the risks that those in this community are exposed to are folded into the 
uncertainties of everyday life. While Ibañez-Tirado (2015) described how exposure to 
risks in Tajikistan, including flooding, was seen as a life of ‘everyday disasters’, for this 
Turkish community in Almaty, such risks are not seen as disasters: they are perceived to 
be manageable on a community basis, and the local failure of the state does not have 
such a dramatic impact. Perhaps, as Göksu and Firat demonstrated in their 
chronological narrative of events, they are confident that they have a good 
understanding of what happened. Their knowledge distinguishes this account from the 
accounts that follow, in which a lack of information correlates with a feeling of greater 
uncertainty. 
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This section shows how the dam marks a boundary between natural threats, symbolised 
by the mountains to the south, and spheres of social and political influence, which 
extend out from the city. The flood broke the technological defences of the city; in so 
doing, it provoked those informants who were affected by it to question the sphere of 
political influence. Without information, they turned to supposition and rumour to 
openly discuss the ambiguities of the situation, in this case with an inquisitive 
international researcher. 
 
 
Second section: An area that was flooded  
 
This section explores the comments of informants who lived half a kilometre 
downstream from the dam. The riverbanks were breached at this location, small bridges 
were swept away, and some houses were flooded. I analyse the accounts of two people: 
a Kazakh woman, Dilnaz, and a Russian man, Nikita. I spoke to Dilnaz outside her 
house after introducing myself on one of our walks down the river. I also met Nikita 
outside his property, where he was painting a sign. I spent more time with Nikita, 
drinking tea at his house and taking a trip in his four-wheel-drive car; he showed me the 
upper stretches of the river, starting above the dam and travelling down to his house. He 
did this to help explain to me what had happened in each place. The informants living in 
this area were affected in a different way by the rupture of everyday life caused by the 
sel. They expressed a greater degree of confusion around the actual events that took 
place, fiercely criticised the state, and discussed a wider range of potential risks. They 
also questioned who was responsible for dealing with those risks, suggesting that the sel 
was more disruptive for them than it had been for those living closer to the dam. 
 
Dilnaz is a young mother in her late 20s. She lives with her extended family, who are 
ethnic Kazakhs. She was at home at the time of the flood and gave her account of what 
happened, speaking to us in Russian. 
Dilnaz: It was 1:50 a.m. and nobody notified them. I heard that sound. I thought 
that it might be an earthquake, so I went outside and the neighbours had already 
gathered there. Everyone was looking into the river, but it was really dark, so 
they couldn’t see what was happening. It was very dark, and both the electricity 
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and the water were turned off. It was really scary, like a horror movie; it could 
even have been temnii sily [the literal translation is ‘dark power’ in Russian, but 
was likely used by Dilnaz to indicate an evil or supernatural force]. Smelt 
strongly like hvor [Russian word for pine trees]. 
Three key observations emerge from Dilnaz’s account: first, a power cut meant that 
those living near her could not see what was happening. This led to confusion. The 
disconnection of electricity and water supply further intensified an emotional response 
of fear and isolation. In the previous chapter, I argued that my informants view 
connections, such as the supply of utilities, as an integral part of what it means to be 
urban. In Chapter 6, I suggest that the deliberate disconnection of a Uighur 
neighbourhood was used by the local government to isolate the community. In Dilnaz’s 
case, the severing of these connections dislocated her from the community and support 
of the city, leading to uncertainty. 
 
Because of this disconnection, Dilnaz knew little of what was going on. She told me, 
‘Lots of people and I were wondering if it is our destiny and we will die today’. This 
was not the only account I heard which mentioned a fatalistic approach to major natural 
hazards; indeed, it was a frequent trope that appeared when discussing seismic risk. 
When events fell outside of people’s ability to make sense of them in the context of 
shared public narratives, for example when discussing the threat of a major earthquake, 
my informants cited divine will as an explanation of responsibility for major change. 
This can have serious consequences; for example, Paradise argues that attributing 
causation to the wrath of God has a significant effect on the action taken in response to 
a hazard (Paradise, 2005, p. 171). 
 
Second, Dilnaz had expected that she would be notified about the hazard, but she 
received no such notification. This intensified a feeling of uncertainty, as the expected 
course of events was undermined. The Ministry of Emergency Situations (MoES) 
normally uses SMS alerts, sent to mobile phones, to warn people of potential hazards. 
On average, I received one of these warnings every couple of weeks. They would 
include messages about hazards such as avalanches in the mountains, strong winds on 
the steppe, or potential flooding due to snowmelt and heavy rainfall. Dilnaz had an 
expectation of an official series of events: in these circumstances, she felt the state 
should have been present and offering assistance. She told me, ‘MoES is responsible for 
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preparing the river, managing that river, making the channel wider and opening the 
sluice gates, but they failed. They had to prepare people because people didn’t think it 
possible because they haven’t experienced it’. Dilnaz expected the state to be involved 
in dealing with this hazard—an expectation reflected in a joint Overseas Development 
Institute and Earthquakes Without Frontiers conference report on natural hazard risk in 
Kazakhstan, which agreed that ‘governments are ultimately responsible for public 
safety—and they are not only responsible for what they do, but for what they don’t do’ 
(Overseas Development Institute, 2016, p. 18). In this instance, the expected public 
narrative course of events, including training and preparation, was not followed. 
Consequently, Dilnaz’s trust in the government’s ability—and its willingness to care for 
the public—was undermined. 
 
Third, there was a strong sensory experience of the hazard. Dilnaz was unable to see 
what was happening, and she commented on the unfamiliar experience of encountering 
a strong smell of pine trees for which she had no frame of reference. This was possibly 
caused by the rocks smashing trees as they were carried by floodwaters; hundreds of 
trees were found caught behind the dam the following morning. Gregg comments on 
how, preceding a tsunami in Thailand following the 2004 Sumatran earthquake, a lack 
of experience meant that people did not react to unfamiliar sights and sounds, despite 
being potential warnings of the incoming tsunami (Gregg et al., 2006). In Kazakhstan, 
where there is previous experience of minor earthquakes, Dilnaz was able to interpret 
the sounds that she heard as being linked to known hazards, especially those that are 
background worries in everyday life. When her ability to explain events through 
personal experience was exhausted, and with no public narrative of events supported by 
state-provided information, she turned to those around her for answers. 
 
Dilnaz’s grandmother, Karlygash, helped her make sense of the situation in the 
aftermath of the flood. Dilnaz recounted how Karlygash had told her, ‘50 or 60 years 
ago, something like this happened; it happened because the ice was melting’. In the 
absence of an official public narrative of events, Dilnaz was able to form a narrative 
version of events pieced together from different sources, including firsthand experience, 
memory of past events, and local media reports which appeared the next day and 
corroborated her experience and memory. This brings us to the account of my next 
informant, Nikita. 
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Nikita, a Russian man in his mid-50s, lives at the spot along the river where the 
floodwaters swept away two small bridges. He lives in a single-storey home with his 
wife and works in the centre of the city. I asked Nikita how people in Almaty 
approached hazards such as this flood, to which he replied: 
Nikita: How to explain… they don’t think about anything. They just build their 
houses. That’s it. As I say, they just live today, without thinking about the future. 
The danger passed by this time, thank goodness. If someone’s property has been 
touched by the flow, he will probably enhance it and build again at the same spot 
and will think that it might happen again in 20 or 30 years. Everyone likes to 
think that anything might happen to others, not ourselves. Nash [Our] mentality 
is a bit… not a bit… catastrophically different. 
It was Nikita’s opinion that people in Almaty live with a carpe diem mentality. Although 
there are many reasons why people could have this approach to risk, Nikita’s comments 
can tell us something about how some people deal with risk in a context of rapid 
change. Nikita referenced a timespan of 20 to 30 years. This marks a generational gap, 
the time since the end of the Soviet Union and the age of the cohort that I focus on: my 
young urban middle-class informants. While it may seem illogical to rebuild a house in 
a location that is known to be dangerous, in doing so one is taking advantage of the 
relative stability of the present compared to past experiences of change, acting in the 
face of what may appear to be inevitable uncertainty in the future. Nikita didn’t distance 
himself from the mentality which he had observed in society, saying that it is ‘nash’ 
(our) mentality. This ambiguous statement could indicate those living in the 
neighbourhood, the city of Almaty, or the country of Kazakhstan. He differentiated this 
mentality from mine, but again this could mean my English, European, or Western 
mentality, among other possibilities. Nikita’s account of the sel provides an example of 
what he believed to be the consequence of having this mentality—rebuilding in areas 
which have been flooded in the past.  
 
On the night of the sel, Nikita had come back late from work. He tried to sleep, but the 
sound of the river kept him awake. He drifted off, but then:  
Nikita: I woke up and realised that there was no electricity, and I decided that 
something had happened. When I went outside, I saw people sitting all on the 
street. If not for the dam, my house would be destroyed for sure; those living on 
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the other side of the river in that hollow wouldn’t have survived… the 
neighbours were screaming at night, they were very scared. The houses were 
built improperly, as usually happens here. Right after the big bridge there is a 
house which suffered a lot, and it is being demolished now. By destiny’s irony, 
the house was purchased and occupied by the family of the head of the 
Department of Emergency Situations, and he was removed from the position 
after the event. 
Nikita gave these examples to illustrate how a carpe diem mentality could lead to 
certain behaviours, such as choosing to build a new house in an area which had flooded 
only a few weeks before the sel. He also argued that people knew that their houses 
might be badly built, and that is why they were scared when the sel came. This suggests 
that there is an underlying uncertainty about building standards in Almaty and that it is 
only in exceptional circumstances, such as in the event of the sel, that these 
uncertainties become more immediate concerns. Nikita laughed at the irony that one of 
the most badly affected buildings belonged to someone whose professional duty was to 
know, understand, and prepare for risks. This brings us back to the issue of 
responsibility, calling into question the trustworthiness of the public narratives of 
support issued by these officials. Although I heard this story from more than one 
individual, I was unable to verify if this house had actually been owned by a 
government official. It is possible that this was actually a rumour—a narrative account 
which manifests the sense of public distrust in the state’s support and perpetuates the 
uncertainty that the potential of a recurring sel hazard places upon those living in the 
area. As a narrative account, it can be easily shared, joked about, and reflected upon. 
Ibañez-Tirado argues that joking was one of the ways which her informants in Kulob, 
Tajikistan, made light of their dire situation to normalise the risk of flooding they faced 
and turn it into another aspect of everyday life (Ibañez-Tirado, 2015, pp. 5 & 13). This 
anecdote about the official’s house could be just such an example of this, illustrating the 
consequences of a particular mentality. 
 
Despite these narrative ways of reflecting on everyday uncertainty, Nikita’s comments, 
along with those of the other informants we have heard from in this section, challenge 
this uncertainty head-on. There is a local expectation of responsibility: people believe 
that the state should have been involved to a greater extent and that it neglected its 
duties. 
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Nikita: The collective opinion is that he [the government official] was fired 
because they [MoES] neglected that lake. They weren’t monitoring the situation 
because nobody knew that the lake existed there and that its water was close to 
breaking through to the valley. I’m not sure—was it a closed or open lake, 
underneath the glaciers or above them? But the core thought here is that the 
event has happened, but nobody in the authorities had done anything to prevent 
it. There were no notifications. 
In the accounts of my informants from this area, the lack of action taken by the state 
was seen to have eroded public confidence in the state’s abilities. Proportionate to a 
declining trust in the state, there is an increasing feeling of vulnerability and uncertainty 
in Almaty. It appears that those living in the area affected by the sel make sense of 
things not on a societal level, but on an individual level. They take advantage of 
opportunities such as the ability to purchase very cheap land, even if it comes at the cost 
of the significant risk of further flooding. This could be a reflection of a wider shift in 
responsibility for dealing with risk, moving from the state to the individual, which came 
with decentralisation after 1991. This could also be combined with a changing approach 
to risk-taking, as neoliberal policies push the potential gains of risk-taking and 
downplay the negative effects of inequality that this risk-taking produces. To investigate 
this shift, I seek to compare narratives with those of my young urban middle-class 
informants. In comparison to members of the older generation, who grew up with the 
paternalistic support of the Soviet state, my younger informants have adopted a different 
societal and institutional approach to risk. 
 
In the next section, I move north—down the slope, away from the mountains—along 
my transect, following the river into concrete channels throughout the more densely 
populated urban housing districts. Here, the sel triggered widespread panic verging on 
mass hysteria. Narratives of abandonment, a lack of trust, and disconnection grow 
stronger as multiple voices contribute their opinions to the discussion. 
 
 
Third section: On hearing about the sel 
 
Dinara is a Kazakh woman in her mid-20s and lives in a Soviet-era komunalka (shared 
dormitory apartment). Although Dinara falls within my selected age group for those 
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who grew up outside of the Soviet Union, she cannot be considered part of the young 
urban middle class: she has not been to university, and she did not share my other young 
informants’ same type of narrative performance or any of their moral and material 
aspirations (see Chapter 5). I had first spoken to her during a transect walk farther 
upstream, when I stopped into a shop where she worked. Dinara spoke with us in 
Russian; she was a native Kazakh speaker, but Anna was my research assistant at the 
time and wasn’t confident translating from Kazakh. Dinara lived further downstream 
from the sel, so it wasn’t until 3 a.m. that she first knew something had happened: 
Dinara: There was a woman shouting and screaming, ‘The dam has been totally 
destroyed, there is a massive water coming!’ I have four children and so I was 
so… so afraid and started to collect their stuff into bags. Since I have no 
husband and no car, I was trying to get a lift. No one stopped, and no one would 
help until we found some old guy. We went to another microdistrict until the 
next afternoon. There were already crowds there. The people were walking 
around and observing the mountains, trying to work out what was happening. 
Dinara’s account was fraught with panic. Due to a lack of information, exaggerated 
rumours emerged, and potential fears rose to the surface and were expressed in this 
unchecked form. Dinara’s fear was a result of her four children. Her fear was intensified 
by her social isolation, as she lived alone with them. She did not tell me why she was 
single, but as a consequence, she had to rely on others for help. Tobin and Whiteford, 
speaking from the context of a volcanic hazard in Ecuador, argue that in a ‘post-
disaster’ context, ‘those with the least resources—usually the marginalised—are often 
both the hardest hit and least able to cope’ (Tobin & Whiteford, 2002, p. 29). Dinara’s 
social isolation is one example of how social circumstances lead to people being 
impacted in different ways by a hazard. Living in a komunalka, and without the support 
of a husband or access to a car, it is likely that she has a low income, as this is one of the 
cheapest housing options in the city. When she travelled to another district of the city, 
she found many others in the same position as her. Without official sources of 
information or any way to verify rumours, they used their senses to try and find out 
more information about what was happening, looking to the mountains in search of 
answers. Without the kinship networks through which Dilnaz, for instance, was able to 
gain a better understanding of what was happening, public information channels did not 
reach Dinara. This increased both her actual vulnerability—due to her inability to 
respond to the actual hazard, as it was unknown—and her uncertainty, as this lack of 
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knowledge meant that rumour, gossip, and hearsay became her main source of 
information. 
 
Dinara relied on one source of information in particular: SMS text message warnings 
from the MoES, which were not sent on the night of the sel. The lack of information 
changed Dinara’s behaviour in the months following the flood; she told me that she 
receives these messages ‘maybe twice a month’, and when she does she cannot sleep all 
night and is constantly checking because she is so scared of floods now. This suggests 
that incomplete or ineffective communication channels can be problematic and 
potentially more damaging when not operated properly or complemented by a more 
comprehensive information strategy. However, Dinara was not angry about how her life 
had been changed, saying, ‘I don’t blame anyone and do my best to get by’.  
 
The information given in these SMS messages is brief and limited to one sentence, 
provided in Russian and then repeated in Kazakh. A comment on this topic by Daria, a 
young urban middle-class informant who is in her mid-20s and works in IT in the city, 
gives a contrasting perspective. Daria said that the messages ‘don’t bring any emotional 
response in me whatsoever’. This could suggest that the messages trigger a range of 
responses that unearth underlying worries for those who receive them; it could also 
indicate that responses are based on personal experiences, rather than the information 
contained in the messages. Hamilton Bean has researched the efficacy of SMS messages 
in the United States, where they are known as WEAs (Wireless Emergency Alerts). 
Bean found that these WEAs, due to their brevity, were ‘often deemed confusing, 
difficult to believe and impersonal. Participants consistently found WEAs and tweets to 
be fear inducing and uninformative’ (Bean et al., 2016, p.136). In Kazakhstan, the 
limited information in messages and short-term timing of alerts has the potential to 
amplify underlying fears; in instances where recipients can do little to prepare, such 
alerts have the potential to lead to panic. These messages also need to be consistent. In 
the case of the sel, the lack of any message exacerbated worries, and for those who 
could not directly experience the flood and only heard about it through others, the 
potential for damaging rumour and misinformation to spread was magnified. 
 
As a key group of interest, the responses from members of the young urban middle 
class, many of whom did not live in areas that were flooded, give us an insight into their 
background worries and concerns. Up until this point, we have heard from inhabitants 
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of the Nauryzbai district from a range of backgrounds. An interesting point to note here 
is the lack of young urban middle-class informants I encountered living in these areas 
farther up the river; geographically, my younger informants were concentrated around 
the centre of the city. Those who did have links with these outer-city districts were 
likely connected to these areas because their families lived there, as was the case for 
Alma, Sasha, and Nuriya. For those informants who had come to Almaty to study, they 
lived on campus or in the city centre, many choosing to stay in that area after 
graduation. 
 
I undertook a series of focus groups at the university, which I will explore in detail in 
Chapter 5. These focus groups were semi-structured and followed a set of 
predetermined discussion topics. Each focus group included students from either a 
private or state university. They were a roughly even mix of men and women of 
different ethnicities. I chaired the discussion and introduced a range of different topics 
for discussion, one of which was the sel. I will give more details on these focus groups 
in the following chapter, where I discuss those who were present and why I chose to 
speak to these informants. Here, I want to include the response of one of the 
participants.  
 
Gulnara is in her early 20s. One of her parents is Kazakh, and the other is Tatar. She has 
lived most of her life in Almaty and also studied in Northern Europe for a year. She 
speaks excellent English and was keen to speak in English at the focus group, so her 
quotes are direct with no translation. 
Gulnara: How I knew about the flood? My friend lives here, like somewhere 
here. [Looking at a map of the city I provided, she points to a Soviet-era 
microdistrict that lies alongside the Kargalinka River in the Nauryzbai district in 
the southwest of the city.] He called me, and he was like, ‘Do you know the 
bridge over here on Ryskulova Street?’ It was stuck with traffic in weird 
directions—people didn’t know which way to go because they didn’t know 
where to run from the flood—and he was like, ‘I was with my friends, and now 
I’m driving at 4 a.m. in the morning back home’, and he sees all the people and 
he is like, ‘I thought it was apocalypse’, so he was freaked out and he called me 
because he thought that the river was the one next to me. I freaked out and I 
opened my laptop. I go to [the] MChS [MoES] webpage; I see nothing, because 
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they usually report how many times per day they have to go out and do stuff. 
They didn’t report anything that day, but they were out. And my mom was like, 
‘Wow… you know, maybe they were out and they didn’t have time to report’, 
and I was like, ‘Mom, the dispatcher, the people behind the desk, they don’t 
have to go out’. 
The conversational tone of Gulnara’s account reflects the way that these issues were 
talked about in everyday life by my young urban middle-class informants. She found 
out about the flood after a friend called her to check that she was okay; the friend 
recognised that something was wrong when he encountered an abnormal traffic jam in 
the middle of the night. These informal sources of information are key to navigating 
risks and uncertainty. Gulnara expected the government to be providing information, 
and she checked the relevant website only to find that there was nothing there. By this 
time, other family members had woken up, and Gulnara was surprised that her mother 
was not as worried about the lack of information. When I asked Gulnara why this lack 
of information concerned her, she responded: 
Gulnara: Well, it is [a] major problem here, I think, because even when they do 
their job, people still perceive them as not doing their job properly… People 
don’t trust them and now they have to build the trust, because seriously, they 
might be very good at their job… like, really. I saw some emergency cars that 
were really, like... I don’t know how to say that... the doctors, the firemen, they 
are trying their best and then you just see one example of not doing his best and 
then you see all of them not doing anything right… They have to work on that. 
They have to work with the public. If you are not public, no one knows what 
you do, no one trusts you because when you are not transparent, people can’t 
trust you.  
Transparency is a key trope of the neoliberal ‘solutions’ that economists brought to 
post-Soviet countries in the 1990s. As Patico argues, these ‘solutions’ value 
‘“transparency” over informal social networking’, and these values often ‘differ from 
local norms’ (Patico, 2008, p. 17). Gulnara’s expectations are different from those of her 
mother, suggesting that there might be a generational difference in what is expected of 
the state in this situation. For Gulnara, perceptions of transparency were strongly 
correlated with trust in public services and would suggest a value system more akin to 
the neoliberal ‘solutions’ that were prevalent as she was growing up. Other members of 
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the young urban middle class have picked up these themes as valuable and desirable 
traits, symbols of an international way of living. However, if we consider what actually 
took place, the information reached Gulnara through her informal social network. 
Patico’s discussion of a post-Soviet middle class, using an ethnography of teachers 
living in St. Petersburg in the late ’90s, cites Wanner’s use of the idea of a Soviet 
‘moralising lens’ through which regimes of value are scrutinised (Patico, 2008, p. 17; 
Wanner, 2005, p. 516). As an informant who grew up during the Soviet Union with this 
‘moralising lens’, Gulnara’s mother appeals to her daughter, suggesting that the 
emergency services have good moral intentions and there must be a reason why there is 
no information. Gulnara, on the other hand, frames the MoES response in terms of a 
failure of service, not seeing MoES’s work as an extension of the state’s moral 
obligation to protect the population, but rather as a business that has failed to support its 
customers. The government’s control of public information channels has led to a 
shortage of reliable and trustworthy information, to which Gulnara and her mother 
respond differently. This shows the differences in generational frames of understanding, 
and I hypothesise that members of the young urban middle class expect a functioning 
public system, but that expectation is undermined by the failure of the MoES to provide 
official information. What information, then, was available in official and public 
channels? 
 
 
Media Accounts 
 
By the next day, local media outlets had begun to report on the flood. Excerpts from a 
local broadcaster give an indication of the widespread panic that had been triggered by 
the sel; the examples I provide come from TengriNews, a majority state-owned media 
outlet. At the time of publication, this was one of the few sources of information 
available about the sel in Russian and Kazakh.  
 
TengriNews regularly published news pieces in Russian, Kazakh, and English. 
However, these multilingual news services have now been dropped; specific news 
pieces are targeted to Russian- and Kazakh-speaking populations independently, and 
only some news articles are translated into both languages. The following images 
accompanied a TengriNews report on the sel. 
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Image copyright limits publication here. The original image can be found here: 
https://tengrinews.kz/events/sel-v-almatyi-live-278175/  
(Accessed 25th September 2020) 
 
Image 4.3: Highway on the outskirts of Almaty. 
 Published on 23 July 2015 by TengriNews. 
 
 
 
 
 
Image copyright limits publication here. The original image can be found here: 
https://tengrinews.kz/events/sel-v-almatyi-live-278175/  
(Accessed 25th September 2020) 
 
Image 4.4: Highway on the outskirts of Almaty. 
Published on 23 July 2015 by TengriNews. 
 
Images 4.3 and 4.4 show the large scale of panic which swept the city. In the first 
image, we can see traffic jams in multiple directions. If we look closely at the cars to the 
left of the centre of the image, we can see that it is nose to nose with another car on the 
wrong side of the road. The car doors are open, and its occupants can be seen looking 
around and making calls on their mobile phones. In Image 4.4, a long line of cars trails 
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off into the distance. Again, cars are stuck facing in both directions on both sides of the 
road. In the far distance, the dark band of the mountains is visible under the layer of 
cloud and smog as people flee the source of the panic. Fleeing danger was a sensible 
choice in this situation, especially when there was a lack of public information 
regarding which areas of the city were affected. Although the lack of official 
information led to confusion, informal social networks proved helpful, as exemplified 
by Gulnara’s phone call from a friend. With hindsight, the area directly affected by the 
floodwaters was relatively small, limited to one or two square kilometres. The scale of 
the public’s response suggests that those living in Almaty expect the worst: their 
response is proportionate to a much bigger hazard, evidence that widespread uncertainty 
is a presence in the lives of many urban residents. 
 
Online articles with information about the sel provide an unlikely place for public 
discussion of events and the uncertainty surrounding them. At the time, comments could 
be left anonymously under the main body of an article, a feature that is now missing 
from many new articles published on the TengriNews site. Though we know little about 
the background and context of these different voices, we can learn a lot by thinking 
critically about what people are willing to share publicly. The use of online pseudonyms 
means that these comments are anonymised and can be understood as similar in form to 
the rumours that I have previously discussed. Their function is to air private comments 
in a public context, and the anonymity affords the speakers some level of protection—
either to speak the truth or to spread malicious gossip. This is a good example of 
offstage discussions breaking through to onstage contexts, and Paz’s (2009) discussion 
of a local gossip magazine among the Latino community in Israel, discussed in Chapter 
2, provides important insights to help understand what might be happening here. Paz 
found that a local gossip column allowed for reflections within a marginalised 
community, giving them a voice they didn’t have in mainstream Hebrew press. 
However, in this example from Almaty, there is a much broader population speaking: 
the wider urban public are expressing their opinions and concerns in the context of a 
strictly state-controlled public media. This is therefore much closer to the ‘offstage’ 
discussions which Scott discusses as a ‘weapon of the weak’ (Scott, 1985). Here, the 
subordinate power dynamic is between the urban population and the state. The 
following examples of comments show a range of concerns about, and criticism of, the 
state: 
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‘Inhabitant’, 07/23/2015, 8:44—Just resent information to support disaster! 
When it is not necessary, [MoES] send thousands of SMS, and then a single 
news item! At 5 a.m. all were frightened. The website had zero information. On 
TV—silence. The worst thing is not so much distress as panic, and our 
[population is] frightened. I see both this reaction and apathy. There is no 
official information, therefore any lie is taken for the truth! People are more 
frightened and so are running to villages… someone started a rumour… The 
only way to stop them—is with official information. 
At first this account appears very similar to those we have already heard, but Inhabitant 
goes a step further, suggesting that this lack of information has led to distress, panic, 
apathy, lies, and rumours. With anonymity, Inhabitant is able to offer a scathing critique 
of the state’s actions. However, what we see is a response to the panic—a plea for help. 
Inhabitant asks the government for more information in order to tackle what they see as 
a damaging spread of rumours. Another commenter, Saltanat, echoes Inhabitant, 
conveying the sentiment of some of my informants: ‘There was no warning, no hint of 
it. They [MoES] inappropriately write a hundred posts, but today everything was quiet’. 
Dina replied to this comment and a debate opened up, thanks in part to the ability for 
individuals to quickly reply to comments on an online forum: 
Dina: Saltanat, why slander our services. People work harmoniously. The siren 
and the evacuation were deployed where necessary, the people themselves have 
spread panic and began to throw themselves from the city, people have enough 
reason to sow panic, bitterness without you already OK!  
Dina’s comments suggest that the population has reason to panic, but Dina does not go 
into detail about what these reasons may be. This suggests that there is an undercurrent 
of uncertainty, with reasons that are not publicly shared. Dina sees Saltanat as 
responsible for spreading this discontent and comes to the defence of the authorities, 
suggesting that there is more subtlety to the situation than a simple divide between state 
and population. The other possibility is that the state employs its own voices 
anonymously within the comments in order to combat public disquiet. Commenters 
such as Inhabitant are able to air concerns that may not be covered in highly censored 
public media. As I will explain in more detail in Chapter 5, my young urban middle-
class informants consider public media to be among the least trusted sources of 
information. As a consequence, when there is a lack of trust, there is a greater reliance 
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upon family, friends, and close community. This is shown in a post from Erlan, who 
writes that he ‘even got a call from the other end of the city, that is from a rural area at 5 
a.m.’. Erlan acknowledges the source, saying that he wants to ‘thank you friends for the 
warning’. 
 
As a source of reliable information, these public spaces for discussion are also treated 
with suspicion. Although the motives for posting here may be mixed, one example 
shows that even here, the public choose to share the impact of trauma from the past to 
offer support to those in need. Later the next day, once the initial sel hazard had 
subsided and water levels in the riverbed were reduced, Galina reflects on what has 
happened: ‘Thank God, people are alive! I remember in 1976 we were evacuated from 
the area during the night in the area of Zhandosova [a street that runs through my first 
transect location]. Our house stands near the river. There was a terrible roar of the 
thunder of huge stones, I understand and sympathise with people emerging from this 
experience. Let the whole world help all those in need, to the extent that is possible’. As 
these examples show, the comment section became an unlikely venue for personal 
comment, gossip, concern, and argument. The state’s heavy censorship of media 
provides no balance to reporting, no public discussion, and no criticism. However, as 
the comments illustrate, the state’s media censorship does not remove these opinions, 
but simply suppresses them. It takes an event such as the sel to expose these opinions 
and ideas, since such an event falls outside of the condoned narrative of stability and 
security that the public state relies on for its continued authority over the population. 
 
 
An Official Response 
 
One perspective has been conspicuous in its absence from this chapter so far: the 
official position of the state, and the personal opinions of various state actors, 
employees, and representatives. This information provides the final piece in helping us 
to understand how events played out and how such a broad array of feelings, thoughts, 
and concerns rose to the surface. The day after the sel, an official version of events was 
presented by Yuri Ilyin, the deputy to the akim (mayor) of Almaty, during a televised 
news interview: 
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There was a breakthrough of the moraine lake […] under the Kargalinka glacier. 
The volume of this lake was about 40,000 cubic metres, which provoked the 
formation of the sel flow. The sel flow came till the Kargalinka dam, which 
reached 10 to 12 meters at the ridge. The basic water bulk was withheld by the 
protective construction. At the moment, the condition of the sel-protective 
construction is stable: there are no defects or damage. The water discharge is 
being done through two apertures which are working and in the proper 
condition. We observe higher volumes of water in the Kargalinka River which 
currently constitute about 10 to 12 cubic meters per second […] Currently the 
evacuation of people is taking place, and hereinafter we are going to undertake a 
yard-by-yard visiting round with the aim to identify the precise quantity of 
flooded houses […] The situation is under control. The emergency group has 
been formed both from the committee of emergency situations, national guard, 
local authorities… 
This press statement provides answers to many of my informants’ questions—answers 
they lacked during the night of the sel and the following morning. However, the 
statement is scientific, technocratic, and does not address the major issue raised by my 
informants: the failure of the state apparatus to inform and support the population. 
 
A month after the sel, I was able to arrange an interview with Nurlan Madyrov, the 
deputy head of emergency situations for the city of Almaty, and his head of public 
relations. The interview was conducted in Russian, and we met in the MoES 
headquarters in Almaty at Baizakov 300 (the address has become a colloquial nickname 
for the emergency responders themselves in reference to the Spartan 300 of Greek 
mythology). To begin with, Mr Madyrov chose to emphasise the support volunteered by 
the urban community.  
Mr Madyrov: Officially there were over 2,000 volunteers that came to help. Also 
some organisations [which] believe there were many more people. Private 
restaurants and shops brought hot food. Basically, they brought two hot meals a 
day for two weeks. Building merchants were also helping with that. We also 
help other countries when something happens somewhere else. It is not a 
surprise for us that there were 2,000 volunteers. It is just a normal reaction.  
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Madyrov’s example praises the local population, with an emphasis on volunteer help. 
However, it is difficult to know if his comments that there were over 2,000 volunteers 
are true. In the context of speaking to me, an international researcher, it would have 
been important to present things in a positive light. I only heard one comment from the 
public about volunteers: a group organised by a Russian Orthodox Christian group went 
with shovels to clear debris from people’s houses.  
 
There is a particular post-Soviet aspect to Madyrov’s response. In a shift of 
responsibility, emphasis is placed on private organisations and individuals fulfilling 
some of the roles which would previously have been the responsibility of the state. 
Madyrov is keen to show that with this setup, the population still gains the assistance 
they need, suggesting that Kazakhstan is also in a position to show support to other 
countries in need. In contrast, my informants’ comments suggest that they consider the 
state responsible for providing them with information, assisting them in situations such 
as a sel, or assisting them in recovery stages in the aftermath of major hazards. The 
government official’s comments suggest that from the state’s perspective, there is a 
subtle but important shift of responsibility from the public to the private domain. 
 
I followed up with questions about the failure of the MoES’s public communication 
channels. Madyrov was candid in his responses, highlighting what he saw as the 
difficulties that they faced and admitting that ‘social networks are being more effective 
than official methods. Facebook and VKontakt (Russian version of Facebook) have all 
the information: for example, what, where, and when.” Especially for my young urban 
middle-class informants, digital communications and social media are an integral part of 
everyday life and relied upon for communication. These platforms include WhatsApp, 
Facebook Messenger, VKontakt, Instagram, and Snapchat. There are serious 
consequences when official government information is presented on a level playing 
field within these apps alongside personal opinions, rumours, and hearsay. In the case of 
the failure of communication on the night of the sel, the MoES blamed the mobile 
phone operators for not sending their alert messages, while mobile phone companies 
blamed the MoES for not providing messages in standard format, which meant that they 
couldn’t be sent. This left official versions of events as just one of many competing 
voices on social media. As this thesis continues, with its focus on the young urban 
middle class, I will show how a high level of distrust in public media suggests that 
rumour, gossip, and hearsay may actually be taken as more trusted sources of 
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information than official channels—especially when they are repeated by family 
members or close friends. 
 
 
Chapter Conclusion: The Articulation of Transects 
 
Although an influential government official spoke to me about the characteristic 
behaviour of the Kazakh population, his comments contrast sharply with what I have 
documented in the aftermath of the sel. However, in combination with the generational 
differences seen in the narratives of the transect in Chapter 3, I am able to comment on 
the coexistence and intersection of these dual narratives as expressions of different ways 
of dealing with uncertainty. The key to this argument is that the sel can be seen as an 
ethnographic moment that brings background concerns and anxieties to the fore. 
 
This government official, the national head of the Directorate of Deterrence and 
Prevention of Emergency Situations, has been working with the MoES for 23 years. We 
spoke at a conference held by the UNISDR (now UNDRR, United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction) in Georgia, where I was assisting the UNISDR team as part of 
their resilient cities programme. He told me that the Kazakhstani population are 
‘psychologically very solid. They are not prone to panic. When disaster happens, they 
understand that it is nobody’s fault; it is natural disaster. And they realise, they know 
that help will come and if something is not coming yet, it will come’. How can this 
opinion about the population’s behaviour be reconciled with the widespread panic seen 
in the aftermath of the sel? The answer is that each of these accounts is a different type 
of narrative. The official’s account is an idealised public notion of Kazakh identity, a 
people exhibiting strength in the face of adversity. Drawing upon stereotypes supported 
within the context of government nation-building initiatives, it is a public story which 
the government tells in order to promote national unity; in this case, it was regurgitated 
by the government official. The coexistence of apparently mutually exclusive versions 
of events can be explained by comparing the accounts shared in the previous chapter 
with those included here. 
 
The two different transects presented in this chapter and the previous chapter overlap 
and build upon each other. However, there are some key differences. In the first transect 
from west to east, the older generation who grew up in the Soviet era use narratives to 
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introduce stability and coherence when talking about people’s life experiences, 
structuring events to make sense of change. My young urban middle-class informants 
face greater difficulties in narrating the changes that they face, such changes are equally 
part of their future and their past. Instead, this younger generation seek to tell new and 
exciting narratives of prosperous growth, opportunity, and positivity, despite their 
apparent uncertainty and worry about the threats they face. Therefore, the first transect 
builds a sense of place for both me as a researcher, making sense of the urban 
environment, and for my informants, whose narratives tie their life stories to the places, 
people, and connections of the city. 
 
These long-term narratives are overturned in the second transect, which follows the 
river from south to north. Here, for informants of all ages, backgrounds, and ethnicities, 
the dramatic and disruptive events of the sel bring to the surface concerns, worries, and 
awareness of risk faced on an everyday basis. The transect begins at the edge of the city, 
where people have firsthand knowledge of hazards; rely on smaller, trusted 
communities; and receive information and support through their kinship and community 
networks. Moving down the hill into the more densely populated areas of the city, the 
communities in this transect become more separated geographically, but are more 
densely connected through digital communications. In this context, rumour is presented 
with equal weight alongside official information due to the state’s inability to keep up 
with rapid technological change and, furthermore, due to the damaging effects of 
government censorship of my informants’ trust in public media. Often these different 
narratives counteract, contradict, and undermine each other, leading to further 
uncertainty. The gap between public and private narratives strikes at the heart of the 
articulation between the two transects: long-term stories are key to everyday stability, 
while short-term stories of events such as the sel are everyday ruptures that shatter these 
narratives, revealing the hidden worries and concerns simmering below the surface. In 
the next chapter, I focus in on the narratives of my young urban middle-class informants 
to understand the everyday difficulties they face in narrating their lives.
Chapter 5 
The Young Urban Middle Class:  
Difference, community, and risk 
 
Part 1  
Who are the young urban middle class?  
Differentiation and the vision of success 
 
In this chapter, I go into greater detail about the distinct societal group that is central to 
this thesis: the young urban middle class. I investigate how they characterise themselves 
in everyday conversation and their social relations, as well as how they make sense of 
their place in society. Developing upon Patico’s (2008) argument that the post-Soviet 
middle class are bound by a shared narrative, I argue that members of the young urban 
middle class in Almaty share a distinct, public, onstage narrative which binds together a 
heterogenous group from different places and family backgrounds, comprised of 
different ethnicities and genders. 
 
Because universities are a central aspect of life for the young urban middle class in 
Almaty, the majority of my interactions with my middle-class informants took place in 
my second transect location, downtown, where there is a cluster of higher education 
institutions. This includes state-funded universities, technical universities focused on 
areas of study such as agriculture, and privately funded universities specialising in 
business and finance. Within walking distance of the university campuses, there are a 
number of small businesses fulfilling the needs of students, many of whom live in 
dormitories on campus. Abay—one of the oldest streets in the planned section of the 
city, built after the fort of Verny was extended in 1867—is a main area of social life for 
young Almatineans. On one side of the street are two universities, including the private 
university I attended, and a public university that was state-funded and specialised in 
agricultural technologies. Abay is a busy street, and the only way to cross is through 
underpasses with small kiosks and shops tucked into the tunnels. These shops include 
bookbinders, printers, locksmiths, phone kiosks, fast-food steamed-corn vendors, samsa 
(triangular pastries filled with minced meat and onion) bakers, and toy shops; there are 
also public toilets in the tunnels. These underpasses are always a busy hive of activity. 
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Emerging from the underpass on the opposite side of the street, there are kebab shops, 
an upmarket steak restaurant, an American-diner-themed restaurant, and Café Nadelka.  
 
Café Nadelka is a very popular cafe and an institution for the young urban middle class. 
Always packed, the modestly priced coffee shop was a hub of social relations. It was a 
place to be seen and hang out for many of my young research informants, including 
those who had recently graduated and worked in the downtown area. I mention this cafe 
for two reasons. First, I would often meet my research assistants there to debrief after 
longer interviews. Second, its popularity can tell us a lot about the fashions and trends 
which the young urban middle class value, in this case an Americanised and ‘modern’ 
coffeehouse. As this coffee house was always busy, it was not always possible to carry 
out interviews here; I would often go to quieter cafés and restaurants outside of peak 
times, as it afforded my informants a little more privacy. 
 
 
Methodological approach to studying the young urban middle class 
 
I tailored my methodological approach to research so that I could speak to informants 
from different backgrounds, including members of the young urban middle class. I 
interviewed many individuals—scientists, architects, and local state officials—because 
of their occupation, role, or expertise. However, understanding how something is 
spoken about in an everyday social context, such as middle-class tastes, fashions, and 
perceptions, is best done through both participant observation and group discussion. 
Focus groups were a key tool in understanding the lives of my young urban middle-
class informants. As I found on a number of occasions, they work well because multiple 
voices can lead discussions in unexpected directions. I was interested in topics including 
the apparent division between public and private universities, which communities these 
informants belonged to, and how their lifestyle affected the way they dealt with risk.  
 
In the first part of this chapter, we hear from four informants: two men and two women, 
all in their early to mid-20s and of Uighur, Russian, Korean, and Kazakh ethnicity. The 
second part of this chapter is based on discussions from two focus groups. All of the 
focus-group informants—five men and six women, including my research assistants—
are in their early 20s. They were from a range of ethnic backgrounds, including Kazakh, 
Russian, Korean, Uighur, and Tatar. The difference between the groups is that the first 
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focus group was made up of students who attended a private university and the second 
group of students came from three different publicly funded universities. These groups 
included topic-focused discussions and drawing activities, including the production of 
diagrams of trust and community relations, and lasted just over two hours each. Further 
detail on the methodological approach of using focus groups for this research is detailed 
earlier in the thesis beginning on p. 35.  
 
In the third part of the chapter, we hear from a Kazakh man, a Kazakh woman, and a 
Russian woman, all in their early 20s; a Kazakh woman in her mid-50s; and a Russian 
man in his mid-40s. Other data used in this chapter came from participant observation in 
everyday interactions with the young urban middle class. I attended birthday parties in 
local restaurants, visited art galleries with a local artist, and participated in social events, 
such as meals arranged by various student groups. Other interactions I draw upon here 
include those with my language teachers, friends, and hosts. There is also a vibrant live 
music, party, and entertainment scene, which included Russian billiards halls and 
karaoke venues.  
 
Another important place for the young urban middle class are the large shopping malls, 
frequently visited in the cold of midwinter and the searing heat of high summer. In a 
study of the MEGA shopping mall in Aktobe, Kazakhstan, Jäger (2016) argues that the 
shopping centre became a focus for social life, particularly for the younger generation. 
He also draws upon the analogy of performance, describing the shopping centre as a 
stage where the young generation go both to see the latest international trademarks and 
fashions, and also to be seen. Jäger argues that the centre consequently offers young 
women a new social space where they have greater freedoms away from the codified 
behaviours of other public places in the city.  In Almaty, the food court on the upper 
floor of Dostyk Plaza, a large downtown shopping centre that is a 10-minute walk from 
the universities, would be packed throughout the day. An area of seating in the food 
court is surrounded by more than 20 different food stalls serving a range of food, 
including traditional Kazakh besh-bar-mak (the literal translation is ‘five-fingered’, as it 
is traditionally eaten by hand), Uzbek plov (a slow-cooked rice dish which in 
Kazakhstan is often prepared with carrots, onions, raisins, and mutton), Burger King, 
and Korean bubble teas. It was a place to meet, get lunch during work breaks, or hang 
out and socialise in the evening, particularly for those who did not drink alcohol. These 
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different social contexts and my observations and interactions in these places all feed 
into this chapter’s discussion and analysis. 
 
 
Differentiating the young urban middle class 
 
The bustling spaces downtown are shared by a diverse range of people, and the young 
urban middle class are a heterogeneous group. In a series of discussions at Café 
Nadelka, my research assistants explained what they saw as important social 
distinctions that were relevant for one’s identity. They based these distinctions on which 
university a young person currently or previously attended, where somebody came 
from, and the language they spoke. I documented distinctions that were made between 
rural and urban; Kazakh-speaking and Russophone; and the past and the future, as well 
as associations with private versus state-funded universities. My research assistant Alma 
told me, ‘People from the city are known as gorodskii [literal translation ‘being of the 
city’], and [the private university] is full of these’. The gorodskii are stereotyped as 
Russophone, future-oriented, and likely to be studying finance, business, or economics 
at a private university. As these stereotypes were reported by my research assistants, 
who themselves fulfil many aspects of the stereotype, this suggests that many of these 
traits are not viewed in a negative light. 
 
Nevertheless, there are some negative stereotypes associated with the gorodskii. Anna 
said, ‘There are specific things [about those who go to the private university]; they say 
they are spoilt children or they pay for it with money from corruption, which is why 
they are rich’. As Anna was attending a private university at this time, she offered a 
rebuttal to this stereotype: ‘Maybe they say this because there is jealousy from students 
and other institutions. Without reason they don’t like [private university] students. It is 
partially true about the money, but you don’t know if it’s from corruption. Many parents 
work abroad, so maybe it isn’t from corruption’. Anna’s comments suggest that a 
perceived hierarchy between institutions underlies in-group distinctions that are made 
between young urban middle-class Almatineans. She also indicated that when a 
student’s parents work abroad, they are wealthier. Implicit in her statement is the fact 
that if you are rich in Kazakhstan, it is likely that your money has come from corrupt 
sources. 
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Discussing how corruption is talked about in Almaty, Alma highlighted the term 
agashka: ‘This is a name given to an uncle who is rich and has a good network. The 
term is often used anecdotally as a way to discuss networks and contacts. Sometimes it 
is used to say that’s why someone is in a position [of influence]’. In Ledeneva’s 
encyclopaedia of informality, Oka has written an entry for agashka which supports 
Alma’s definition, adding that ‘[a]gashka is in wide currency mostly among Russian-
speaking Kazakhs in contemporary Kazakhstan, but not generally used in the Kazakh 
language’ (Oka in Ledeneva, 2018, p. 86). This term is intersectional: it emerges from 
ethnic Kazakh practices, but has gained wider currency for my Russian-speaking 
informants, no matter what their own ethnicity may be. Age is also an important aspect 
of this term, as it suggests that an older person is responsible for the success of a young 
person—yet this in itself counteracts a public narrative of individual self-sufficiency 
and success through personal means, a neoliberal ethos that has become embedded in 
young, urban, middle-class public narratives for young Almatineans. A more colloquial 
form of agashka for a young Almatinean is the term baki shaki, which Alma said can be 
used to talk about anybody who is thought to have a good network or for whom 
corruption is perceived to be the key to their success. 
 
From these discussions with my research assistants, I found that my young urban 
middle-class informants were publicly rejecting the support of these family and kinship 
connections, as they are reframed within their public onstage narratives as being 
examples of corruption. This perception is influenced by the value regimes of 
neoliberalism—what Yurchak refers to as ‘entrepreneurial ethic’ imported from Europe 
and the United States by experts from the IMF and World Bank during the ’90s—which 
reframed informal exchange practices as immoral, instead emphasising transparency, 
hard work, and self-sufficiency (Yurchak, 2003, p.72). While this may be influential to 
my informants’ onstage presentation of self, they are nevertheless aware that many parts 
of society are plagued by corruption and nepotism, as I will discuss in the following 
section. As a result, there is widespread offstage uncertainty that a public presentation 
of self may only be a mask or façade and therefore cannot be trusted. Yet paradoxically, 
in this climate of uncertainty and mistrust, it is these close social relations whom the 
young urban middle class turn to for information. 
 
The literature offers an explanation for the unique role informal social networks play in 
post-Soviet contexts because of their importance during the Soviet era as a way of 
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redistributing scarce goods in an economy of shortage (Schatz, 2004; Kornai, 1980). 
Verdery draws our attention to a ‘repertoire of strategies for obtaining consumer goods 
and services’ that was important during the Soviet period and found new utility after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (Verdery, 1996b, p. 27). One such informal practice is blat, 
a Russian word which refers to the practice of obtaining goods or services through an 
informal ‘economy of favours’; the practice became influential during the Soviet era 
and is still used today (Ledeneva, 2018, p.41). Ledeneva’s commentary is based on 
research in a Russian context but is relevant across the former Soviet Union, including 
Kazakhstan (Ledeneva, 1998). 
 
Before proceeding with a discussion of blat, it is important to define the wider concept 
of corruption and how the particular forms in which corruption has been discussed in 
relation to Kazakhstan have been a problematic area for definition. Werner (2000) 
discusses how, in Kazakhstan, ‘the boundaries between “corrupt” behaviour and 
“cultural” behaviour are not always clear, especially when it comes to the distinction 
between “bribes” and “gifts”’ (p. 12). Werner suggests that a definition of corruption 
could include ‘bribery, fraud, embezzlement, nepotism and patronage’, which would 
implicate the support of agashka as an example of corruption (ibid., p. 16). She also 
argues that the accepted scholarly definition of corruption as the ‘abuse of public power 
for private gain’ is problematic when applied to Kazakhstan, where corruption is ‘not 
limited to the public sector’: ‘corrupt acts sometimes benefit somebody or something 
other than the public official who commits an illegal act’, and ‘what constitutes abuse 
will vary depending on legal or cultural standards’ (ibid., p. 16). She settles on a more 
subjective assessment of corruption which ‘takes local perceptions of morality into 
account’ (ibid., p. 20). This definition provides a basis for the ongoing discussion of 
informal exchange practices and their impact on negotiating uncertainty in Almaty. 
 
Blat ‘referred to routine, mostly non-monetary, give-and-take practices, often associated 
with mutual help, mutual understanding or cooperation of “us” versus “them”’ 
(Ledeneva, 2018, p.40). As resources were publicly owned, the boundary between 
public and private domains was blurred. Blat was influential because it allowed for both 
vertical and horizontal exchanges. Vertical exchanges included the transfer of goods 
from state enterprises down to those who worked there; horizontally, goods and services 
were transferred among social or kinship networks. Since independence, blat has taken 
on new significance as different forms of capital enter into everyday exchanges. For 
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example, blat played an influential role in the privatisation of state assets, which led to 
the elite capture of resources as those with influence leveraged their position for 
preferential treatment and/or access to resources (Ledeneva, 1998).  
 
The concept of elite capture is summarised succinctly by Dutta as ‘a phenomenon where 
resources transferred for the benefit of the masses are usurped by a few, usually 
politically and/or economically powerful groups, at the expense of the less 
economically and/or politically influential groups’ (Dutta, 2009, p. 3). This ties back to 
Alma’s discussion of agashka, the manifestation of these trends in everyday social 
relations. While my young urban middle-class informants see practices such as blat as 
synonymous with corruption, Ledeneva argues that blat is distinguished from 
corruption or bribery by the indirectness of the transaction, which relies on mutual 
indebtedness and notions of reciprocity for it to function (Ledeneva, 1998). According 
to Werner’s suggestion, this would suggest that the indirectness of the transaction 
contributes to a perception of the morality of blat as differentiated from corruption 
(Werner, 2000). The distinction has become increasingly blurred since independence. 
Oka argues that money has begun replacing mutual indebtedness in these exchange 
networks, in which case my middle-class informants would be right to perceive 
instances of blat as being possible evidence of corruption (Oka, 2015). A real-world 
example of this was my informants’ perceived uncertainty of the integrity, 
trustworthiness, and reliability of qualifications when these important markers of 
cultural capital1 can be bought rather than earned. 
 
The recent economic situation for many young people in Kazakhstan has been one of 
great inequality. In 2010, just five years before my fieldwork, sociologist Ken Roberts 
writes that ‘exceptionally high rates of youth unemployment and under-employment in 
many regions’ are distinctive features of life for youth in Kazakhstan and that this 
appears alongside an ‘intense spread of poverty’ (Roberts, 2010, p. 537). Roberts, whose 
research was carried out in Almaty, says that this occurs despite a high proportion of 
young people going through university (ibid.). Young people in Almaty have benefitted 
 
1 As Bourdieu (1986) argues, cultural capital is the attribution of value in society through 
recognised forms of status (such as university degrees) or markers of artistic achievements (such 
as prizes) which indicate a certain level of knowledge or ability recognised within a social group 
or a society. 
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from Kazakhstan’s economic growth, and other young people have travelled from across 
the region to study in Almaty and take advantage of available opportunities. Although the 
situation had somewhat improved five years after Roberts was writing, aspirations to a 
middle-class life are the manifestation of young people’s drive to escape this economic 
uncertainty, unemployment, and poverty.  
 
I found that international links, such as those gained through working or travelling 
abroad, are highly valued by my young urban middle-class informants and aligned with 
their public narrative of success. For example, a highly coveted government scholarship 
named Bolashak (literal translation ‘Of the Future’ in Kazakh) supports students from 
Kazakhstan to study abroad on a full scholarship on the condition that they then work in 
Kazakhstan for five years after graduating. Zhansaya, a friend and informant that I met 
early on in my fieldwork, received a Bolashak scholarship and studied engineering in 
Manchester University and Exeter University in England. She now works for Tengri-
Chevron, a branch of a large multinational oil and gas corporation in joint enterprise with 
the Kazakh government. As a consequence of the scholarship, many members of the 
young urban middle class who have studied abroad now hold influential positions and 
highly skilled jobs in Kazakhstan with strong international connections. As these 
international links were viewed as a sign of success—both by the government who 
sponsors the scholarships and by the young adult informants that I met—this also has 
methodological implications for me as an international fieldworker; those who assisted 
me in my research went on to use me as a reference so that they could secure full-time 
jobs after graduation. 
 
In contrast to the private university gorodskii, students at state-funded universities are 
subject to different associations and stereotypes. State-funded universities, such as Al-
Farabi State University, have a much higher proportion of ethnic Kazakh students in 
comparison to those that are privately funded. This is due to the scholarships offered to 
ethnic Kazakhs to come from across the country to study in Almaty. Alma told me that 
these students were often ridiculed. Mambet was the most offensive term used to refer to 
these students (and indeed others in society) who had come from rural areas and could be 
recognised in an urban context by being out of place, wearing unfashionable clothes, or 
behaving in an uncouth way. Catherine Alexander also cites an example of her middle-
class informants using this term as an insult in a ‘jocular exchange over dinner’ to 
indicate a rural origin or backwardness (Alexander, 2018b, p. 7). Laszsckowski 
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emphasises the way that the term mambet provoked different reactions, comparing an 
offstage discussion with informants at a party, when it was used in a humorous and 
playful manner, and a time when he used the term in a meeting with staff at a university. 
In the latter instance, the term was seen by an elderly Kazakh lady as an offensive term 
used by Russians and Russified Kazakhs to belittle Kazakh culture and language 
(Laszczkowski, 2016, pp. 58–59). Alma said that a less offensive version of this word 
would be aulskii, which translates as ‘being from a village’.  
 
There are a host of other slang terms used locally that all have slightly different 
connotations, and I asked Anna whether there was a term used locally that described the 
group that I am calling the ‘young urban middle class’. Anna said that there was a term 
that approximated this for ethnic Kazakhs: they are called iigil (eagle), a reference to the 
national symbol of the eagle which spreads its wings across the national flag, assfalt 
qazaq (asphalt Kazakh), or simply assfalt, which Anna said referred to ‘Kazakhs who 
have grown up all their lives in a city as opposed to those who grew up in a village where 
there is no asphalt’. Anna added that there are other terms which loosely fit: familiar to a 
Western readership, these terms have travelled internationally as concepts and become 
Russified in their everyday use as miileniial (millennial) and hiipster (hipster), the latter 
denoting a certain fashion subculture that emerged from New York and East London 
fashion in the late 2000s and is now an established part of international popular culture as 
shared through social media apps such as Instagram. 
 
During my fieldwork discussions, private university students made a distinction between 
private and state-funded universities, suggesting that this was an important distinguishing 
social marker for them. Laszczkowski has also identified this distinction in Astana: his 
informant Ainura expresses a preference for the Eurasian ‘elite’ university when she 
remarks, ‘Anyone can go to the agrarian’ (state-funded university) (Laszczkowski, 2016, 
p. 76). Serik, a Kazakh student in his early 20s who was studying at a private university, 
referred to state-funded universities’ academic approach and style of teaching, 
differentiating his own university by saying, ‘In other universities it is still some Soviet 
Union stuff’. Anna, who attended the same private university, commented, ‘“Soviet” is a 
synonym for “Old World” and everything that is antiquated. You use it if you want to say 
that something is old-fashioned’. Both Serik and Anna demonstrate a young urban 
middle-class perspective which differentiates their way of life in opposition to a Soviet 
past. I found there to be some truth to Serik’s statement. When I visited a state-funded 
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university and interviewed lecturers in ‘life security’, I asked them about their approach 
to teaching the compulsory course designed to prepare people for a range of natural and 
man-made hazards. They told me that their curriculum had changed little since the 1980s 
and supported a civil defence approach to dealing with natural hazards, using course 
materials which had not been updated. They also said that they had no access to Western 
journals. When I explained what I was doing, they asked me why I was speaking to 
different groups, commenting, ‘Different groups are not interesting—all people act the 
same’. This uniformity in dealing with a population could perhaps be the legacy of a 
Soviet approach to equality. However, my research has shown me that the young urban 
middle class are a unique group, holding certain values which influence the way they act 
on an everyday basis. 
 
The young urban middle class place a high value on appearances, in particular looking 
wealthy or outwardly displaying signs of success in business and work. Ventsel (2006) 
has documented a similar example in post-Soviet Siberia, where even famous local 
musicians—who may wear expensive designer clothes and outwardly display signs of 
wealth—live in small two-room apartments. There is an added dimension to this public 
display of wealth: one’s onstage presentation doesn’t always reflect actual wealth and 
may instead be a marker of social aspirations. Alma explained what she understood to be 
at the root of these displays in Almaty, linking it to a Kazakh tradition of demonstrating 
bridal wealth: ‘People will take a 20-year loan to have a good wedding. This comes from 
the past when the number of animals you had [in your herd] was a display of wealth. It 
was much easier back then to show this; now it is much harder to look rich. If you had a 
bad wedding, then people here would mock it, so it is important to make sure that is good 
and displays wealth’. The conspicuous display of wealth is an everyday concern for my 
young urban middle-class informants, who have to think creatively about how to present 
themselves in public. 
 
Anatoli is 25 years old and an ethnic Russian who has lived in both Moscow and Almaty. 
He works as a freelance ‘lifestyle photographer’, a job which entails visiting bars and 
clubs across Almaty to photograph the rich, famous, and attractive clientele. My 
interview with him gives further insight into my middle-class informants’ strategies for 
displaying wealth in Almaty. Patico argues that such insights help a researcher 
understand what she describes as ‘logics of value: the manner in which people in a 
particular historical context routinely consider measures of material wealth […] and other 
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kinds of value’ (Patico 2008, p. 7). In Almaty, the photographs Anatoli shoots are posted 
online to promote the venues. They are then shared by the individuals featured in them as 
a public display of association with particular places and people as an example of the 
conspicuous consumption they can afford. Anatoli told me more about the people he 
photographed: 
Anatoli: My generation and the younger generation of people, they don’t want to 
be something—they want to appear to be, they pretend. They have dreams and 
desires, but they don’t really try to achieve them. And they are happy with that 
façade they let others see. So if this person comes to the club, they probably have 
some money, they are successful. But they leave the club and wake up in the 
morning and they won’t really have anything. I mean that moment when 
somebody looked at them in the club is gone.  
Anatoli’s comments suggest that the middle-class narrative may only be a ‘façade’. This 
fits with Goffman’s (1959) argument that everyone is ‘playing’ their role in society in an 
onstage context. The form of this façade is a neoliberal notion of material and financial 
success. The young urban middle class in Almaty have adopted a distinct cultural style: it 
is fashionable to ostentatiously display wealth. This is most visible at night: the streets are 
filled with expensive black Mercedes G-Class SUVs, and the most expensive bars, with 
$250 table tabs (charged in USD), are packed with smart young men and women, clothed 
in designer labels and sipping expensive cocktails. Alexei Yurchak discusses the 
‘performative acts’ that created ‘the true careerist’, a new societal role that emerged in 
Russia in the 1990s which relied on certain aspects of performance, including the bodily 
acts of ‘appearance, clothes, gestures, movements, way of walking, manners, voice, style 
of drinking’, to fulfil the ‘new norms of the neoliberal model’ (Yurchak, 2003, p. 80). 
Anatoli was describing a local, Almatinean identity that has hereditary links to the New 
Russians of the 1990s, but which is unique in its expression among a new generation. 
 
Anatoli suggested that these façades are limited to certain situations; when in the privacy 
of one’s own home—a perfect example of an offstage and private context—such a façade 
is no more. I asked why he thought his younger generation played this superficial role. 
Anatoli: Because people who lived in the ’80s and ’90s and even 2000s were a bit 
more closed. They were very cautious about what they said because of the high 
crime rates in the ’90s. And people were cautious in the Soviet time, too. The 
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Soviet power were like inquisitors. You had to watch your tongue; somebody 
could easily misunderstand you and you could be accused of something, even if 
you may have meant something else. 
Anatoli differentiates the young urban middle class from the previous generation because 
of the societal uncertainty that held the previous generation back from truly expressing 
themselves in public. I argue that much of this uncertainty has not simply vanished, but 
has been pushed in offstage contexts away from a public façade of success, stability, and 
security. To challenge the public façade would be to break the shared societal 
performance. This, Goffman argues, is what keeps society moving; as each and every 
person contributes to keeping the performance going, it is in their interest not to 
undermine the shared narrative. As a consequence of this, there is a shared understanding 
that what is said in public is often fake and cannot be trusted. 
 
 
A vision of middle-class success: Onstage, performative, and public image 
 
As Anatoli suggests, outward appearances are important for the young urban middle class 
in Almaty. I observed other examples that were not often discussed by my informants. In 
the foyer of the private university, there were life-size cutouts of students and posters 
signifying students’ nomination or candidacy for different student competitions or 
committees. Accompanying captions (‘Finance student of the year’) gave examples of 
these public status roles, and large banners advertised the transformation from being a 
student to having a ‘dream job’ in ‘financial accounting’ (Image 5.1). In the photographs, 
students are dressed in suits or smart blouses with ties and shiny shoes, fulfilling an 
image of success—examples of the country’s future leaders in finance and business. 
There is a model for this image: the New Russians of the 1990s, successful businessmen 
and entrepreneurs. Yurchak describes how the business magazines of the late ’90s had 
‘endless lists of “best bankers” and “best managers”’—much like the student cutouts and 
banners, these are a public declaration of success. There is a question as to why these 
models of a ‘neoliberal “homo-economicus”’ (Yurchak 2003, p. 73) are still echoed 
today, up to 20 years later, in the behaviour of Almaty’s young urban middle class. 
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Image 5.1: A promotional banner at a private university in Almaty advertising their 
Financial Accounting degree programme. University branding has been removed.  
Taken by author 3 September 2015. 
 
For the answer, we have to look to wider societal efforts to re-image the present. I argue 
that the post-Soviet ‘homo-economicus’ is an enduring type that renews and refreshes 
itself with each generation as long as the public goals of society, framed in the 
government’s nation-building narratives, remain focused on economic growth and 
prosperity. We can see a Kazakh example of this in how the government has undertaken 
the rebuilding of Astana (renamed Nur-Sultan in 2019) to be, at least in appearances, a 
skyline comparable to other international capital cities (Bissenova, 2013; Laszczkowski, 
2016). In Yurchak’s description of Russia’s new rich, he encapsulates the post-socialist 
situation I describe: ‘Indeed, while you are forging, molding a career for yourself, you 
are also forging, or counterfeiting, a neoliberal model of meaningful life that looks 
almost like “the real thing,” only without the “trivialities” of human ethical dilemmas’ 
(Yurchak, 2003, p. 90). 
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Part 2  
How the Young Urban Middle Class Live:  
The everyday creation of middle-class identity 
 
I begin with the introductions two young women gave in the first focus group, which 
consisted of private-university students. Gulnara—whom we heard from in the previous 
chapter’s discussion of the sel—and Katya were both in their early 20s at the time. 
Gulnara spoke in English, while Katya spoke in Russian. 
Gulnara: My name is Gulnara—we don’t need last names, right? I don’t think 
you'll spell it the right way. I was born and raised in Almaty. My family comes 
from Almaty as well. I have been studying at [a private university] for two years 
and one semester I’ve spent abroad in Norway. I am looking at having one more 
experience abroad. I’m majoring in finance and my specialisation will be 
financial management, but right now I’m trying to figure out if it’s the sort of 
thing I want to do! That’s it. 
Gulnara’s comments fulfil many stereotypes associated with private university students. 
She is from the city, has studied abroad, and is specialising in finance. One parent is 
ethnic Tatar and the other Kazakh; they speak Russian together at home. Gulnara, born 
and raised in Almaty, is therefore gorodskii, from the city. Although not all participants 
in the focus group were from the city, they were all considered gorodskii. Adilet told me 
that he is ‘from Kyrgyzstan. I entered [the private university] and then moved to 
Kazakhstan’. Another student, Nurislam, said, ‘Actually, I live in Atyrau but came here 
to study [...] Atyrau is a city in the western part of Kazakhstan’. Rather than being from 
the city, what these students have in common is their attendance at the university in the 
city. This is one of the primary ways in which these cultural attributes are acquired; it is 
not necessary to be from the city to be labelled as gorodskii. On one occasion at a local 
cafe, I was speaking to friends who introduced me to some other students who were part 
of their group. They told me that ‘these students are like students from a private 
university, and you wouldn’t know that they went to a state-funded university because 
they are so similar to us’. Being gorodskii is not about where you are from, but the role 
that you play in public. In this example, the outward, onstage performance is similar, 
while the offstage background is different. Each of these students is playing a similar 
public role. 
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The term gorodskii is used in other former post-Soviet places in subtly different ways, 
and the definition I outlined above is specific to the context of my fieldwork in Almaty. 
For example, Schröder (2017) encountered the term gorodskii in his research into youth 
and urban change in a neighbourhood of Bishkek, the capital of neighbouring 
Kyrgyzstan. He found that the term gorodskii was used interchangeably with ‘urbans’, 
which in the context of his fieldwork he found to be an ‘identity boundary separating 
those Kyrgyz who were long-time inhabitants of Bishkek… and those Kyrgyz who had 
not been born in the capital, but relocated there at a later point in their lives from a 
peripheral area’ (ibid., p. 9). This subtle difference in the local meaning of gorodskii 
suggests that in Almaty, the ability for my informants to ‘play’ different roles in public 
allows them to become gorodskii by going to a private university and presenting a 
certain outward presentation of self, whereas in Bishkek the term is used as a marker of 
where one is from.  
 
In fact, my young urban middle-class informants can come from many different 
backgrounds. Another student told me, ‘My name is Katya. I’m Korean, actually. My 
family came from Uzbekistan because of the historical situation in 1937. I was born 
here in Almaty’. In Katya’s comments, which came from her introduction to the focus 
group, she asserted both her ethnicity and alluded to the events that led to her family 
coming to Almaty. In 1937, ethnic Koreans were deported from the Russian Far East to 
Central Asia, a subject I will discuss in detail in part three of Chapter 6. While they 
share the same type of performance, other factors, such as ethnicity, influence my 
informants’ offstage lives outside of their everyday onstage performances. Even in these 
few examples, we can begin to see different influences come together in making up a 
heterogeneous middle-class population. 
 
My informants’ introductions in this focus group show that members of the young urban 
middle class situate themselves according to the subjects they study, their ethnic 
background, and the places they are from. In the next section I explore the role these 
narrative performances play in forming, supporting, and spreading connections between 
people. What does community mean to the young urban middle class? 
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Middle-class connections: Family, university, and the general public 
 
Through an analysis of my informants’ discussion of community, we can begin to 
understand and tease out a young urban middle-class approach to everyday life—
specifically, how they relate to the wider flows of people, goods, and ideas in an urban 
environment. This discussion helps us to understand the extent to which the young 
urban middle class are either a coherent community in their own right or embedded in 
other distinct communities.  
Gulnara: The first community I belong to is my family, because my family is 
quite large. This is a part of Kazakh tradition; we have a lot of relatives all 
around Kazakhstan. I guess the next community will be my university 
community, and the last one will be my exchange-group community, because I 
still keep in touch with them though we are not in the same place. We are all 
spread over the world.  
Gulnara’s strong social links are to her family, her university community, and her 
exchange-group community. She attributes her large number of family relations to 
Kazakh tradition, demonstrating a link for her between ethnicity and community. Katya 
also ranked family, followed by university, as the most important communities for her. 
Katya’s ethnicity is the distinguishing factor of a third group: ‘The third community, I 
guess, is the [ethnic] Korean community, because we have the same mentality—we 
have a common mindset which is different from other nationalities’. While it appears in 
different forms in my informants’ accounts, ethnicity is an important aspect of 
community for my young urban middle-class informants. In the following chapter, I will 
analyse the impact of this and what it means to be both middle-class and Kazakh, 
Uighur, or Korean.  
 
Social relations, in a variety of configurations, have been shown to be a way that young 
people have responded to the uncertainties that have come with change in post-Soviet 
spaces. For example, Frederiksen (2013) researched the lives of young men in the city 
of Batumi, Georgia. Frederiksen found that young men from diverse backgrounds 
experienced a much wider sense of social isolation than what I believe my informants in 
Almaty experienced. These men, Frederiksen argues, became victims of what he terms 
‘temporal marginality’, finding themselves with no role in the present and fraught with 
uncertainty as both the trauma of the 1990s and the uncertainty of different potential 
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futures haunted them in the present. Frederiksen found that in response to this 
uncertainty, ‘brotherhoods’ formed as stable groups bound together by common 
experiences of the past and feelings about the future. In this instance, shared 
experiences—particularly the problems they found as men trying to identify a new 
societal role for themselves—is what brought them together. Likewise, my informants 
in Almaty are bound by their common societal role, yet the prospects that this role 
offers, such as the promise of upward social mobility accessed through education, come 
with their own uncertainties. 
 
The shared university experience is one thing my middle-class informants in Almaty 
have in common; it is a part of their middle-class identities, forming an important time 
when they are enculturated into a particular way of life and take part in a shared 
performance. However, university communities are just one of many other communities 
that my informants are part of. Both family and ethnic communities remain significant 
to their social lives, even though these communities hold no clear role in the onstage 
performance of middle-class life. What other social connections do my informants 
have? Are they all treated the same?  
 
Anthropologists have used mapping techniques as a qualitative method for data 
collection and an exploratory tool for data analysis and synthesis (Genz & Lucas-
Drogan, 2019; Turnbull, 2007). Although they have most often been used to explore 
spatial relationships, I employed them as a way to map social relationships, asking my 
informants to draw diagrams of their social lives to visualise their social connections. I 
also asked them to think about how they received information from these connections 
and the level of trust they had in them. I did this in order to visualise the relations 
between my informants and different groups, people, and sources of information. Not 
all social relations are created equal, and this affects how the young urban middle class 
gain knowledge about the world: differences in relations’ form, content, and trust affect 
the giving and receiving of information, the verification of its credibility, and how it 
informs life choices. I have shown multiple examples of how offstage uncertainty 
worries my informants—for example, in Nuriya’s account in the prologue and Aizhan’s 
account in the first transect location in Chapter 3. I have also highlighted how this 
uncertainty, coupled with a lack of information about a hazard, manifested itself as 
panic after the sel in Chapter 4. Through diagrams of their social lives, I explored the 
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theme of trust with my focus-group participants in order to better understand the role of 
their social connections in managing uncertainty. 
 
In response to my request, my informants produced a range of visualisations, including 
concentric ring diagrams and spider diagrams. One informant drew a Soviet-era 
apartment block, putting different groups in different apartments. I discuss a few 
examples below, starting with that of Aslan, a young Kazakh student. 
 
Aslan: Can I start? First of all, I drew myself in the centre, then my connections 
with the world. The first [circle] is my life experience; then the second is my family, 
then to my close friends. I can find my place in the world through the examples of 
others and by history.  
 
Aslan’s diagram placed the highest level of trust in his own experience, followed by his 
family and then his friends. He made no mention of other groups or communities in 
society that he trusted. 
Darya, who chose to draw a multi-storey apartment block to illustrate her social 
relations, explained:  
Darya: Each flat belongs to that building and it means there is already one 
community [...] these people from different flats in the same multi-storey house 
don’t communicate as much as they used to before in different times […] Each 
member of the community [in a block] might switch communities and transfer 
information between them. This is the city. Inside the city there is a phenomenon 
called sarafannyy melefon [word of mouth], and we sometimes receive 
information because someone told us, and in turn someone has told this to the 
previous person, too. It may go further and further; it is not clear where the 
information has originated from. This is the city. 
Darya highlighted the links between different social communities by using the metaphor 
of the Khrushchevka housing block to describe how they are related. Darya said that the 
individual apartments communicated less than they used to, suggesting that she thinks 
that individuals within the city have become more isolated over time. She described 
receiving information through sarafannyy melefon as a particularly urban phenomenon. 
As Gluckman argues, the passing of information by word of mouth, for example in the 
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form of gossip, is often used to distinguish group identity and to both explore and 
delineate the boundaries of a community (Gluckman, 1963). However, in this example, 
Darya is suggesting that rather than serving as the insular bounding of gossip within a 
community, sarafannyy melefon is a way that information anonymously travels between 
individuals across society. This begs the question: Why is private and offstage 
communication so prevalent, and what does it offer over more public forms of 
communication such as newspapers or TV? 
 
Islam’s diagram helps us to explain the prominent role of offstage communication over 
more public channels. His diagram is a good example because it has many similarities 
to those drawn by the other students in the focus group. Islam explained that his family 
are his most trusted social relations: ‘I am sure that they tell me what they really think is 
the truth. I fully trust their words’. Working outwards through the consecutive 
concentric rings of Islam’s diagram, each circle marks a progressively diminishing level 
of trust. Islam said, ‘The last circle is the whole society in general—including mass 
media, radio, TV, and internet. All of these are the last circle because it is important to 
understand that everything that is being communicated through these channels is always 
being communicated with a particular purpose’. 
 
Islam’s diagram signals the existence of a wider distrust of the media, which was 
corroborated by my other informants. Ulyana commented on the trustworthiness of 
mass media, saying, ‘As a journalism student, I can say that some of them are corrupted 
and held by the strong hands of the authorities. Especially TV’. My informants also 
commented on the state’s control and censorship of media sources that do not toe the 
government line. Darya remarked, ‘Recently they’ve closed one [newspaper], Adam 
Bol. It was such a stupid reason they’ve used to close them’. By shutting down news 
outlets through strategies such as filing criminal charges of financial mismanagement, 
the government’s repression of dissenting voices has reduced the trust that members of 
the young urban middle class place in the media. However, Darya told me that she 
thinks that this lack of trust is not the same for everyone in society and it is greater for 
the younger generation: ‘Everything depends on the target group. If we will, for 
example, observe older people, they are reading newspapers. They watch Russian and 
Kazakh television. They are told something there and they believe it. There are some 
people who don’t go for news at all. They don’t think they need it’. 
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Image 5.2: Graffiti text reads, ‘The walls have ears’. 
Image taken by author in downtown Almaty, 2015. 
 
There is a precedent for this present-day uncertainty and distrust in hegemonic state 
information channels in society, which was also mentioned by Anatoli earlier in this 
chapter. Image 5.2 shows graffiti in downtown Almaty which reads, ‘The walls have 
ears’. This graffiti references an evolving trope in Soviet—and now Kazakh—society. 
First appearing in a WWII poster discouraging gossip (Image 5.3), the phrase came to 
indicate the uncertainty prevalent during the Soviet era, with people fearing that the 
secret police were bugging apartments or their neighbours were overhearing and 
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reporting on unpatriotic activities. This graffiti is a tongue-in-cheek dig at the 
authorities in present-day Almaty. Yurchak (2003) commented on the emergence in the 
literature of a theoretical binary in which the Soviet state is framed in opposition to the 
people. As an example, Yurchak cites John Young’s argument that ‘Soviet citizens are 
“non-conforming” dissidents, who “counter the deceptions of government by setting 
forth ‘the facts’ in contrast to official falsehood”’ (Yurchak, 2003, p. 482; Young, 1991, 
p. 226). Such a binary is evoked in this graffiti. The graffiti’s creator clearly sees 
relevance in bringing back an old trope to reflect upon society today, and the artwork 
could be seen as posing a question to those who see it: Who can be trusted? In so doing, 
it demonstrates the existence of a public offstage debate, outside of official channels and 
in resistance to state hegemony over public information. 
 
 
Image 5.3: WWII Soviet propaganda poster.  
Text reads, ‘Don’t gossip! Be aware, these days, walls can overhear you,  
treason is not far from empty chatter and gossip’. 
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By combining Islam’s point—there is always a purpose to what is said—with the 
observation that the young urban middle class have little trust in the media, we can 
understand more clearly why they perceive that the state is not acting in their interests. 
If they did trust the state, then they would also place greater trust in the media—as they 
do with close family, who are trusted precisely because they are perceived to have their 
kin’s interests at heart. ‘Public transcripts’, where ‘social action takes place in the open’, 
are difficult to produce in Almaty due to the state’s censorship of the media (Besnier, 
2009, p. 8). This discussion, along with wider debate of these topics in cafes, 
restaurants, and the universities, is a prime example of the ‘hidden transcripts’ which 
Scott discusses as a form of resistance, placing the young urban middle class at odds 
with the present-day Kazakh state (Scott, 1985). The young urban middle class, thanks 
in part to strong international links and study abroad, are critical citizens, not only 
aware of the censorship and bias in society, but also speaking against it in offstage 
contexts in a way that older generations may not be. As a result, the government 
sometimes perceives the young middle class in Almaty as a potential threat. 
 
My young urban middle-class informants find themselves in a difficult situation. In an 
urban context, the majority of people one meets on a daily basis are not known (Foster 
& Kemper, 2002 [1979], p. 139). As a result—and in the context of their increasing 
social isolation from wider societal groups—my informants’ everyday lives are fraught 
with uncertainty. Does this mean that the young urban middle class live cautiously? Far 
from it. Everyday life for the young urban middle class in Almaty is characterised by a 
unique approach to risk-taking. This is tightly bound to fulfilling the hopes and 
aspirations integral to their onstage performance, but also has important ramifications 
for the uncertainty plaguing their offstage lives. This topic receives further attention in 
the third section of this chapter. 
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Part 3  
Living with Risk:  
Aspiration, opportunity, and threat 
 
 
A hybrid approach to risk 
 
Mary Douglas emphasises how the configurations of everyday life influence the 
prioritisation of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 8). Almaty has experienced two 
distinct periods of influence: a history of Soviet state paternalism and the introduction 
of neoliberal policies in the 1990s following independence. In Kazakhstan, a unique 
post-Soviet approach to risk has emerged. For my young urban middle-class informants, 
their parents have direct experience of Soviet state paternalism, but as they were born 
after 1991 themselves, they only have direct experience of a post-Soviet combination of 
the two different influences. What we see today is a combination of these influences—
just one aspect of what Burawoy and Verdery describe as the ‘hybrid societies’ that have 
emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Burawoy & Verdery, 1999, pp. 1, 
33). Here, I focus on the resultant ‘hybrid’ approach to risk. 
 
Neoliberal policies, introduced by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in the 1990s, encouraged a more positive attitude to risk-taking, framed within 
the context of opportunity and emphasising potential gains. In a speech to students at 
Nazarbayev University in Astana in 2016, Christine Lagarde, the head of the IMF, said, 
‘Your country, and the region as a whole, have made great strides since independence. 
Growth has averaged more than 7 per cent per year over the past two decades. In a 
single generation, living standards—in terms of per capita GDP—more than tripled, and 
many countries, including Kazakhstan, achieved middle-income status’ (Lagarde, 
2016). Lagarde’s statement signals economic growth in GDP as a sign of success. Her 
use of the term ‘middle-income status’, an economic marker of wealth on a comparative 
global scale, is further evidence. She directly addressed the young urban middle-class 
students who were present, saying, ‘You—the young people in this audience—are 
enjoying the fruits of discipline and hard work by the previous generation. You must 
now lead by example and carry the baton, securing prosperity for the next generation’. 
Her remarks place the responsibility for future prosperity upon the young urban middle 
class, suggesting that this is dependent on furthering neoliberal goals. However, 
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Lagarde’s speech also included a warning: ‘Greater openness, of course, means greater 
sensitivity to external shock’. The increased vulnerability of a society following 
neoliberal economic policies is an additional burden shouldered by the middle class in 
urban contexts. In Central Asia, the vulnerability of the middle class is particularly 
acute: Reeves (2014b) has commented on an example of this vulnerability in 
Kyrgyzstan, where the 2008 global financial crisis, in combination with the doubling of 
electricity rates in the run-up to a planned privatisation of state assets, ‘sent Bishkek’s 
emergent middle-class back below the poverty line’ (Reeves, 2014b, p. 68). As I show 
through their discussions of risk, members of the young urban middle class in Almaty 
balance a public onstage façade of success, stability, and prosperity against an offstage 
uncertainty experienced in daily life. 
 
 
Devaluation of the Kazakh national currency 
 
The young urban middle class live an outwardly consumerist lifestyle. Wealth, in 
particular the outward appearance of wealth, is an intrinsic part of my informants’ 
public performance of their image of middle-class success and prosperity. During my 
fieldwork, there were two successive waves of currency devaluation, which challenged 
the dominant public societal narratives of stability, security, and success that originate in 
the Kazakh government’s nation-building rhetoric (The Strategy for Development of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan until the Year 2030; Kazakhstan, 1997). For the young urban 
middle class, their aspirational and future-oriented public performance was undermined. 
The way in which my informants discuss this threat, and the way in which they 
responded to devaluation, reveal their feelings of uncertainty; as with the sel, it exposed 
their own vulnerability. 
 
The Kazakh national currency, tenge, received significant government support until 
2014. Government monetary investment in the currency had increased following the 
2008 global financial crisis. The government bought gold reserves to prop up the 
currency in the face of rapid inflation. Their actions made the tenge uncompetitive 
against a similarly depreciating Russian ruble, making exports too expensive and 
depressing trade with Russia, one of Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partners. In August 
2015 the currency was floated on the stock market and appeared to go into free fall. 
Chingis, a Kazakh man in his early 20s and a good friend of my research assistant Anna, 
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commented on what was happening, as we were together on the day when the currency 
started to plummet: 
Chingis: I knew it would happen. I thought it would happen at the beginning of 
the year. Damn, it is getting tougher to be Kazakh. I don’t think the public will 
protest, but they’re certainly not going to like it when the price of imported 
goods increases. 
Commenting on how devaluation had been a background worry, Chingis said he had 
expected the devaluation to happen six months earlier and had been living in 
anticipation of significant change since then. While he acknowledged that devaluation 
makes everyday life more difficult, he did not know how the public will respond, but 
believed they will not protest. Other informants reacted differently, adopting a range of 
strategies for dealing with devaluation. Nuriya, whom we heard from in the preface, 
discussed the devaluation with two of her close friends and me. This conversation took 
place in the period between the first and second waves of devaluation. 
Nuriya: Current discussion topics [with friends] include devaluation, and current 
predictions are for 10 February. People are really afraid because all the prices 
are going up and salaries are not changing. It is getting difficult to live, actually; 
everything is getting really expensive. A high dollar is responsible for these 
changes. 
Saltanat, Nuriya’s friend, had taken practical steps to reduce the effect of devaluation on 
her life: ‘Since the last devaluation, I have had my savings in a U.S. dollar account’. 
Her comments reinforce Chingis’s suggestion that devaluation is making some of my 
informants’ everyday lives more difficult. The ongoing squeeze of wages, in 
combination with rising everyday costs, challenge the young urban middle class’s 
aspirational way of life, which is based on ongoing financial prosperity and conspicuous 
consumption. The economic vulnerability exposed by devaluation is a result of the 
Kazakh economy’s reliance on the U.S. dollar. This in turn is a consequence of the 
economy’s reliance on fossil fuels and mining—for example, the oil industry accounted 
for an estimated 21.1 per cent of Kazakhstan’s GDP in 2017—which have been affected 
by declines in global markets (World Bank Group, 2017, p. 9). Saltanat’s comments on 
the ‘high dollar’ are an example of the problem being framed as external to Kazakhstan, 
a narrative which originates in the Kazakh government’s public discussion of the issue.  
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While practical steps, such as Saltanat’s savings account in U.S. dollars, went some way 
to protect the interests of the young urban middle class, protecting the credibility of the 
narrative itself—continuing the appearance of prosperity—was perceived to be just as 
important, if not more so. As mentioned by the photographer Anatoli, the outward 
presentation of wealth in a club doesn’t necessarily equate to having money in an 
offstage context, when one wakes up in the morning with an empty wallet. 
 
We can see movement to keep up appearances most clearly in the way that the 
government has sought to shift blame, reframe uncertainty, and deflect criticism. In the 
first wave of devaluation in February 2014, shortly before I started my extended 
fieldwork stay, the Kazakh government blamed the ‘crisis of the world economy’ and 
‘the “bad” dollar’ (Atabaev, 2014). Government promises were broken and Aidar 
Alibayev, the chairman of the Association of Pension Funds, warned that ‘as a result 
there will be mistrust of people towards the government, the increase of social tension, 
rise in the costs for living, usually followed by a decrease in quality of life’ (ibid.). To 
avert disaster, Nazarbayev, the president at the time, dismissed the head of the national 
bank, scapegoating the problem in an effort to restore trust in the government. 
Nazarbayev’s actions worked to some extent, although standards of living fell for many 
as prices of imported goods rose dramatically.  
 
By August 2015, there was a change in the government’s approach to the financial 
management of the national currency. Significant state intervention in the economy, 
which had mitigated the risk of currency fluctuations through purchasing further gold 
reserves, ceased. On 30 August 2015, the government made the decision to float the 
tenge on the open market. The tenge immediately fell by more than 30 per cent and 
continued to fall by almost the same amount again over the next five months (Azatik, 
2015). The online news site nur.kz reported that the ‘devaluation of tenge in Kazakhstan 
was unavoidable’, citing the devaluation of many regional currencies (nur.kz, 2015). 
The economy of Kazakhstan is closely linked with its neighbours through trade and 
remittances, and it was impossible for the government to shield the population from all 
external risks (Alexander, 2018b, p. 10). As with devaluation in 2014, the government 
reframed the situation, promoting confidence in its actions and absolving itself of 
responsibility. In an article from TengriNews, the prime minister, Masimov, explained 
‘why they couldn’t keep the promise of the head of National Bank Kairat Kelimbetov’:  
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The situation of the global economy is continuously worsening, the prices for 
the main exporting goods of our country, oil and metals, keep falling, which 
negatively affects the growth rate of GDP and increases the economy’s 
vulnerability to the external shocks. (TengriNews, 2015) 
Devaluation in 2014 and 2015 demonstrated to the public in Almaty that current 
prosperity was vulnerable. Devaluation challenged the foundations of economic 
stability and security, which the public narratives of both young urban middle-class 
identity and government power, influence, and authority relied upon. This set public 
onstage and private offstage narratives on an increasingly divergent trajectory—what 
something appeared to be was no guarantee of its credibility. Indeed, the economy has 
not been the only place where this phenomenon can be seen. 
 
 
Corruption in academic establishments in Almaty 
 
Practices including gift giving, bribes, and patronage are widespread in universities in 
Almaty and affect the integrity of locally awarded qualifications that are ostensibly 
social markers of merit-based achievements. As my informants discussed, these can be 
considered corrupt practices because they go against socially accepted moral codes. As 
a result of these widespread practices, a degree is no guarantee that one’s university 
work has been completed. This is one of many examples of a broader issue of similar 
corrupt practices in Kazakhstani society: for instance, a driving licence gives no 
indication of a competent driver, and perhaps worst of all, a doctor may not have 
completed all of their training and could have bought their certificate. As with 
devaluation, a public façade is no guarantee of veracity. 
 
The proliferation of corrupt practices in Almaty has established money as a way for 
people to overcome uncertainty, simultaneously creating greater uncertainty for those 
who do not have access to money. At the start of this chapter, I discussed how nepotism 
and the influence of agashka was seen as a common practice in Almaty. At universities 
in Kazakhstan, it was common for money to be used to secure success in exams and 
coursework, a practice documented in other post-socialist places as well. Denisova-
Schmidt argues that in Russia, these practices were indicative of a ‘longstanding 
tradition of corruption in almost every area of society’ (Denisova-Schmidt, 2015, p. 20). 
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Krysha (‘roof’ in Russian) is a practice of providing protection: in Humphrey’s (2012) 
example from Russia and Mongolia, krysha involved academic guardianship for 
students through payments to teachers and lecturers. Humphrey describes various 
monetised strategies, from the top-down influence of a dean to direct payments for 
success in exams. The examples Humphrey cites, including the work of Denisova-
Schmidt, Huber, and Leontyeva (2016), are evidence that the practices I recorded are 
not unique to the young urban middle-class in Almaty and are widespread in post-
socialist contexts. 
 
During my fieldwork, I observed many references tote universities tackling corrupt 
practices. A key aspect of the private university’s mission statement was a ‘commitment 
to quality and intolerance of nepotism, corruption, and discrimination’. While this may 
be a value supported by many universities, there was a particular emphasis placed on it 
in Almaty. The use of money to secure an advantage was openly discussed, with one 
lecturer announcing an exam to the class with the comment, ‘You cannot buy a pass in 
my class’. The University prided itself on its American marking and exam system and 
sold itself as an international institution, teaching classes in both English and Russian 
while lecturers often spoke Kazakh informally in class. A Western approach to higher 
education was perceived to indicate a fair and less corrupt system. As a result, it was a 
coveted place to study for the young urban middle class because there was a higher 
perceived degree of integrity to their qualifications. Making these types of choices was 
one way that the young urban middle class reduced their exposure to uncertainty; the 
other is their use of informal networks to secure access to services, goods, or 
information that could be trusted. 
 
 
A middle-class approach to seismic risk 
 
As I have explained in the introduction to this thesis, my route into researching risk and 
uncertainty was through the study of seismic risk in Almaty. This city’s risk profile, of 
exposure to a major but infrequent hazard, has similarities with other risks my 
informants cited as background concerns or worries in everyday life. The discussion of 
seismic risk—an example of how the young urban middle class live with risk and 
uncertainty—presents a microcosm of my research thesis. 
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Earthquake risk is normalised in everyday discussion. Despite a fair amount of 
knowledge of the potential risks faced, my informants take few practical steps to lower 
their vulnerability. Instead, narrative techniques, such as telling jokes, help to alleviate 
concerns and a feeling of helplessness by making light of the situation. Svetlana, a 
young ethnic Russian woman in her mid-20s who lived downtown and worked in IT, 
helped me with language practice classes on a weekly basis. During one of these 
classes, we discussed seismic risk and everyday responses to it. Describing an office she 
used to work in, she said, ‘There are jokes about this. Our office had an evacuation plan 
hanging on the wall. There were arrows all formed into a circle and the diagram showed 
everyone running around in a circle. It comes from the national mentality—I think it is a 
post-Soviet Union thing. In the past, the government was always saying that they were 
under constant threat’. Svetlana referenced a particular post-Soviet approach to risk, 
making light of what had been a serious concern in the past. The other side to this 
particular post-Soviet approach to risk is that when there are inevitable or seemingly 
unavoidable risks, the feeling of uncertainty can be crippling. Svetlana’s story is 
reminiscent of Ibañez-Tirado’s findings that joking is used ‘as [a] means to endure and 
circumnavigate disastrous events towards everydayness’ (Ibañez-Tirado, 2015, p. 13). 
 
When I engaged in serious discussions with my informants about the potential effects of 
a major earthquake, it revealed a potential rupture in everyday life. This was an 
uncomfortable reality for Svetlana, who said, ‘People are not used to a feeling of 
constant danger—I can’t bring myself to… I prefer not to think about it’. 
Methodologically, discussing these topics with informants had the potential to trigger 
feelings of uncertainty and panic; often my discussions were a form of intervention in 
themselves, which led to these topics being spoken about in a way that they may not 
have been otherwise. A level of trust had to be established between my informants and 
me so that their discussions with me as a researcher could be considered private 
communications.  
 
Other triggers can also bring these uncertainties to the surface. Bruckermann (2018) 
observes how an earthquake rumour led to her informants confronting the potential 
consequences of an earthquake. This resulted in a rupture of the division between public 
and private domains as personal concerns crossed over into public discussions. 
Bruckermann’s example suggests that risks, including seismic risk, have the potential to 
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lead to ruptures in the division between onstage and offstage narratives that are 
navigated in everyday life. 
 
My informants perceive that responsibility for dealing with seismic risk in Kazakhstan 
lies with the government. In combination with a relaxation of strict Soviet-era building 
standards and an increase in corruption in building projects, there has been significant 
diversification in the hazards to which people are exposed. For example, those who live 
in much taller apartment blocks face new threats, since the nine-storey height limit for 
constructing new buildings was lifted in the early 1990s. In recent years, new buildings 
have been constructed up to 38 storeys high. Chingis told me that in the event of a 
magnitude 8 or 9 earthquake, ‘all new buildings will be in ruins and it is more likely 
that Soviet buildings will be standing’. My informants have greater confidence in the 
Soviet buildings, partly due to their distrust in the newer buildings—a result of the 
damaging influence of endemic corruption that is assumed to have influenced their 
construction. Government strategies for mitigating earthquake risk have changed little 
over the last 30 years; they remain grounded in Soviet-era methodologies which are no 
longer adequate for the diversity of risks now faced in the city.  
 
The population of Almaty has taken steps to mitigate a range of hazards, although steps 
taken for short-term gain can expose populations to longer-term risks. The majority of 
the urban middle class live downtown or in Soviet-era mikro-raion housing districts—
transect locations 2 and 1, respectively, discussed in Chapter 3. Downtown Almaty, 
especially in the hot days of summer or the temperature inversions of cold winters, is 
drowned in a soupy smog due to heavy traffic and coal-fired heating power stations, 
which provide communal heating to mikro-raion around the city. The entire city is on a 
hill, with the southern areas of the city climbing into the foothills of the mountains; 
consequently, the air becomes cleaner the higher you go. The more temperate climate in 
the foothills means that dacha (weekend homes and gardens) and sanatoria such as 
Arasan are situated there. For those who can afford to, moving to the foothills—to 
cleaner air and lower summer temperatures—is seen as a way to mitigate these hazards.  
 
As a result, the area in the foothills is known for exclusivity, which is increasing with 
the building of extravagant homes and apartments. These homes are a distinguishing 
factor of the urban elite, who, unlike many among the urban middle class, have 
sufficient wealth to live in these more expensive areas. To distance themselves from the 
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Soviet past, the ostentatious and ill-proportioned buildings are a deliberate affront to the 
simple and functional designs of Soviet minimalism; they are constructed in a style 
which Holleran (2014) has labelled as ‘Mafia Baroque’ in his study of Albanian post-
Soviet architecture. Measurable risk from natural hazards is high in this area due to its 
proximity to the mountains. With a greater proportion of moneyed elite living and 
working in the south of the city, there is an inversion of the common observation that 
‘marginalised people live in the riskiest environments’ (Mutter, 2015, p. 1). In Almaty, 
the richest are more likely to be exposed to significant, measurable hazard risk, but they 
are also more likely to have money to build again. This is the result of a trade-off 
between the short-term benefits of moving to a ‘healthy’ environment with cleaner air 
and the long-term risks of natural hazards such as sel or earthquakes. 
 
Earthquakes are indiscriminate hazards. As Kanatbek Abdrakhmatov, director of the 
Institute of Seismology in Bishkek, is quoted as saying, ‘Earthquakes don’t care 
whether you’re Kyrgyzstani or Kazak, man or woman’ (Overseas Development 
Institute, 2016). There is still a significant risk faced from seismic hazards across 
Almaty, whether one is a member of the elite or the urban middle class. There is still a 
society-wide reliance on the government to deal with large-scale hazards. However, this 
is impacted by a lack of trust in the government, which is linked to how it has been 
perceived to deal with major threats; as Svetlana said, ‘The higher up in government 
you go, the less I trust them. The president said that devaluation wouldn’t happen!’ She 
shrugged her shoulders, holding her hands out to emphasise her point.  
 
When the authorities are not trusted, my informants turn to those they do trust, 
including family and close friends. However, there is little personal experience of 
earthquakes, as the last major earthquake in Almaty was in 1911. Often this means that 
there is no experiential framework for interpreting seismic hazards. Therefore, in search 
of information, the young urban middle class turn to rumours—such as a rumour of 
mass graves outside the city—to understand the true potential of the hazard, which the 
government avoids discussing in order to minimise panic.  
 
I first heard about a rumour of mass graves from Zhuldyz, an official who worked at a 
state archive. This was towards the beginning of my fieldwork, and it would crop up 
again in numerous interviews over the next 18 months. I was introduced to Zhuldyz, a 
Kazakh woman in her mid-50s, by a mutual contact, and we met in her apartment 
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downtown. Zhuldyz and I chatted while drinking tea on her balcony. I asked her a range 
of questions, as I was still scoping out my research at the time and I hoped the archive 
would help me contextualise and understand the history of my research topics. We were 
discussing earthquakes, and she said, ‘I have heard that the authorities have built a large 
mass grave in the city which is able to take thousands of bodies for when there is an 
earthquake’. If we break down this comment about a mass grave, we see that the 
information contained in the statement is plausible. However, the source of the 
information is not cited, and this makes it a rumour. It is simply ‘heard’. 
 
Informants often looked to me to verify what they had heard elsewhere. As a researcher 
who was talking about earthquakes with different people across the city, including 
government officials, my informants saw me as a potential source of information. My 
exchange with Zhuldyz fulfils the defining features which Paz cites as particular to 
gossip and rumour, in particular that ‘there is a sense of telling news which does not 
appear across authoritative news channels’ and that this exchange happens in a ‘face-to-
face interaction’ (Paz, 2009, p. 118). I mention this particular rumour of a mass grave 
here because it appeared in different forms in interviews with a range of research 
participants—including my young urban middle-class informants—but also in a wider 
context, which suggests it was circulating across the city. For example, another time I 
heard the rumour was from Stanislav, an ethnic Russian inventor in his mid-40s. 
Stanislav had made a steel caged bed, designed to protect the occupant from falling 
rubble in the event of an earthquake. In his account, the rumour was fleshed out with 
more detail: ‘A mass grave has been built outside the city. Two years ago one was built 
for 300,000 people, and now there are graves for 500,000’. Almaty’s population was 
1,877,000 on 1 July 2019. It is easy to see how a mass grave of this size would be a 
shocking and scary revelation if it were official information. However, as a rumour, it 
was a point from which to discuss the potential impact of a major earthquake, a way to 
quantify the human impact of an unknowable hazard causing widespread uncertainty in 
society. 
 
The government appears to be aware of the potential for panic that could be caused by 
revealing information about preparations such as a mass grave. This issue was discussed 
at a UNISDR conference in Tbilisi, Georgia, previously mentioned in Chapter 4, which 
I attended as an assistant to the Central Asia office. When delegates from local 
municipalities across Central Asia discussed making a public database of hazard risk, 
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local Kazakh government officials and members of the national Kazakh committee 
argued that agreeing to such a register was likely to cause panic rather than alleviate 
it—the suggested outcome the conference was aiming for. According to their argument, 
knowing the risk to which you are exposed, without the ability to do anything to reduce 
the potential effect, would lead to widespread panic—perhaps this is an insight into 
what happened with the sel. This example shows that the Kazakh government’s priority 
is to uphold a public narrative of stability and security, despite the potential measurable 
risks to which the population might be exposed. My young urban middle-class 
informants therefore live in a context where public information is a government tool to 
support a particular narrative, rather than a resource from which offstage uncertainty 
can be prepared for and mitigated. 
 
 
Chapter Conclusion: Difference, community, and risk 
 
In this chapter, I have shown that the young urban middle class are a heterogenous 
group with intersectional identities which crosscut categories of gender, ethnicity, 
language, place of birth, family background, and university education. As Patico (2008) 
found with ‘a middle-class’ in St. Petersburg in the 1990s, what binds members of this 
group together, differentiating them from the previous generation, is a common onstage 
narrative: internationally oriented, individualised, ambitious, and critical, it is a hybrid 
post-Soviet approach to risk-taking which combines the ‘entrepreneurial ethic’ of the 
New Russians of the 1990s, a Soviet notion of state responsibility and support, and a 
Western notion of transparency and democratic values. Supported by government 
scholarships, the generation that has grown up since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
has a distinct identity. Through a public onstage narration of their lives, placing an 
emphasis on opportunity and the potential benefits of risk-taking, members of this 
generation downplay the potential negative consequences which come to form 
background offstage uncertainties.  
 
Offstage, the negative consequences of risk-taking manifest themselves as a society-
wide uncertainty, experienced as a distrust of those outside of kinship and close friend 
networks. Official channels of information are viewed as heavily censored; state-
controlled online news sites, newspapers, radio stations, and television channels are 
therefore treated with suspicion and are not trusted. When there is no experience of risk, 
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either personally or within trusted social networks, the young urban middle class look 
for answers in unofficial offstage face-to-face forms of communication such as rumours. 
These rumours circulate across the city and provide new sources of information, 
speculation, and discussion, but the anonymity that allows them to exist is also a further 
source of uncertainty. 
 
When ruptures in everyday life take place and risks are realised in hazardous events, 
members of the young urban middle class turn to those they trust. In the next chapter, I 
look in more detail at how informants from different ethnic groups not only face 
different threats, but also have unique ways of responding to them through their 
resources and social networks. In examining these differences, I explore how a young 
urban middle-class way of living can play out in myriad ways.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 177 
Chapter 6 
Being Middle Class  
and Kazakh, Uighur, or Korean 
 
This chapter explores the differences in everyday life for my middle-class informants, 
asking what it means to be both a middle-class citizen of Kazakhstan and ethnically 
Kazakh, Uighur, or Korean. I provide examples of how being a particular ethnicity 
impacts upon the everyday lives of my informants, as well as how this affects the 
challenges and risks that they face and the support that their kinship networks are able 
to provide. 
 
I begin this chapter with a brief explanation of the historical events that have influenced 
the current ethnic diversity of Almaty. This discussion covers the different ethnic 
populations in the wider region before the Soviet period, the impact of the 1924 Soviet 
nationalities project, and the demographic changes that came with independence. This 
overview provides the context for the three main parts of the chapter, which consider 
Kazakh, Uighur, and Korean ethnicities, respectively. 
 
First, I consider what it means for my informants to be both Kazakh and middle class, 
focusing on the accounts of three of my Kazakh informants: Nuriya, Zarina, and 
Saltanat. Through their accounts, I explore their perception of important aspects of 
Kazakh identity: the role of Islam, the importance of tribal affiliation and clan identity, 
and distinctions between rural and urban Kazakh identity. Ethnic Kazakh identity is 
shown to have distinct gender roles, and I discuss the particular challenges this 
presented for the women I talked to. I argue that my informants’ accounts show a 
rupture, disjunction, or incompatibility between being a modern Kazakhstan middle-
class citizen and upholding traditional expectations of Kazakh identity. 
 
Second, I investigate what it means to be both Uighur and middle class. In comparison 
to ethnic Kazakhs, Uighurs are a much smaller minority population. Here, I focus on a 
particular neighbourhood, located adjacent to my first transect location. My discussion 
and analysis is structured using the example and account of my research assistant Alma, 
with additional material from interviews with her close family and neighbours. Topics 
covered include a description of the neighbourhood, ‘ghettoisation’, the perception of 
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risks faced by the Uighur community, and the state’s response to the persecution of 
Uighurs in China’s Xinjiang Province. In this section, I argue that the Uighur 
community confront a unique set of challenges, exposing them to both risks and 
uncertainties that other middle-class informants living in Almaty do not experience. 
 
Third, I discuss what it means to be both Korean and middle class. My research 
assistant Boris explains the history of the Korean population in Almaty. Building upon 
this background information, I discuss how the ethnic Korean identity of one family I 
lived with impacted their son Sasha’s life. When Sasha chose to marry a Tatar woman, 
it caused a rupture in his close family relations. My analysis illustrates how ruptures in 
kin relations on a family scale can have a massive impact—especially when kinship is 
the most trusted source of support and information in society, as my young urban 
middle-class informants have suggested. 
 
This chapter argues that the challenges my young, urban, middle-class informants face 
in dealing with uncertainty—in particular the different experiences they have and how 
they come to narrate them—are influenced by their different social positioning, 
explored in this chapter in relation to their ethnicity. These examples are not given as 
representative of the communities, but offer examples of how being differently 
positioned within society can impact everyday experiences of uncertainty. Upholding a 
middle-class public identity often clashes with ‘traditional’ ethnic practices which have 
seen a resurgence in the post-independence period. This conclusion supports Roberts’ 
(2010, p. 537) assertion that ‘[y]oung people in Central Asia also face distinctive 
difficulties in anchoring their personal biographies, assessments of their current 
situations, and future hopes in historical narratives about their people’. Each example 
illustrates generational differences in how ethnic identities are enacted, showing the 
difficulty faced by the younger generation as they attempt to reconcile their social 
positioning as part of a particular ethnic community, on the one hand, with leading a 
middle-class lifestyle, on the other.  
 
 
A History of Nationality and Ethnicity in Kazakhstan  
 
Kazakhs trace their heredity to Temüjin, better known as Chingis Khan—a name which 
translates as the equivalent of ‘universal emperor’ and was given to him in recognition 
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of his role in establishing the Mongol Empire. He lived between the mid-1160s and 
1227 (Golden, 2011; Olcott, 1987). Historically, Kazakhs were a nomadic pastoralist 
group who lived across the Eurasian Steppe, which includes the present-day territory of 
Kazakhstan. By the mid-19th century, Russian imperial influence was strong in the 
region and a number of military forts were established (Becker, 2004, p. 6) to protect 
the frontiers of the Russian Empire. The fort of Verny, established to protect the 
Zhetysu (Seven Rivers) region, was renamed Alma-Ata during the Soviet period; after 
independence, it was changed to the more Kazakh-sounding Almaty. 
 
There were significant changes to how different ethnicities were recognised following 
the Communist Party conference of 1924, when, as Esenova explains, ‘Moscow 
launched an ambitious project focusing on reorganization of the Soviet Union along 
national lines, and by 1938 the old-style Central Asian cultural and political systems 
were replaced with that of Soviet nationalities’ (Esenova, 2002, p. 11). The concept of 
nationality ‘referred to a religious and cultural community which had no territory and no 
state of its own’ (Roy, 2000, p. ix). This constituted the foundation of both a ‘multi-
ethnic empire’ and a ‘system of governance’ that was deemed ‘inter-nationalism’ 
(ibid.). The Soviet Nationalities plan was formative in the creation of different ethnic 
delineations that my informants identify with today. These categories are described 
locally as ‘nationalities’, following the Russian term used by the Soviet state. According 
to Roy, the continuance of these categories post-independence is a consequence of the 
re-appropriation of the Soviet model as a foundation of the new Central Asian nations 
(ibid.). 
 
Theoretically, there was equality between the different nationalities under the Soviet 
state, but this may not have always played out in practice; as Roy explains, ‘The 
disappearance of the USSR [in 1991] exploded the notion of the supra ethnic state and 
left a collection of nationalities in search of a state of their own’ (Roy, 2000, p. 174). 
After 1991, Kazakhs became the titular nationality, despite constituting only 39.7 per 
cent of the population in the 1989 Soviet census. The difficulties Kazakhs encountered 
as a minority group were compounded by the ethnic and linguistic Russian dominance 
of main urban centres, including Almaty. The table in Image 6.1 (Davé, 2004) lists the 
largest ethnic populations in Kazakhstan and shows how their numbers have fluctuated 
over time. Most notably, by 2009 Kazakhs are recorded as making up 63.1 per cent of 
 180
the population, while the percentage of ethnic Russians has fallen from 37.8 per cent, as 
measured in 1989, to 23.7 per cent in 2009 (Image 6.1). 
 
Nationality 1959 1970 1979 1989 1999 2009 
Kazakh 30.0 32.6 36.0 40.1* 53.4 63.1 
Russian 42.7 42.4 40.8 37.4* 29.9 23.7 
Ukrainian 8.2 7.2 6.1 5.4 3.7 2.1 
Belorussian 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.1 0.8 - 
German 7.1 6.6 6.1 5.8 2.4 1.1 
Tatar 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.3 
Uzbek 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.9 
Uighur 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.4 
Korean 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 - 
Other - - - - - 4.5 
 
Image 6.1: A table showing the percentages of different ethnicities that make up the 
population of Kazakhstan. This table is an updated version of Davé (2004) which now 
includes the 2009 census data taken from the government of Kazakhstan’s statistics 
agency website (stat.gov.kz, accessed 10 October 2019; Davé, 2004, p. 442). 
 
Following independence, Kazakhs were a minority population. The state therefore had 
to make a concerted effort to reinforce the position of ethnic Kazakhs and legitimise the 
government’s authority over non-titular minorities. There are two important aspects of 
this effort: first, how it was carried out, and second, the continuing consequences of the 
government’s actions. 
 
One of the government’s tactics was an ongoing public campaign to promote Kazakh 
interests. Davenel argues that the ‘promotion of Kazakh heritage has been used to assert 
the titular nationality’s legitimacy (that is, Kazakh nationality) and hegemony over the 
territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ (Davenel, 2012, p. 17). In this campaign, the 
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promotion of Kazakh heritage included various elements. The Kazakh language has 
played an increasing role, for example in state bureaucracy: administrative documents, 
such as those used for the registration of visas, are now only available in Kazakh. 
Kazakh celebrations were also incorporated into the national calendar; the Kazakh 
spring festival of Nauryz is now included alongside holidays that were implemented 
during the Soviet period. The campaign also featured government acceptance of Islamic 
practice under the auspices of a secular state.  
 
Kazakh government policies since independence have had far-reaching consequences. 
Following independence, there was significant demographic change due to the 
migration of some non-titular minorities. Oka describes how government policies led to 
different levels of international migration within different ethnic communities: ‘[I]n 
contrast to the Russians, whose number decreased by a quarter in the ten years after the 
last Soviet census in 1989, there has been no large-scale out-migration among the 
Uighurs and Koreans’ (Oka, 2006, p. 361). Many ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan 
were able to move to Russia, but emigration was not as simple for Uighurs, as they 
faced potential persecution in China. Many among the Korean population did not speak 
Korean; their ancestors having moved two generations before, they no longer had places 
with established connections where they could return. An exception to this language 
issue was the now Russophone Volga-German population living in Kazakhstan: many 
took the opportunity to move to Germany, where a greater degree of financial certainty 
outweighed the challenges of not speaking German. These out-migrations are important 
because they changed the demographic makeup of urban Almaty. 
 
Almaty’s demographic makeup was also significantly impacted by a second type of 
migration: rural to urban movement within Kazakhstan. As Catherine Alexander 
discusses, Almaty’s akim (mayor) ‘Zamanbek Nurkadilov […] called for young 
Kazakhs to come and make a home in their homeland’s capital’ (Alexander, 2018a, p. 
8). This request was intended to boost Kazakh representation in the mainly Russophone 
urban capital, shifting the balance in the favour of ethnic Kazakhs, which Alexander 
argues was the basis of a new, independence-era social contract (ibid.). A third type of 
migration has also changed the urban population. The national government issued a call 
to oralmen, ethnic Kazakhs living abroad, to return to the ‘homeland’ (Alexander, 
2018b). Returning oralmen often over-fulfilled the state’s markers of Kazakh identity, 
speaking fluent Kazakh and still practising traditions which had been suppressed in 
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Soviet Kazakhstan. This led to the curious situation of returning Kazakhs often being 
‘more Kazakh’ than their counterparts who had not left Kazakhstan (ibid.).  
 
The state sought a careful balance, seeking to promote Kazakh interests without 
alienating non-titular minorities and leading to ethnic conflict. As Davenel argues, ‘[I]n 
official texts, the Republic of Kazakhstan is defined as a multinational state, and has 
made inter-ethnic and inter-confessional tolerance an important part of its image 
presented to the international community’ (Davenel, 2012, p. 18). Therefore, this 
‘double process’ involves both ‘nationalization in favour of the members of the titular 
nation […] and the promotion of a civic Kazakhstani identity’ (ibid., p. 19). One 
important consequence of this double process is that it has led to Kazakh, Korean, and 
Uighur nationalities adopting different strategies, as each has a unique history and 
situation which impact their role in modern Kazakhstan. Throughout the rest of the 
chapter, I will consider the impact of these recent historical policies on the lives of my 
young urban middle-class informants. 
 
 
Being Kazakh 
 
Here, I focus on three young urban middle-class informants who are also Kazakh. These 
three informants were all in their early 20s during my fieldwork. They did not know 
each other, although two of them studied at the same university. Their separate accounts 
provide subtly different angles on the same issues, and I bring these together in 
discussion with existing literature to argue that over the last 10 years an incompatibility 
has emerged between a reimagined ‘traditional’ Kazakh identity and the values and way 
of life of the young urban middle class. 
 
Saltanat considered being Kazakh an important part of her identity. Her family story 
locates Kazakh traditions and identity in the context of the societal transformations and 
challenges of living in Almaty over the last 25 years. Saltanat was a 22-year-old student 
studying marketing at the private university when we met; she now works for Air 
Astana, the Kazakh national airline, in a marketing role. I was introduced to her by my 
research assistant Anna. Saltanat spoke excellent Kazakh and agreed to teach me in 
private language lessons. During these lessons, I studied the Kazakh language and we 
discussed Kazakh poetry traditions and Kazakh culture in general. Saltanat was happy 
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for me to include these communications and discussions as part of my research. I also 
worked with her to produce a detailed kinship diagram. This process prompted her to 
recount many details of her family story, and it was during this discussion that she made 
many of the comments included here. 
 
Saltanat’s family members come from different cities across Kazakhstan. ‘My mother is 
from Kyzylorda and my father is from Aktobe’, she told me. ‘My parents met studying 
at KazGU [a state university]. My father is a lawyer now’. I mention these details 
because this is another account of a young middle-class informant’s family who came to 
Almaty to study. In this instance, Saltanat’s whole family came to Almaty—not just 
those studying, but her grandparents, too. Saltanat commented on the difficulties her 
family faced in the 1990s.  
Saltanat: My parents said that the ’90s were [a] hard time. When my dad’s 
brother moved to Almaty, he had only been here a few days when he was 
stabbed in the street and died. At this time they had money but couldn’t spend it. 
Mum’s dad was a policeman and was well respected in the raion [city district]. 
When my grandmother went to the shop, she would get things because they 
would hide produce and sell it to those who were more influential. Even then, it 
was difficult to get everything, and my father says that they used to hunt pigeons 
and then eat them. 
Although Saltanat’s family faced clear hardships in the 1990s and kin were an important 
source of support, there are no aspects of this account which are specific to ethnic 
Kazakhs; similar hardships were faced by most of society during this period. However, 
there are specific distinctions in how Kazakhs record and recognise kin and organise 
social relations, networks which were drawn upon for support in these difficult times2. 
The traditional Kazakh practice of shezire—knowing seven generations of one’s 
family—is not always practised by the younger generation. Saltanat explained to me her 
understanding of how Kazakhs recognise kinship relations and how these impact 
everyday life. 
 
2 There are three Kazakh zhuz (tribes or hordes): upper, middle, and lower, which are also 
known as elder, middle, or junior or uly, orta, and kishi. These zhuz are then subdivided into ru, 
which are patrilineal clan associations. Tracing seven generations of ancestors within a 
patrilineal clan is a cultural tradition known as shezire. 
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Saltanat: Ru [clan] is important when you first meet someone that you might 
consider dating—you ask them about their seven generations. My zhuz1 [tribe or 
horde] is Kishli and my ru is Alim. I know this through my great-grandfather’s 
name. My father knows to the 11th generation, and he has written this in a book 
at home. Normally the parents would also ask a boyfriend’s family about their 
ru. The reason that you shouldn’t mix blood from the same ru is that it leads to 
disfigurement in the children. For example, an Arab friend of mine who is 
closely descended from his own family has three front teeth. 
The topic of Kazakh kinship and identity has been discussed in the literature; Yessenova 
(2005) argues that Kazakhs turn to ideas of their roots through the tradition of shezire, 
in which individuals recite seven generations of their ancestors that they have learnt by 
rote, in order to help them explain the routes that were taken—often from the 
countryside to the city—and that have led to their current circumstances. Yessenova 
argues that in doing this, Kazakhs are able to make sense of their apparent distance from 
‘traditional’ rural Kazakh life in post-socialist urban environments like Almaty. This 
statement can apply to Saltanat, who explained shezire to me as an important marker of 
her identity as an urban Kazakh living in Almaty. 
 
Tradition and cultural heritage have been shown to play an influential role in asserting 
identities in Central Asian contexts. Aksana Ismailbekova (2017, p. 8) discusses the 
intricacies of this discussion—for example, the use of problematic terms in public 
contexts such as ‘clan politics’. Often used to describe the association between cultural 
traditions and social networks of allegiance in Central Asian politics, this term can lead 
to criticism of the impact of culture on democratic systems. Ismailbekova argues that 
‘political scientists, NGO workers and journalists’ have adapted terms such as ‘clan 
politics’, ‘clan networks and tribalism’ to indicate political failure (ibid.). Her argument 
is based on anthropologists’ criticism that the term has no empirical basis as a measure 
of people based on hereditary relatedness and is based on individuals’ ‘genealogical 
narratives’ (ibid., p. 9). Ismailbekova argues for ‘alternative ways to think about kinship 
and patronage through social poetics, manipulative strategy and strategies of 
identification’ (ibid.). Again, as we have seen in other examples throughout this thesis, 
we find that the stories people tell, and the way in which they are told, are important 
tools in the formation of identity and the negotiation of a social in-between as the 
individual marks out their place in society. 
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Ismailbekova’s (2017) ethnographic research in Kyrgyzstan, in a town only a few hours’ 
drive from Almaty, illustrates her point through an exploration of how individuals have 
drawn upon traditional Kyrgyz practices of tracing kinship to legitimise their social and 
political roles in society. As an example of the influential role of patronage in Kyrgyz 
society, Ismailbekova describes how, through making and emphasising a potentially 
fictive kinship claim and an association with a prestigious lineage, a local businessman 
assumed a representative role within a local community. He went on to enjoy a 
successful political and business career, established on the basis of his role in the 
community being legitimised through his kinship. This is just one example of the ways 
that cultural heritage, based upon ideas of traditional practices, act upon present 
situations. 
 
In Kazakhstan, aspects of cultural heritage, tradition, and the importance of a nomadic 
pastoralist past for ethnic Kazakhs are important elements of public narratives related to 
identity. These narrative elements are reaffirmed in the present through government 
nation-building policies. I argue that in the present, my informants’ concern for these 
topics is related to the way in which state policies promote ethnic Kazakh tradition as a 
way to legitimise current government actions and policies. There are parallels with 
Ismailbekova’s example, but in the case of Kazakhstan, the influence of these factors 
can be seen most clearly in the role of former president Nursultan Nazarbayev and the 
ruling Nur Otan political party. Nazarbayev, now installed in his position as de facto 
father of the nation, is the prime example of the blurred line between political 
democratic representation and the evocation of cultural tradition in support of 
legitimacy. In addition to winning successive presidential elections, Nazarbayev also 
purports to be ak suyek or ‘white bone’, a historical ruling hereditary lineage outside of 
the three main zhuz which my informants refer to. This interweaving of democratic 
principles and ideas of traditional symbolism and values has become commonplace in 
Kazakh politics. Following Ismailbekova’s argument, cultural heritage and tradition 
should be understood not as a fact of heredity, but as an aspect of the social poetics 
through which social identities are constituted.  
 
To create a national and civic identity after 1991, the government drew upon cultural 
heritage and traditional Kazakh culture as a model. Key symbolism drawn from Kazakh 
nomadic pastoralist traditions has become central to the projected image of modern 
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Kazakh identity. This can be seen in the use of the shanyrak, or central supporting 
lattice of a traditional Kazakh yurt, in the logo of the ruling Nur Otan party, as well as in 
everyday contexts, such as the ironwork of municipal fences in public parks and 
benches on the streets of Almaty. Archaeological finds such as the ‘Golden Man’, a 
well-preserved warrior’s grave with gold armour, have been adopted as ‘Kazakh’ 
history. Further archaeological evidence of people having lived in the area around 
Almaty led to the government announcing slogans such as ‘My native city for 1,000 
years!’ (Moyemu rodnomu gorudu 1,000 let!) in celebration of Nauryz, a Kazakh 
celebration of a Lunar New Year festival originating from ancient Persian culture. Roy 
argues that while the nation-states of Central Asia were born out of the Soviet period, 
they are also formed in opposition to it: ‘1,000 years of history’ is used ‘as a way of 
anchoring the present in a timeless and ahistorical past’(Roy, 2000, p. 161). 
 
While the use of these symbols as a trope of ethnic Kazakh nation-building was 
especially impactful in the 1990s and early 2000s, I found that the perception of 
practices rooted in Kazakh cultural heritage has been changing over time: these 
practices were seen as a sign of backwardness by some of my urban informants. For 
example, Zarina, another of my Kazakh informants living in Almaty, did not have the 
same feelings towards the relevance of shezire in present-day Almaty. Zarina is a close 
friend and another language teacher who was 24 years old when we met. Her mother is 
also a language teacher, and her father is an astronomer. They are a Kazakh family from 
the southern city of Taraz. Zarina came to Almaty to study and stayed on as a language 
teacher, teaching English to local staff at a large city-centre hotel. Her insight on the 
practice of discussing which zhuz someone is from suggests that my young informants 
have a changing approach to traditions of shezire. Speaking to me in English, she told 
me: 
Zarina: These fights between people from different zhuz… it kills me—I mean, 
come on, guys. People think that upper is better than middle, and middle is 
better than lower. When they ask me, I don’t want to answer. People used to ask 
a lot more, even five to 10 years ago. Even taxi drivers would ask you when you 
got into the taxi. Among my friends, we don’t talk about these things. It is talked 
about more in rural areas. They ask to find out if you are [a] relative of theirs.  
Zarina’s comments suggest that the influence of clan for the young urban middle class 
may have changed since 1999, when Yessenova carried out the fieldwork which formed 
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the basis for her 2005 research paper. My fieldwork—which began in 2015, 16 years 
after Yessenova’s—also indicates that the priorities for some young urban Kazakhs, 
particularly the generation of the young urban middle class that I focus on, may have 
shifted since then. 
 
There are a number of potential reasons why this change could have occurred. It could 
be that this disassociation with Kazakh tradition is only taking place among the young 
urban middle class, who were only just coming of age in 2005. Another potential 
explanation is that the idea of traditional lineage clashes with one’s modern urban 
identity, as in Zarina’s case; she remarked to me that she ‘feels very Kazakh, but dreams 
of living elsewhere’. Yessenova tackled this second explanation, arguing that ‘rural to 
urban migration is bound up with the movement from the state of “villager” to that of 
“urban resident”, both defined in society as stable social positions’ (Yessenova, 2005, p. 
665). Perhaps this is evidence of a full transformation. Zarina’s account of change could 
be the result of her own personal journey from a small, Kazakh-majority town to the 
multi-ethnic urban centre of Almaty. Her new urban identity is now dominant, and 
discussions of clan are an indicator of a past rooted in a romanticised idea of Kazakh 
ethnic identity. 
 
An account from my informant Nuriya, whom we heard from in the preface, supports 
the argument that the young urban middle class in present-day Almaty face a unique 
challenge that cannot simply be overcome by establishing meaning through ties with 
shezire. Young urban middle-class identity has come to a point where it is increasingly 
difficult to reconcile a dual Kazakh and urban identity; this is being replaced by a 
distinct middle-class identity. 
 
In the later stages of my fieldwork, Nuriya was doing public relations work for a coffee 
company. While discussing religion, another important factor in the state’s ethnic 
Kazakh nation-building, she said, ‘There are two different types of Muslim. The first 
type attend mosque and abstain from alcohol. The second type is just being Kazakh. To 
say that you are not Muslim is to say that you are not Kazakh’. These ideal types 
demonstrate the strong link Nuriya saw between Islam and Kazakh identity. However, 
this caused an existential problem for Nuriya when she tried to reconcile this 
expectation with her present-day middle-class life. She told me, ‘I have been brought up 
to be like all of my family, but I am not a practising Muslim. I don’t feel that I am 
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Kazakh—I was born Kazakh, but now I belong elsewhere’. The similarities between 
Zarina and Nuriya’s comments are striking. The two do not know each other and all that 
they share, both being young, urban, middle class, and Kazakh. This similarity in their 
accounts—Zarina’s ‘dream of living elsewhere’ and Nuriya’s comment that she 
‘belongs elsewhere’—support my argument that there is an incompatibility between the 
cultural values of the younger urban middle class, which promote an internationally 
oriented modern identity, and the traditional ethnic Kazakh revivalism, which the state 
has used to reframe Kazakh identity in the context of a multi-ethnic state.  
 
Nuriya gave further evidence that the young urban middle-class feeling of not belonging 
is a recent phenomenon that marks an ongoing change underway in society. This 
evidence emerged in a discussion Nuriya and I had about the expectations associated 
with Kazakh gender roles, in which she stated, ‘In Kazakh culture, men are expected to 
be chivalrous; they are expected to pay for things. Traditional values are important and 
keeping them is patriotic. Another example is that 10 years ago it was not seen as good 
if the woman was not married at 23 or 24’. Nuriya made the connection between 
following traditional Kazakh values and being patriotic. Her comments on the 
difference between today and 10 years earlier support my argument that the young 
urban middle class are adopting a new and distinct way of life. In Nuriya’s case, she is 
now 28 years old and is not married. This could therefore be a way that she reconciles 
her current situation with the cultural exceptions placed upon her, justifying her 
unmarried status. It could also be an indicator of the incompatibility between her 
situation (and that of the young urban middle class in general) and the state’s outdated 
model of ethnic Kazakh nationhood. 
 
Saltanat is the only informant out of these three women who had up until now been 
sympathetic to the state-produced image of Kazakh ethnicity. However, on one occasion 
she described to me what she thought constituted the image of the ‘good Muslim’, 
something that I have already shown to be linked to Kazakh identity:  
Saltanat: To call yourself a Muslim, you should do prayers. My mother and 
brother do. I should be wearing hijab, I shouldn’t drink and go to clubs […] If I 
start wearing a hijab, I should also change the people I hang out with. 
Saltanat’s comments show that she is aware of the societal expectations of being a good 
Muslim and being Kazakh. However, this is not what she practises; such a practice is 
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incompatible with her current way of life and that of her other young urban middle-class 
friends. 
 
 
Being Uighur 
Alma: I am first of all a citizen of the world, then Kazakhstani, then Turkic, and 
then Uighur. 
The second part of this chapter focuses on the influence of Uighur ethnicity for my 
informants. My main insight into the Uighur community came from my research 
assistant Alma, a young urban middle-class informant who was Uighur; Alma opened 
doors to her local Uighur community for me. There is also additional information from 
three Uighur bek (elders) and other young informants. As the opening quote suggests, 
Uighur ethnicity is just one aspect of Alma’s identity, but as a member of the young 
urban middle class, it is ranked below much broader societal groupings. In this section, I 
seek to find out the reasons behind this, as well as its consequences in everyday life for 
the experience and narration of uncertainty. 
 
In comparison to Kazakhs, who live throughout the city, the Uighur population is 
concentrated within particular districts of Almaty. As a result, there are specific 
challenges that Uighurs face, and there is a strong geographical focus to the community 
assistance and support that is offered within the community. For this reason, my 
discussion focuses on one such Uighur neighbourhood, located in my first transect 
location discussed in Chapter 3. I do not name the neighbourhood here, as some of the 
rumours that I recount are critical of the local government; I want to reduce the 
possibility that the particular streets and communities I am discussing could be 
identified. Despite the fact that their ethnicity has led to many of the challenges and 
risks which my young urban middle-class Uighur informants face, traditional Uighur 
practices which offer community support and assistance are becoming less important for 
young urban middle-class Uighurs. 
 
Alma was in her early 20s when we first met. She was head of the AISEC international 
student group and was studying business management at a private university. Alma also 
introduced the Uighur population in Almaty to me: 
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Alma: We are mostly living in one area of town, and also there are some living 
in Dostyk mikro-raion [micro-neighbourhood]. My relatives are from China and 
moved to Almaty in the 1960s. Some of them are known as Zarya Vostok, which 
translates as ‘Eastern Dawn’. Most of the areas in which Uighur live are older 
and lower-height houses. This area [we are in now] is kind of old and could be 
described as a ghetto, although our house is modern. Most of the people own the 
land that their house is built on because when they moved there in the 1960s, it 
was a kind of abandoned area. In the 1960s the area was not in Almaty; it was 
outside of the city. The people who have lived here for a long time refuse to 
move out! 
Alma gave me a walking tour of the neighbourhood, telling me about different areas as 
we went. Along the main road on the edge of the district were two large concrete 
buildings. One was a school where teaching was in Russian, and the other was a school 
with classes taught in the Uighur language. Both Alma and her father had gone to the 
Russian-language school, although she spoke Uighur at home with her grandmother 
who lived with the family and didn’t speak Russian. Oka has suggested that ‘linguistic 
Russification’ of the Uighur population has taken place, although she argues that the 
extent of this is ‘limited compared to many other ethnic groups in Kazakhstan’, an 
observation supported by my own experiences during fieldwork (Oka, 2006, pp. 370–
371). The ability to study in the Uighur language reinforces a sense of linguistic identity 
which extends to other areas of the community. Alma took me to visit a mosque, one of 
two in the district: one offered prayers in the Uighur language and the other in the 
Kazakh language. Although we tried on a number of occasions to arrange interviews 
with the imam at the Uighur mosque, each time we returned the meeting was 
rearranged, the interlocutor was not available, and I was treated with some suspicion as 
a researcher. This could be linked to wider uncertainty in the Uighur community, 
because over the last 15 years there has been growing tension between the Uighur 
community and the general public. Oka argues that ‘in recent years, the Uighurs in 
Kazakhstan (and Central Asia as a whole) have been increasingly labelled as 
“extremists” or “terrorists” who are plotting armed struggles with an aim to build a 
Uighur state or an Islamic caliphate’ (Oka, 2006, p. 369). This has led to the persecution 
of Uighurs, a topic I will return to later in this section.  
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Religion also appeared to be a less important part of cultural identity for the young 
urban middle class. Alma gave an example of generational differences in her family, 
explaining, ‘My grandma is really religious. My parents are 50/50 religious and I am 
agnostic’. While religious practice was restricted during the Soviet period, it may be 
expected that this reduced the level of religious observance in society. However, for 
many people, religious practice did not cease, but was simply brought into offstage 
contexts such as within the home, avoiding public scrutiny (Dragadze, 1993). If Alma’s 
situation is indicative of others who are also young, urban, and middle class, perhaps 
religious practice is in fact less widespread today than it has been in the past. 
 
On our walking tour, Alma showed me a large construction site on the edge of the 
neighbourhood. The construction of a new metro station was extending the single metro 
line in the city, offering a direct connection to the city centre. However, this new 
connection also came with uncertainty; even these potential benefits for the community 
were treated with suspicion. Alma remarked, ‘There have been many rumours and a lot 
of gossip that the neighbourhood and these houses will be demolished by the 
government—that they will be razed to the ground’. Many people have been living in 
this neighbourhood since the 1960s. Although it is geographically located inside the 
city, encircled by a busy urban ring road, the area is disconnected from many urban 
flows. We were just one street back from the main road, a well-paved two-lane highway, 
but the streets here are unpaved and open sewers and drainage ditches run alongside the 
potholed track. That evening, as Alma gave me a lift back to the Khrushchevka where I 
was staying, I commented that it was very dark and there were no streetlights. Alma 
replied, ‘There were lights, but for some reason the government came and took them 
away’. The community’s literal disconnection from the networks of the city—in terms 
of both transport and utilities—suggests that it is isolated by the local government; at 
the very least, it is treated differently to other nearby districts. In the context of the 
government’s abandonment and isolation of the district, the construction of a new metro 
station, which could benefit the community, was being overshadowed by the uncertainty 
of what that could mean for the Uighur community, who have dealt with a history of 
being deliberately left out of potentially beneficial change. 
 
These local uncertainties come in the wider context of the persecution of Uighurs—in 
particular, those living in Xinjiang Province in China, where Alma’s family are from. 
Discussion of this persecution in the literature suggests that the Kazakh government’s 
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interests in regional stability may be a priority over supporting the Uighur community; 
this could explain the Kazakh state’s apathy towards the Uighur population living 
within its borders. 
 
Oka writes that ‘in Xinjiang, Beijing not only cracks down on national independence 
movements, but polices any “suspicious” activity of the Uighurs’ (Oka, 2006, p. 369). 
Due to Beijing’s stance, ‘the Uighurs in Kazakhstan not only lack a kin-state, but also 
increasingly are alienated by the state ruling their external homeland and their home 
state that wishes to maintain friendly relations with it’ (ibid.). Oka wrote this over 10 
years ago, but her arguments are still relevant today. In fact, the situation has only 
deteriorated since then. Since 2017, after the end of my fieldwork, it has emerged that 
between 800,000 and 2 million Uighur and other Turkic Muslims have been interned in 
political re-education camps in China. This situation marks a dramatic escalation of 
violent persecution against ethnic Uighurs (Smith Finley, 2019, p. 2). The Kazakh 
government, still responding to the desires of Beijing, has also arrested and put on trial 
a Uighur activist, living in Kazakhstan, who has advocated for the rights of those held in 
the camps in Xinjiang Province; as of August 2019, his trial was currently underway in 
Almaty. These current issues are some of the risks and uncertainties faced by Alma and 
other members of the young urban middle class who are also Uighur, particularly those 
living in this neighbourhood today. 
 
The Uighur population have dealt with many significant changes over the last hundred 
years, and I discussed these changes with both Alma and her father. Our conversation 
helps to illustrate how the older generation have made sense of and narrated these 
changes, as well as how Alma, as a member of the young urban middle class, can see 
the same events from a different angle. Our discussion then moved on to discuss 
traditional Uighur practices of community assistance, which have offered a source of 
support in the past, and touched on how the younger generation are no longer interested 
in these traditional practices. 
Alim: I was born in China in a place called Chungu Chag. My parents were also 
born in China. In 1961 the whole family moved to Kazakhstan. I joined the 
Soviet army, where I worked as a mechanic and electrician. I then spent two 
years in Moscow, where I was trained, and then came back to Almaty. I’ve since 
spent my whole life in the district we are sitting in now. 
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Alim delivered a stable narrative of his life. He provided this sense of stability by 
avoiding discussing the reasons why his entire family had left China in 1961. He then 
described living in the district as a single experience, which he phrased as a ‘whole life’. 
At this point Alma interjected, saying, ‘Even during my lifetime we have moved more 
than seven times, although it has been around the same place’. The same story was 
narrated in different ways. Alim, having lived through significant hardships, presented a 
clear and stable narrative, but this struck Alma as unrepresentative of her life.  
 
The literature offers a number of potential explanations for this disparity. Ibañez-Tirado, 
for instance, explores what happens when challenges are frequently faced in everyday 
life. Facing a constant barrage of change, her informants ‘do not simply cope with 
misfortune but deal with the normalcy of non-development and everyday disasters in 
creative, lively and morally informed ways’ (Ibañez-Tirado, 2015, p. 4). Two aspects of 
this argument need unpacking to make sense of what is being said: ‘the normalcy of 
non-development’ and ‘everyday disasters’. Ibañez-Tirado uses these phrases to refer to 
the state of constant threat that residents of Kulob in Tajikistan face on a daily basis 
(ibid.). Rather than seeing these threats as ruptures or significant individual events, they 
are folded into everyday life as part of what is to be expected. If we apply this analysis 
to Alim and Alma’s discussion, it suggests that Alma sees occurrences such as moving 
house as significant events, but for Alim these changes are just an expected part of 
everyday life. Having lived through dramatic and significant change throughout his 
lifetime, Alim chooses to emphasise a stable narrative; however, the same is not 
possible for Alma, who sees these changes as events which expose her own 
vulnerability to the risk of further change and uncertainty in the future. 
 
As I have shown, simply being Uighur, living in Uighur neighbourhoods, or speaking 
out against the persecution of Uighurs is an additional source of risk and uncertainty for 
my urban middle-class Uighur informants. However, a Uighur community tradition 
called meshrep offers mutual assistance within the neighbourhood. Although this 
established practice of mutual assistance could be of potential benefit to my young 
informants, my research suggests that young people are neglecting these traditions, 
potentially making them more vulnerable to a range of threats. My explanation for this 
phenomenon of neglect is that living a young urban middle-class life in Almaty does not 
align with following traditional Uighur community practices.  
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This is Alim’s explanation of the traditional practice of meshrep, a regular gathering 
within the Uighur community: 
Alim: Meshrep is a Uighur gathering that happens at least once a month. I 
haven’t been to one in about six months because I have been busy. There is a 
leader there and you must be invited to go. They talk about problems and sort 
them out at the meetings. It is not just about problems, though, but also about 
music, singing, and dancing. Now it’s just a cultural thing. You can only go after 
you finish school, when you’re an adult. Each Uighur district in the city has one, 
so there are around five in Almaty. Others will come to this meshrep from other 
cities too. These groups are becoming less important now, as the younger 
generation are not interested in tradition. 
These community gatherings are regular events. By bringing together adults in the 
community, these meetings are also community bonding sessions. In describing a 
meshrep in Almaty in 1997, Roberts gives an account of how young Uighur men are 
bringing an all-male, ‘“traditional”, more comprehensive and overtly Islamic form’ of 
meeting back into existence after years of its being neglected which functioned to build 
male peer groups in the local community (Roberts, 1998, p. 675). While my informants 
also mentioned peer bonding, they described meshrep as a much more informal and 
relaxed social occasion for the whole community. Roberts also describes how meshrep 
during the Soviet era were more informal gatherings of both men and women, which 
has more similarities with the form of meeting described by my informants (ibid., p. 
694). Burhandin Tazhidinov, bek (head) of the Uighur cultural centre in the Auezov 
district of Almaty, was responsible for organising a citywide meshrep in 2009. He 
described the ways in which he understood the practice to have changed over time, 
telling me that ‘in order to gather for meshreps, our ancestors would travel long 
distances on horses, and now people travel easily by cars, trains, etc. Meshreps used to 
be held in gardens or by rivers, lakes, whereas these days we have them in cafes or 
restaurants’. Burhandin links the current meshrep to a historical practice while 
emphasising the way that the practice has adapted to modern urban contexts. However, 
from my conversations with my young urban informants, it appeared that there were 
other ways in which, over time, the role and relevance of meshrep were changing. 
 
Although Alma is now an adult who lives in the neighbourhood, she does not attend 
meshrep meetings. When Alim said, ‘The younger generation are not interested’, Alma 
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responded, ‘I do know about this, but it is really not important for me’. Interested in the 
role of meshrep, particularly for the younger generation, I spoke to Bari, who studied 
marketing at a private university. As Roberts discussed how meshrep could be a 
predominantly male gathering, it was important for me to gather a range of perspectives 
from both men and women.  
 
Bari lived outside this district and has a Uighur father and a Kazakh mother. I asked him 
about his thoughts on the relevance of Uighur cultural practices such as meshrep for 
young people of his generation who have attended university, and he replied that there 
was ‘no relevance, I think’. He added, ‘Even though I am Uighur, I know nothing about 
my culture—I don’t even know what meshrep is. I don’t think that it is important for 
my life. My values are shaped by my experience, rather than the ethnicity that I happen 
to be’. The comments made by Alma and Bari, both young middle-class informants, 
were at odds with those of other informants that I spoke with, including Uighur 
community elders. For example, Raziyev Alymzhan, bek of the meshrep in Dostyk 
district in Almaty, explained that ‘almost any boy knows about meshrep from 
childhood. There’s even a saying which states, “If you want to raise a decent man, bring 
him to meshrep.”’ 
 
To understand the disparity in opinions, we must consider the way in which Uighur 
cultural practices are passed on, either between generations or within geographical 
communities. Raziyev Alymzhan emphasised the importance of generational knowledge 
exchange: ‘[Meshrep] plays an important role in preserving the culture and traditions of 
our ethnicity which are passed from one generation to another. The role of meshrep in 
Uighur society is irreplaceable and preserved in its original form’. As a community 
representative, Raziyev was keen to emphasise the importance of this practice to me as 
an anthropologist and outsider. Bari, on the other hand, explained that this practice 
didn’t apply to him. Although his father spoke Uighur, he didn’t learn the practice of 
meshrep from his father, as he ‘wasn’t really practising any cultural stuff’. Instead, Bari 
explained that as he saw it, the reason for a disparity between opinions on the role of 
cultural practices such as meshrep was a consequence of growing up ‘living in a 
multicultural neighbourhood’. The question then presents itself: What are the younger 
generation missing out on by not participating in Uighur traditions such as meshrep? 
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Barat Mishrat, a Uighur man in his mid-50s who worked as a chairman in a local akimat 
(district mayor’s office), said, ‘Young people need meshrep in order to learn the history, 
culture, and traditions of their people. It unites young people and offers new methods of 
social and charity work, as well as the opportunity to take part in big cultural and sports 
events in a district or city’.  
 
In a discussion of the components of meshrep, Alim gave an insight into the ways in 
which meshrep might help my informants living with uncertainty through social, moral 
and practical support and assistance. Alim explained, ‘There are three sections to 
meshrep: sharing news, solving problems, and socialising. An example of when 
meshrep had been useful was the opening of the stadium [a sports venue in the district]’. 
Alim added, ‘If someone were living in bad conditions, then they could collect 
sponsorship to support them. Contributions would only be made by those who were able 
to [help]. For example, there was a house that was damaged by fire. In this instance, it 
was a Russian family that they helped’. I enquired about the requirements for being 
included in the help offered by the meshrep. At first, Alim said that ‘it was living within 
the boundary of the main road’; then he said, ‘If you live close by, you might still be 
helped’. This suggests that the provision of assistance may not be bound to a specific 
ethnic group, but instead to one’s district or close social relations, an assertion which 
supports Bari’s comments that his reason for knowing less about Uighur cultural 
practices was a result of the neighbourhood he was brought up in.  
 
There are a few threads to explore from Alim’s comments. Firstly, news is shared at 
these events. If the young urban middle class do not trust the public state-controlled 
news, as was suggested in the previous chapter, why are they not using meshrep as a 
source of reliable face-to-face information from within the community? By not 
attending the group, the young urban middle class in Almaty are missing out on an 
opportunity to be supported by their community. Their lack of interest in attending 
meshrep suggests that they have different priorities; the places where I often met them 
and where they hung out, such as coffee shops, the shopping mall, and local cafes, were 
more suited to their public performance of a particular way of life—traditional 
community gatherings such as meshrep were not included in this. 
 
It is worth mentioning the apparent changes that have taken place over the last 30 years 
regarding the support meshrep offers the community. Roberts (1998) notes that in the 
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past, meshrep had ‘served as a grassroots movement to tackle social problems that the 
Uighurs of the area felt the state was not properly addressing’, which turned out to be an 
important factor in the revival of the ritual of meshrep within the Uighur community in 
Xinjiang. Roberts (1998, p. 685) mentions an example in which meshrep offered a safe 
space of support for young Uighurs with heroin addictions—an argument supported by 
my informant Burhandin, who commented on how ‘during meshrep people study and 
discuss [the] behaviour of its members, for example if someone drinks, takes drugs, or 
does bad things’, and referred to the information exchanged there as a ‘school of life’. 
Barat’s comments further support this argument: ‘Meshrep teaches participants to be 
disciplined, patriotic, and open to express oneself or self-reflect on one’s behaviour and 
be critical about it’. This relevance for Uighur youth, as reported by community elders, 
seems to have diminished over time. Roberts details how at the time of his fieldwork in 
1997 the ‘less ritualized versions’ of meshrep offered direct material support in the form 
of a ‘rotating credit system, functioning as a more material strategy for adapting to 
economic and social changes’ (ibid., pp. 694–695). Meshrep now appears to have a 
wider role, located not just within the Uighur community but also geographically; 
according to Alim’s comments, for instance, its assistance extends to a Russian family 
affected by a fire. In addition to these changes, the practice is no longer all-male and 
overtly religious, but has a diminishing influence on a younger middle-class generation. 
 
If we return to Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical theory to explore onstage and offstage 
aspects of life in Almaty, we can see a strong division in the Uighur community. When 
onstage, in the public eye, members of the Uighur community must be careful how they 
tread. The state is constantly watchful and policing their ‘performance’. As a necessary 
aspect of the state’s own performance of a harmonious multi-ethnic nation, the role the 
Uighur community must play is one that does not challenge the status quo. Their shared 
Turkic roots mean that there are many similarities with the ethnic Kazakh population, as 
well as with other Turkic-language-speaking groups. These similarities mean that 
potential discord, such as the persecution of another Turkic group, has the danger of 
targeting shared values such as religion, language, or other traditions. This particular 
threat has been rising to the surface, as recent reports suggest that ethnic Kazakhs are 
now also being detained in Chinese government ‘re-education’ camps along with 
Uighurs; this issue is addressed in detail in a 2019 special issue of Central Asian Survey 
with an introduction by Smith Finley, p. 6). There is potential for the narratives of 
Islamic extremism, cited by the Chinese government in support of their severe policies, 
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to also influence the perception of ethnic Kazakhs in China and abroad. This would then 
challenge the Kazakh government’s own narrative of being a stable state, successful in 
promoting regional stability in a context of political uncertainty. 
 
In offstage aspects of Uighur life in Almaty, Uighurs are able to reflect on the difficult 
position and relative vulnerability of their ethnic group in comparison to ethnic 
Kazakhs. Meshrep gives an offstage forum away from the scrutiny of Kazakhstani 
public life. In this forum, community assistance can build both actual resilience and a 
feeling of reassurance that there is community support available if and when needed. 
Although it appears the young urban middle class rejects this type of support and turns 
to close family and friends in the face of societal uncertainty, my younger Uighur 
informants are not taking part in this tradition. Perhaps this is because it clashes with the 
Westernised, consumerist lifestyle of the young urban middle class.  
 
Ultimately, being Uighur and a member of the young urban middle class has its own 
risks and opportunities. However, as was the case with ethnic Kazakhs, these two 
aspects of an individual’s identity come into conflict. As Alma said when I asked about 
the role of ethnicity for her and her friends, ‘Young people do not like to talk about it; 
they try not to talk about background and ethnic groups between young people’. As a 
young urban middle-class Almatinean, it was most important for her to first of all be a 
‘citizen of the world’ and least of all to participate in public life in the context of a 
Uighur identity. 
 
 
Being Korean 
 
Ethnic Koreans have a distinct place in Kazakh society, which can be traced back to the 
way in which they first came to Kazakhstan. Oka explains that ‘Koreans differ from the 
Russians and the Uighurs in that they had been forcibly taken to Kazakhstan and never 
claimed a native status’ (Oka, 2006, p. 376). In the late 1930s, Koreans, ‘mainly from 
the northern part of the Korean peninsula who had settled in the Russian Far East since 
the second half of the 19th century’, were deported to Central Asia to stop them joining 
the enemy in the Soviet–Japanese border conflicts (Oka, 2006, p. 373; Chang, 2016). A 
consequence of this deportation was an influx of ethnic Koreans: ‘whereas the 1926 
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census recorded only 42 Koreans in Kazakhstan, by 1939 this number had exploded to 
96,453’ (Yem & Epstein, 2015, p. 136). 
 
My initial insight into the Korean population of Almaty was through my first research 
assistant, Boris, a colleague of my American hosts in my first transect location. Boris 
worked for a Kazakh national NGO that received USAID funding. He worked in an IT 
role, but he was often called upon to help with translation because he spoke a high level 
of English. He grew up in Almaty and was 32, a few years older than me, when we first 
met. He therefore bridges the gap in my distinction between the ‘Soviet generation’ and 
the young urban middle class. This is interesting in itself because his memories of the 
late 1980s and his teenage years in the 1990s show a detailed awareness of the 
uncertainty of everyday life at the time. Boris was an interesting personality; he could 
often be found in the pub or pool hall, and he often gave a critical perspective of 
modern life in Almaty while chain-smoking cigarettes. 
 
Boris and I met at a pub to have a meal together and speak in detail about the Korean 
population. It was his choice to meet at a local Irish-themed pub rather than one of the 
many Korean restaurants that dotted the city. After settling down to his first beer, Boris 
gave me his description of the Korean community, starting from the early 1990s: 
Boris: At this time there was a few Koreans who were powerful in the 
community. Many of these were connected to the criminal spheres in the ’90s. 
’91, ’92, and ’93 were the most criminal times. The criminals at this time were 
called zanyait [the literal translation is ‘takes’]. You could recognise them by the 
way they dressed—wearing sports shoes and trousers. They would often wear 
leather jackets with these. Most of them were guys with lots of muscle. At first, 
most of the criminals were Russian, but then they started to subdivide by nation. 
In every oblast [county], they were running everything. 
Boris highlighted this as a time of great uncertainty. Nazpary, who carried out research 
in Almaty during the ’90s, describes the phenomenon of diki (wild) capitalism. Nazpary 
argues that in order to survive, everything turned into a commodity that was then up for 
sale. Nazpary describes how people turned to prostitution when they had nothing else, 
selling their bodies as the only commodities they had (Nazpary, 2002). The shift of 
power—from the state to ruthless individuals who prioritised their personal interests 
over the common good—brought uncertainty into each aspect of everyday life. 
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As an example of how these criminals influenced everyday life, Boris told me about a 
cafe established in the 1990s that is still running today. ‘This cafe is named after the guy 
who set it up: “Ginger Alma”’, he said. ‘The cafe is opposite a graveyard. It was said 
that the reason the cafe was put here was because at the time it was a more rural area 
and it would be easier to bury bodies if the cafe was nearby’. In this example, Boris 
cited a rumour (‘It was said that…’), giving form to the illicit dealings that people 
assumed had been happening in this cafe as a result of the known zanyait who ran it. 
Speaking about it in the third person allowed Boris to tell me about these concerns 
without making specific accusations himself. This is particularly important as the cafe is 
still in existence today. This uncertainty still weighs upon the present: as Boris told me, 
‘After 1996 they became official and became businesspeople rather than gangsters’. 
Once again, as seen in other instances, societal risks and uncertainties reach each corner 
of the population. The problems Boris described are not unique to the Korean 
population, but are an example of these wider issues manifesting themselves within a 
specific community. 
 
Boris went on to explain what is unique about the Korean population in Almaty, 
emphasising that Koreans have a close-knit community. This discussion sets the scene 
for an event I will discuss shortly: a rupture that occurred in everyday life when one of 
my young, urban, middle-class, and Korean informants stepped outside the boundaries 
of the Korean community. Boris discussed the unique parts of the Korean community 
and how, in the late 1990s, a number of Korean community buildings were built that are 
still influential today: 
Boris: There is a ‘Korean building’ near Gorky Park. It was built by Koreans 
and it’s mostly Koreans who live there. They also built the Korean cultural 
centre around this time, too. From the age of 14 to 16, I attended the youth 
centre at this place. They have other meetings, such as interest groups including 
Korean drumming and dancing for the girls. There are also the South Korean 
churches and missionary churches—these are the second main aspect of the 
Korean community in Almaty. We are closely linked—in fact, maybe 80 per cent 
of my friends are Korean. 
Boris’s comments suggest a physical focus for the Korean community in the form of the 
Korean cultural centre and ‘Korean building’. The Korean community are well funded 
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and organised as a result of monetary and social support from the South Korean 
government. However, it should be pointed out that some distance remains between the 
Koreans living in Central Asia and those in South Korea, as many members of the 
Korean community in Central Asia do not speak Korean. This is a result of their having 
been educated in Russian at Soviet schools. Yem and Epstein argue that by 1956, for 
Koreans living in Central Asia ‘many elements of culture brought from Korea, such as 
calendar holidays, [had] largely disappeared; traditions were preserved most stably in 
food culture and family relations’ (Yem & Epstein, 2015, p. 139). 
 
Perhaps Boris’s high proportion of ethnic Korean friends is a consequence of the time 
he spent socialising at the Korean youth centre when he was a teenager. This close-knit 
community has also been formed as a result of Korean marriage practices. Boris 
explained, ‘It is traditional to marry within the Korean community. This kind of running 
joke exists that all Koreans know each other. You can be tyagubya, pureblood Korean, 
or argubya, half-blooded. All my grandparents and great-grandparents were Korean, 
and so I am tyagubya’. From Boris’s comments, we can get a sense of the closeness of 
the Korean community and the cultural practices which help maintain relations within 
the community. As a small minority population, Koreans in Almaty are careful to 
protect their own interests. 
 
In the context of this community background, here I will discuss the life events of my 
friend Sasha. Sasha is the son in the Koryo family I lived with on a smallholding in the 
third transect location (see Chapter 3). He is only slightly older than me; he was born in 
1988, and like Boris, he can be considered to be towards the upper limit of the young 
urban middle-class cohort I focus on. As a result of going to school in Almaty with 
classmates of many different nationalities, he speaks Russian and Kazakh; his parents 
only speak Russian. As a teenager he had a strong interest in video games, computer 
programming, and movies, which complemented his school lessons in English; this 
means he has a high level of English-language skills, too. I met Sasha at a family meal 
with my host family towards the beginning of my stay with them. Each year during the 
hay harvest, Sasha and his friends would spend a few days staying at the farm and 
helping his family out. I was also there that year to lend a hand. The long grass is cut 
with an old Soviet-era machine and turned by hand with pitchforks to dry in the sun. 
The family had two small hay fields, but we also helped out on other villagers’ fields. 
On one long, hot summer afternoon, Sasha and I worked together turning the hay by 
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hand. I practised my Russian and he practised his English as we discussed his life, and 
so the conversation was recorded in a mix of the two languages. Our conversation 
meandered, and we eventually moved on to discuss the time after he finished university. 
He told me about the ‘difficult times’ he had faced since then, and his story caused me 
to change the way that I perceived his parents and their relaxed liberal attitudes to life. 
Sasha: I first met Maryam at a social event in Almaty. We got on well and this 
led to a relationship. We decided to marry, and this turned out to be a difficult 
time. There is a saying that ‘if your parents do not come to your wedding, then 
you have no parents’. That is what happened to me. Maryam is Tatar and so my 
parents wouldn’t support me. I had to pay for the whole wedding myself and this 
was very difficult. My parents did not attend and wouldn’t talk to me after the 
wedding. It was only when my son was born this year that they started talking to 
me again. They didn’t want to miss out on knowing their grandson. 
I had spent over a month living with Sasha’s family before I heard this story. It was hard 
for me to reconcile his parents’ treatment of their son with their warm, jovial hospitality 
or with the impression of a liberal attitude to life that I had gained through my 
conversations with them. Their objection was rooted in Sasha’s choice not to marry a 
Korean woman, and his marriage to a Tatar woman was seen as a betrayal. The young 
urban middle-class lifestyle that Sasha had lived up until this point became 
incompatible with his Korean family’s expectations. He stuck steadfast to his decision, 
but this came at a great personal cost. He continued to live what he saw as his preferred 
path in life, one that fitted with his values and understanding of the world.  
 
Marriage among the Koreans of Central Asia has specific significance. According to 
Yem and Epstein, ‘marriage traditionally was a highly significant moment in the life of 
Koreans: individuals were not considered adults, regardless of age, if they had not 
married’ (Yem & Epstein, 2015, p. 142). In this respect, Sasha’s marriage would be seen 
in a traditional context as a key life stage. This coming of age was therefore not an 
entrance into the Korean community, but into the multi-ethnic culture of the young 
urban middle class. There is limited literature on inter-ethnic Korean marriage in 
Kazakhstan, but one of the few studies focuses on marriage between 1937 and 1965 
(Yem & Epstein, 2015). Even during this time in Almaty, there was a high proportion of 
interethnic marriage between Koreans and those of other ethnicities: 36.7 per cent 
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between 1937 and 1963 (ibid., p. 144). Why, then, did Sasha’s parents disown him for 
not marrying a Korean woman? 
 
It could be that Sasha’s parents highly valued their Korean identity. They proudly 
cooked Korean food on a regular basis and would emphasise the origins of any dish 
(including a dog-meat stew) that had its origins in Korean cuisine. The farm had figures 
of Korean spirit guardians hanging on its gates. Whenever they took me to social events 
with their friends, they were often the only Koreans there. Sasha’s marriage to a Tatar 
woman impacted his parents’ public presentation of their Korean identity. 
Unfortunately, this topic was an elephant in the room that I could not discuss with his 
parents. It is possible to say, however, that this single moment served as a rupture in the 
lives of both Sasha and his parents. Sasha found himself financially and socially 
vulnerable, cut off from his kin, while his parents found that their public identity was 
challenged by their son’s actions. 
 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
In each of the three parts of this chapter, I have presented different aspects of 
‘traditional’ practices within Kazakh, Uighur, and Korean populations in Almaty. In the 
examples I have given, these ‘traditional’ practices are shown to be incompatible with 
the way of life that my young urban middle-class informants choose to follow. While 
many of them identify as Kazakh, Uighur, or Korean, this does not have the same 
meaning to them as it does for their parents’ generation. As a result, my young urban 
middle-class informants face greater uncertainty and potentially greater risks. My young 
informants’ social positioning—in these examples, demonstrated in relation to different 
ethnic identities—affects both their experiences and the way they narrate their feelings 
of uncertainty. One consequence of my young informants’ choice to follow an urban 
middle-class lifestyle is that traditional ways of narrating and dealing with uncertainty 
are being abandoned. This, in turn, leads to greater uncertainty, as my informants are 
missing out on the support of their kinship and ethnic community groups as a 
consequence of publicly following a young urban middle-class lifestyle and narrative,
Chapter 7 
Conclusion  
Rumour, uncertainty, and narrating change 
 
 
When I first met Nuriya, she presented me with an onstage narrative of her life. It began 
with her childhood in the 1990s and brought us up until the present day, highlighting 
what she presented as important life goals such as completing university and getting a 
job in marketing in Almaty. There were similarities between Nuriya and her mother 
Nurbakyt’s narrative accounts of life: each provided a sense of structure, stability, and 
coherence in the face of past change. Nurbakyt spoke about her move to Almaty, the 
difficulties she faced living as a teacher in a small, remote village on the steppe, and the 
challenges of finding work and surviving on rationed basic goods between the difficult 
years of 1992 and 1996. However, Nuriya did not discuss the major challenges she had 
faced in everyday life, which had been a prominent aspect of Nurbakyt’s narrative. Six 
months after we met, my friendship with Nuriya had grown, and following a discussion 
on one of our walks across the city, she told me that her father had died in an industrial 
accident. This disclosure was not part of her public onstage narrative which, up until 
that point, was all she had shared with me. The disclosure marked a sharing of a private 
offstage narrative, which I found to include her concerns, uncertainties, and fears not 
shared in her public narrative of her life. I realised that my other informants’ narrative 
accounts may also have been similarly selective. 
 
The main chapters in this thesis have revealed the existence of onstage narratives, 
exploring how they are enacted through public performance. This thesis has also 
investigated how events can rupture these narratives, revealing that such public façades 
are socially constructed in order to present an appearance of success, security, and 
stability. There are many reasons why my informants may narrate their lives in this 
way: impression management, creating myths of identity and origin, dealing with 
trauma, negotiating bureaucracy, providing self-confidence, relating to others, finding a 
place for Kazakhstani life in a global culture and economy, creating new opportunities, 
and instilling public confidence in one’s abilities. Each of these reasons for narrating a 
story in a certain way is linked to their ability to negotiate uncertainty, to take control of 
unpredictable factors and adopt a level of agency that circumstances may not otherwise 
allow. However, as these public narratives are often at odds with an individual’s 
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experience, there is consequentially a societal awareness of the potential superficiality 
of such narratives, a fear further magnified by individuals’ awareness that they 
themselves are often actively reproducing them. In response to this, my informants 
found new narrative strategies to discuss their concerns outside of public narratives. 
 
Once I started to look for them, I began to see further examples of private offstage 
narratives. These were often closer to the surface in times of difficulty, seen in the 
example of the sel (Chapter 4) and with devaluation (Chapter 5), when public onstage 
narratives were disrupted to reveal private offstage uncertainties. The question that 
follows is: How were these private concerns discussed, and why were they not shared 
publicly? 
 
Turning my focus to these narratives of uncertainty, I draw out the threads of discussion 
that run through the main chapters of this thesis. I argue that the way in which my 
informants make sense of past change and the risk of future change is through the 
stories they tell: their narratives of uncertainty. This leaves one last question: What 
forms do these narratives of uncertainty take? In this final chapter, I investigate this 
question, discussing the example of rumour and examining how this narrative form has 
certain properties which allow my informants to move their discussion of uncertainty, 
normally restricted to private offstage contexts, into public onstage spheres.  
 
 
The Journey So Far 
 
In the introduction, I laid out my strategy for exploring the key themes of narrative, risk, 
and uncertainty in the context of a Central Asian urban field site. I also outlined my 
focus on understanding an understudied and under-theorised group in society: the young 
urban middle class. I traced the roots of a Soviet-era middle class, allowed to develop in 
Soviet society through an implicit ‘Big Deal’ through which Stalin allowed for a limited 
range of material rewards as part of a recognition of the role of a new cohort of 
industrial managers (Dunham, 1990). This precedence was expanded further under 
Brezhnev in what Millar (1985) describes as the ‘Little Deal’. I have followed Patico’s 
argument that there is no single post-Soviet middle class, and therefore consider this 
thesis a study of a post-Soviet middle class. Rather than focus on the way that a Soviet 
generation were forced to change and adapt, I bring my focus forward to understand a 
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generation who grew up in a post-Soviet society and who are now coming of age and 
establishing themselves as an important part of future urban life in Almaty. 
 
I offer an additional perspective to urban anthropology, considering the role of a young 
post-Soviet generation whose onstage narratives and presentation of self are driving a 
consumer boom in coffee shops, restaurants, and nightclubs—all of which are part of a 
modern identity for my young urban middle-class informants. Anthropologists have 
demonstrated the importance of narrative in offering people coherence when facing 
change or the risk of future change (Cruickshank, 2000; Ibañez-Tirado, 2015; Petryna, 
2003; Wheeler, 2016; Zonabend, 1993 [1989]). However, there is further opportunity 
for an ethnography of a Central Asian urban context that fully acknowledges the 
important insights available through the role of narrative in ongoing societal 
transformations in Kazakhstan. In the second part of the literature review, I argue that 
the anthropology of gossip and rumour provides tools that help us understand what 
happens outside public onstage transcripts (Besnier, 2009; Gluckman, 1963; Paz, 2009). 
Anthropologists of risk and uncertainty suggest that it is important to research both 
quotidian contexts and spectacular events (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Hoffman & 
Lubkemann, 2005); following this, I believe that risk and uncertainty are a consequence 
of social, cultural, and economic factors in addition to the direct threats posed by 
hazards. 
 
The urban field site is a broad construction, connected by the flow of goods, services, 
people, and information. In Chapter 3, I argue that carrying out fieldwork from three 
transect locations gave me an insight into the backgrounds of a heterogeneous urban 
middle class. In the narratives of the older generation, including the parents of my 
young middle-class informants, the present is seen as a time of relative stability in 
comparison to the significant change experienced in the past. For the younger 
generation, uncertainty is much closer to the surface, as their public narratives are 
focused on their present and future. For example, Anna was able to sculpt the onstage 
narrative of her own ethnic identity in her favour. She retold the story of a traumatic 
past, including the ambiguity of her family’s ethnic background, in a way that afforded 
her what she saw as greater opportunities in life. She emphasised her claim to Russian 
citizenship, which allowed her to get a Russian passport. Sasha’s father Mikhail 
provided an example of the narratives of an older generation who grew up during the 
time of the Soviet Union (see Chapters 3 and 6). Mikhail has used his onstage narrative 
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to reframe his life and justify the choices he has made to benefit his health, escape the 
pollution of the city, move to the countryside, and eat organic produce. Mikhail has 
created a new and stable present in opposition to the perceived risks he faced living in 
the centre of the city. In Chapter 3, I conclude that there are a range of onstage 
narratives presented in everyday life by my middle-class informants; furthermore, there 
are clear generational differences between the narratives of my older and younger 
informants. 
 
In Chapter 4, the coherence of everyday narratives in Almaty is shown to be vulnerable. 
Here, I explore how offstage uncertainties rise to the surface as a result of the disruptive 
flow of the Kargalinka River. Chapter 4 employs a cross-cutting transect to demonstrate 
how a sel hazard triggered a large-scale rupture in the routines and onstage narratives of 
my informants’ everyday lives, exposing uncertainty that is usually confined to private 
and offstage contexts. The state’s failure to provide information, alongside a lack of 
alternative communication channels, demonstrates the large scale of deep-rooted 
uncertainty in society. Chapter 4 also gives us our first insight into how my informants 
respond when facing immediate risks and uncertainty in public contexts—by searching 
for information through social networks of trusted friends and family when public 
information channels are found to be inoperative, unreliable, or lacking in detail. 
 
At this point in my thesis, it is clear that there is a distinct group in Almaty that 
approaches life in a unique way and has its own specific narratives, tropes, and 
vulnerabilities. Chapter 5 shows that this young urban middle class is united by the 
form and substance of their onstage narratives as internationally oriented, 
individualised, and ambitious. They exhibit a hybrid post-Soviet approach to risk, 
combining an ‘entrepreneurial ethic’ and a Soviet-era notion of state responsibility and 
support with a Western notion of transparency and a view of democratic values as 
important moral requirements in society (Yurchak, 2003, p.72). What separates this 
group from others in Kazakh society is a plethora of offstage concerns that are a result 
of their wide range of backgrounds. Influential factors, including ethnicity, gender, and 
family background, not only expose them to different risks, but also affect their ability 
to prepare and respond to them—an argument I take up in Chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 6 considers one of the variable categories of my young urban middle-class 
informants: their ethnicity. I have chosen ethnicity because it is a category through 
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which I can also discuss differences in religion, gender, and family background. I argue 
that the way that these different ethnicities are perceived in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, 
often as a result of the state’s nation-building agenda, frequently clashes with my 
informants’ middle-class way of life as put forward in their public onstage narratives. 
When my informants’ onstage narratives are threatened, they turn to their trusted social 
connections, yet they often find that they are distanced from their community members 
or are unable to draw upon support as a result of living a public lifestyle at odds with 
the values of that community. This brings us to the final thread of my argument: the role 
of rumour. This thread has shown itself in fleeting glimpses throughout the previous 
chapters, and in this final section I draw together these insights in order to understand 
the consequences of the way in which my young urban middle-class informants narrate 
their lives. When facing uncertainty, my informants look to rumour for information, 
confirmation of suspicions, or to express private concerns in a public context without 
the fear of retribution or of undermining their own onstage narratives. 
 
 
The Power of Rumour 
 
Rumours have appeared in my informants’ comments throughout this thesis. There were 
rumours that the anti-mudflow dam had failed; ‘whispers’ that there was a second flood; 
screams about the total destruction of the dam; rumours of the health effects of 
pollution; speculation over the government’s removal of streetlights in the Uighur 
neighbourhood; rumours that this neighbourhood would be ‘razed to the ground’ by the 
government; rumours that the government had built a mass grave for hundreds of 
thousands of people as preparation for a major earthquake, rumours that a hundred years 
after the last earthquake, there would be another. There are many other rumours that I 
recorded during my fieldwork but have not yet been mentioned: rumours of an 
infestation of poisonous spiders in the trees of Almaty that had come to the city in wood 
brought by rural migrants; comments that street-balloon sellers were vendors for illicit 
drugs and that President Nazarbayev was in poor health and would soon die; rumours 
about another devaluation of the currency linked with national holidays and the 
president’s birthday; public discussion of street graffiti; rumours that famous Kazakh 
rock musician ‘Viktor Tsoi is alive’ and conspiracy theories surrounding his death; 
gossip about which lecturers were tough markers and which were corruptible; and 
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rumours that everyone living in Almaty was susceptible to chronic headaches that 
disappeared for those who moved away. 
 
I am not the first to document the role of rumours in Kazakhstan, and these examples 
substantiate the importance of my own findings as evidence of a widespread and 
influential discursive practice across Kazakh society. While rumours are a phenomenon 
found throughout the world, in this thesis I show how they are used in a unique way in 
Kazakhstan. In her research on the topic of waste in Almaty, Catherine Alexander 
discusses her informants’ use of rumour to discuss the uncertainties they are facing in 
everyday life. In the context of the disposal of chemical waste from an industrial site in 
urban Almaty, Alexander describes how an unlined waste pit was rumoured to be 
leaching chemicals into the soil and groundwater supply (Alexander, 2009b, p. 13): 
‘Evil-smelling clouds of smoke from the occasional explosions on site would drift over 
the neighbouring suburbs. “The water tasted strange sometimes,” one ex-resident said, 
“sort of metallic, so we tried to boil it first. There were lots of people complaining about 
bronchial things―not public complaints, but we knew our neighbours’ children had the 
same sorts of illnesses as ours”’ (ibid.). In this example, rumours circulate concerning 
things out of the ordinary, such as the taste of the water or possible causes of illness. 
Those living in the area link these issues to the uncertainties surrounding the potential 
risks that local residents may be exposed to. As a result of residents having no way to 
confirm or deny their suspicions through official channels, these rumours have emerged. 
Importantly, because they are ‘not public complaints’, they circulate in offstage 
contexts; the local residents are protecting themselves from public criticism and 
potential escalation of tensions between them and the owners of the industrial site 
(ibid.). Crucially, these rumours circulate as a result of residents’ perception that they 
lack agency in reducing the risks they are exposed to.  
 
The rumours I have recorded share many similarities with Alexander’s example, 
including the rumoured construction of a mass grave in preparation for a major 
earthquake (discussed in Chapter 5). The scale of the grave’s estimated capacity to hold 
300,000 to 500,000 bodies, with a city population of 1.8 million, is testament to how 
both the potential scale of the seismic hazard and the consequences of the risk are 
perceived locally as severe and uncontrollable. Publicly challenging the state—for 
example, criticising its lack of preparation to avoid the deaths in the first place—is 
perceived by my informants to be a risky undertaking. My focus-group participants in 
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Chapter 5 discussed the corruption and fraud charges that were brought against media 
outlet Adam Bol after its journalists were understood to have spoken out against the 
government. These actions led to the collapse of the group as the government silenced 
public opposition. 
 
Rumours can also be used to cope with risk in other ways, such as scapegoating 
responsibility to avoid making accusations within a trusted community. William 
Wheeler (2016) provides an example of how rumours were used in his ethnographic 
study in the west of Kazakhstan near the Aral Sea, discussing one rumour that: 
 
kommersanty (businessmen) come to buy fish off poachers, and that the fish 
mysteriously disappears out of the region unprocessed. The provenance of these 
kommersanty varies—often they are said to come from Shymkent, the crime 
capital of Kazakhstan and source of all rumours about anything bad; sometimes 
from the Caspian or from Aqtöbe; and sometimes from abroad—from Russia or 
from Georgia (Wheeler, 2016, p. 232).  
 
The rumours Wheeler describes are concerned with the potential threat of lost revenue 
in the local area as unidentified businessmen profit from exploitation of the protected 
stocks of fish. Rather than place blame within the community or even the local area, the 
rumours form a narrative which externalises the threat, placing responsibility elsewhere. 
If we followed Gluckman’s argument that narratives can function to promote in-group 
cohesion, hence othering those from Shymkent and farther afield, these comments 
would constitute a form of gossip. However, this explanation misses some important 
subtleties in what is happening. The community is faced with a double bind. In the first 
potential scenario, these rumours reduce locals’ agency in addressing the issue by 
externalising the threat and relieving the feeling of uncertainty that someone whom they 
trust could be behind it. The second option is no better, however: locals would have to 
face the possibility that trusted social relations may be responsible, undermining group 
cohesion and increasing a feeling of uncertainty in everyday life. As Goffman argues, it 
is in the interests of all members of a group to keep the public performance going; one 
aspect of this is dealing with elements of life which are juxtaposed with the 
performance or threaten to derail or disrupt it (Goffman, 1959, p. 108). Rumours are a 
societal way to avoid breaking the fourth wall of public onstage performance, 
acknowledging the limitations of current narratives and exploring potential alternative 
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futures. In Wheeler’s example, rumours are a route through which public accusations 
can be avoided while providing the community with a topic and discursive space in 
which issues can be discussed. This example also illustrates how rumours are able to 
influence onstage and offstage narratives, shifting blame, externalising threats, and 
relieving uncertainty. With these potential uses in mind, I turn to how rumours are 
perceived by my young urban middle-class informants in Almaty as a way of making 
sense of change. 
 
Through a discussion of rumour in a focus group, my young urban middle-class 
informants contextualised their views, which helps us to understand how they perceive 
the role of rumour in society: 
 Arman: Personally for me, rumours have more power here in Almaty and in our 
post-Soviet Union countries than they have in the West. Our parents lived in a 
country with a much less individual approach and everybody needed to know 
everything about their neighbours. That is why rumours were considered as a 
source of credible information. And of course now we are in a different society; 
we are more individualist, but it is in our upbringing and still has influence on 
us. That’s why I think rumours are important. 
Arman was 22 years old when we spoke and a student at a state-funded university in 
Almaty. He makes a powerful point, arguing that rumours have a unique role in post-
Soviet contexts as a result of the experience of their parents’ generation during the 
Soviet era. He argues that the communal approach upon which Soviet society was 
organised necessitated a flow of information in local contexts that was not available in 
public spheres. There are several potential reasons for the importance of this offstage 
communication. It could have emerged out of fear of being reported to the secret police 
for denouncing the state; it could also have been a way of obtaining information when 
public narratives were limited in their scope or untrustworthy.  
 
I argue that in Almaty, these flows of information parallel those of the informal exchange 
networks, such as blat, that were primarily concerned with flows of goods and services 
(Makovicky & Henig, 2018, p. 35). Informal exchange networks were motivated by the 
need to access goods in an ‘economy of shortage’ (Kornai, 1980). As Ledeneva (2018, p. 
43) discusses, these informal exchange networks have evolved alongside wider societal 
changes. For example, blat has been increasingly monetised, replacing the moral 
 212
obligation of mutual indebtedness that ensured that favours were reciprocated. In post-
Soviet Kazakhstan, a different state-controlled shortage has emerged: a dearth of 
trustworthy information. Cultural strategies have been developed for obtaining and 
sharing information through rumour. These strategies are similar in form to networks 
which developed in response to a shortage of goods and services. Mutual indebtedness 
and trust in reciprocation of actions, the moral currency that these networks heavily relied 
upon during the Soviet era, are still influential today in the offstage discursive narratives 
that include information exchange through rumour. Arman’s comments help to explain 
how their parents’ generation influenced my informants in turn and became the route 
through which these cultural tools for accessing information were impressed on them 
during their upbringing. 
 
The concept of rumour is often considered alongside gossip, which Besnier describes as 
‘often regarded as a reprehensible activity to be avoided or feared’ (2009, p. 13). As such, 
it also has negative connotations with slander, misinformation, or moral degradation. 
However, the Oxford English Dictionary definition emphasises rumour as an ‘unverified 
or unconfirmed statement or report circulating in a community’ (OED 2019). This 
definition makes no comment on the validity of a claim, only that it is unverified. Arman 
suggests that in Almaty, rumours are considered a credible source of information. I argue 
that in some circumstances, my informants see information that is unverified and 
unconfirmed as an asset. The lack of verification breaks the information’s connection 
with its source, offering the source a degree of protection through anonymity. Anonymity 
also provides the rumour’s bearer with protection from blame or retribution that may 
have otherwise resulted from public criticism. Because it is not possible to verify the 
original source of unverified information contained in a rumour, its credibility is judged 
according to the degree to which the bearer of the rumour is trusted. Each person 
mediates the content of the rumour and passes it on only if they believe the rumour either 
contains some credibility or an important point for discussion. An exchange between 
Arman and Darya explores this further: 
 
Darya:  Can I ask? What if these rumours will reach you through your 
parents? What then? 
Arman:  You mean that... 
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Darya:  Well, you say that you trust your parents the most. But what if your 
parents will receive rumours from anywhere and tell these rumours 
to you?  
Arman:  OK. I’m not going to trust them. [Laughter] 
Darya:  But why? They are the closest circle? 
Arman:  There is a very important thing to consider who is the original 
source of the information. If my parents just heard it somewhere, 
they are not the original source.  
Darya:  What if they start spreading rumours? You would trust them? 
Arman:  They won’t.  
Darya:  OK. Sorry. But let’s just hypothetically assume that they will.  
Arman:  Just hypothetically, if they will, I will probably trust them. But you 
should understand, even if they tell me a rumour, they always 
indicate that this is a rumour. 
 
This discussion reveals a subtlety in the role of rumour. My informants critically appraise 
the information they receive; like other sources of information, discussed in Chapter 5, it 
is understood that there is always some motivation behind what is said. Darya was keen 
to understand the degree of power that Arman placed in rumours. Importantly, Arman’s 
response that his parents would ‘always indicate that this is a rumour’ tells us that 
rumours are understood as a distinct type of information that comes with their own 
culturally distinct ways of understanding, communicating, verifying, and reproducing 
them. 
 
 
Rumour in Action: Protest, History, and Public Action 
Aslan: Last year, before the 16th of December, our government heard from 
somewhere that students were preparing for a demonstration against our 
government. As a result, they asked every student who is not originally from 
Almaty to leave the city before the 16th of December.  
A final example from my data shows rumour in action. Aslan recounts a rumour that the 
government sent students home to avoid a protest—this rumour is itself about another 
rumour within the government that students were organising a protest against it. Through 
a discussion of this example with my young informants, we can see the power of rumour 
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to act not only as a discursive tool they use to reflect on their offstage uncertainties, but 
also as a threat to the government’s stability, prompting them to take action.  
 
The power of this rumour is a consequence of historical events in Kazakhstan that have 
triggered changes in the past and continue to impact everyday life today. The threat of 
recurring historical protests, understood to be formative in Kazakhstan’s national history, 
demonstrates the unique context in which my young informants live in Almaty. Protests 
on 16 December 1986, which have come to be known as Zheltoqsan (named after the 
month of December in Kazakh), were a turning point that heralded a change in dominant 
public narratives of the time, both official and unofficial. Protesters took to the streets of 
Almaty to voice their objections to Gorbachev’s appointment of Gennady Kolbin (an 
ethnic Russian) to replace Dinmukhamed Kunaev (an ethnic Kazakh) as First Secretary 
of the Party in Kazakhstan (Alexander, 2009b). The event is still ‘shrouded in mystery’, 
with little official information on what occurred: a police shutdown of the protests was 
heavy-handed, with many arrested, frozen by water in the winter temperatures, or killed 
by police (ibid., p. 11). The consequences of this protest became the subject of rumour in 
Almaty; Catherine Alexander quotes one of her informants as ‘whispering [to her] that 
thousands and thousands of young Kazakhs had been murdered by the police and dumped 
in a pit outside the city’ (ibid.). Protest was a rare occurrence in the Soviet Union; the 
potency of these events was accompanied by a wave of public uprising and discontent 
which led to further incidents, including the fall of the Berlin Wall, and climaxed in the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Nazarbayev’s government perceived a repeat of these 
events as too great a threat to its own position of political dominance and ability to 
control official public narratives and so, in 2015, it took action to preserve the status quo. 
 
There is a precedent for the government’s actions in 2015, and the Kazakh government 
has taken action in the past to stop protests against it. During Nazarbayev’s time as 
president of Kazakhstan, the government has taken an overbearing approach to 
controlling public protest. This includes a notorious incident in which police violently 
shut down state oil-worker protests in the town of Zhanaozen in the west of 
Kazakhstan—this also happened on 16 December, but in 2011. Police opened fire on 
protesters, killing or ‘disappearing’ an unverified number of protesters. Protests in 
Almaty in recent years have also been met with a strong police presence; protesters have 
been arrested en masse and swiftly bundled into police vans before any large crowds have 
been able to amass. Achilov, writing in 2015 about the previous 10 years, reported that 
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‘Kazakh officials have been systematically restricting and preempting all venues for 
collective demonstrations through strict security measures’ (Achilov, 2015, p. 710). 
Aslan, whose comments opened this section, described his version of events in 2015, 
which tally with Achilov’s assessment of the situation. Aslan described how the 
government responded to a rumour:  
 
Aslan: The government asked the university to take action. The university then 
brought forward the dates of our midterms and our finals. They even called some 
of us and said, like, ‘I know that you are from another city—where are you now? 
Students shouldn’t be in the city now!’  
 
Aslan’s comments suggest that the government was able to exert its influence on 
universities and was motivated by the rumour to ensure that no demonstrations could take 
place. According to Aslan, the government did this by preventing students from staying 
in the city during the holidays. My young urban middle-class informants’ discussion of 
these rumours about government actions in 2015 is a way for them to explore their 
offstage uncertainties regarding their ability to protest publicly and the potential force the 
state would use to stop them doing so.  
 
Islam:   In reality, I think nobody was preparing for the protests. 
Darya:   But everyone knew that all of the students would be sent out of the city 
in order to avoid the tensions. 
Aslan:   Maybe it was because of that historic event of the 16th of December. 
What year was it—’90? ’91? 
Everyone:  ’86!! [Laughter] 
Aslan:   I’m bad at history, sorry. And because of that event, somebody got an 
idea that students will do it again. 
Alma:    But still, what is the reason? 
Darya:  I don’t know. Our government is just afraid. 
Islam:   Just because it was a rumour in the government, they’ve decided to 
keep themselves safe. 
 
Here, my informants indicate that historical events provided a basis for these rumours. 
My young informants’ discussion of rumours—those about the government’s actions as 
well as those that may have prompted the government to react in the first place—provide 
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a platform upon which different ideas are sounded out between trusted social relations in 
the private space of a university meeting room. These informants understand that their 
generation is a potential threat to the government; in turn, the government is concerned 
enough to act in order to avoid a potential rupture in which offstage uncertainties would 
break through into public contexts in the disruptive form of protest on the streets of 
Almaty. The government operates with similar onstage performances as my informants—
in this case, a narrative of stability and security—and these rumoured protests were seen 
to have the potential to disrupt these narratives. 
 
In this chapter, rumours have been shown to be more than simply a discursive space for 
offstage reflection. In the case of Almaty, rumours were influential enough that actions 
were taken in response to them. This was the case for both members of the public and the 
government. The government does its best to ensure that private concerns are not able to 
break through into public contexts in the form of protests that could destabilise their 
official onstage narratives. While my informants employ a range of strategies to make 
sense of change, their use of rumour goes one step further and provides a tool for 
introducing and discussing these narratives of uncertainty in public contexts. 
 
 
Afterword: The Unpredictability of Change, Surprising Developments,  
and New Freedoms? 
 
My last visit to Kazakhstan was in 2017, and much has changed since carrying out my 
fieldwork. The unpredictability of change continues to be a central concern for my 
informants in Almaty. There is a glimmer of hope that there may be new freedoms for the 
young urban middle class, but this is a story which is still being told. This research is one 
contribution to an ongoing project of understanding how the young urban middle class in 
Almaty make sense of change in their social, economic, and cultural lives. 
 
In March 2019, then–78-year-old president Nursultan Nazarbayev stepped down after 
having presided over the country since independence. In this unexpected move, 
Nazarbayev was once again able to take control of public onstage narratives surrounding 
his potential succession. During my fieldwork, multiple informants shared a rumour with 
me that Nazarbayev was in ill health. This rumour was linked to uncertainty surrounding 
the future of the president and the country; at the time, there was no clear route for a 
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succession of power. My informants were worried about potential political upheaval, and 
discussing Nazarbayev’s health served as an analogy to reflect on not just the president’s 
future, but also that of the country. 
 
By naming Kassym-Jomart Tokayev as his successor, Nazarbayev was able to maintain 
his influence by taking up a new symbolic position, stating in a televised broadcast that 
he would retain ‘major powers to determine the country’s external and domestic policies’ 
(BBC, 19th March 2019). Following the succession of power, Tokayev passed a 
resolution renaming Astana, the capital, to Nur-Sultan in honour of Nazarbayev’s 
influence in making the city what it is today. Astana, the ‘city of the future’, slips into 
history just as its former manifestation as Tselinograd, the city of an industrialised Soviet 
future, did before it (Laszczkowski, 2016, p. 105). While ensuring that Nazarbayev 
retains influence and cements his place in Kazakhstan’s history books, this succession of 
power and the renaming of Astana simultaneously reinforce the turbulence and 
unpredictability of public life in Kazakhstan. 
 
Yet there is some hope for my young urban middle-class informants. On 30 August 2019, 
a small group of protesters from the recently established Oyan, Qazaqstan (Wake Up, 
Kazakhstan) organisation held a protest in Almaty on the National Constitution Day. The 
group called for reform of the current political system to create a new parliamentary 
democracy (Gordeyeva, 30 August 2019). The police did not shut down this protest or 
arrest protesters. Olzhas Auyezov, a political journalist writing for Reuters, reported that 
since his appointment, Tokayev has ‘invited some [...] prominent government critics to 
discuss future reforms at a special council and has shown greater lenience towards 
dissident groups such as Oyan, Qazaqstan’. A defining feature of Oyan, Qazaqstan is the 
age of its members, most of whom are in their late teens and 20s. Although it is difficult 
to say at this early stage, it is possible that under Tokayev, this young generation are to be 
granted public freedoms that were denied to their parents’ generation. Perhaps this 
change in leadership will aid the young urban middle class in their efforts to make sense 
of the change they face—rather than having to resort to rumour and rely on private 
offstage sources for information, the public sphere may become a place for open debate 
through an uncensored media, a democratic and representative parliament, and peaceful 
public protest.  
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